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ABSTRACT 
 
The thesis addresses a topic that has been extensively debated in the competi-
tion law practice, namely its interface with the various paradigms of intellectual 
property rights. As this especially involves innovation-driven sectors, the research 
has focused on the interplay between competition policies and patent laws in the 
pharmaceutical industry, which calls into question a further level of human rights-
based considerations when trying to strike a balance between the conflicting inter-
ests at stake. 
The inquiry considers the outlined topic primarily from a European perspec-
tive, by carrying out a thorough analysis of case law and practice of both the Eu-
ropean Union and Member States. However, given that the first theoretical studies 
and judicial decisions on these issues have actually emerged in the legal system of 
the United States, the relevant case law and literature is also taken into account in 
order to assess difference and similarities between the US and the EU approaches. 
In the first chapter the scope and purpose of the thesis is presented. Then, the 
main features of the economic and regulatory framework underlying the pharma-
ceutical sector in the EU and the US are specifically dealt with in order to provide 
a general background for the subsequent assessment. 
The second chapter addresses the relevant case law concerning the two main 
competition law infringements, restrictive agreements and abuses of dominance, 
as emerged from the practice in the EU, the US and the Member States (in par-
ticular, the UK and Italy). 
The problematic issues arising from the analysed case law are then thoroughly 
assessed in the third chapter. Indeed, many questions emerge regarding the proper 
standard to structure the antitrust scrutiny in this patent-intensive sector, where 
pharmaceutical companies face high investments in research and development and 
try to put in place strategies aimed at extending the patent protection on their 
products. 
Finally, some broader conclusions are drawn on the overall balancing between 
the various sets of rules that characterise the industry at issue, namely competi-
tion, patent systems and regulation. 
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FOREWORD 
 
Technologies are the drivers of the modern world. Many strategic industrial 
sectors are indeed developing by means of innovative tools that heavily rely on 
proprietary technologies and thus involve, to different extents, the various para-
digms of intellectual property (IP). These exclusionary rights are increasingly be-
coming the substantial asset on which undertakings are measuring their market 
power. As a result, the protection of long-term incentives to innovate is a key as-
pect of the current economic policies at the global level. 
Should competition law play a role in this context? One could reasonably argue 
that it is up to IP legislations to regulate the procurement and use of IPRs applied 
to these new technologies. But what if said legislation bodies are not be able to 
keep pace with innovation? Or what if companies should capitalise on their IPRs 
for purposes that fall outside the scope of legitimate business justifications? Com-
petition law practice is therefore faced with a whole new set of challenges, which 
require the traditional legal standards of anticompetitive restraints to be accom-
modated within these technology-intensive industries. 
From these and other similar questions stemmed the idea of focusing the re-
search project on the particular perspective of competition policy interfacing with 
IP laws. More precisely, the chosen viewpoint is the relationship between compe-
tition and patent law in a specific IPRs-driven sector, which is the pharmaceutical 
industry. Here the above-mentioned technologies refer to a peculiar category of 
“products”, namely medicines and treatments, that further call into question hu-
man rights-based considerations such as the right to health and fair access to ther-
apies. 
With regard to the geographical scope of the thesis, the inquiry considers the 
outlined topic primarily from a European perspective, taking into account case 
law and practice of both the European Union and its Member States. However, as 
American scholars have actually paved the way towards a theoretical framework 
of the interface between antitrust and IPRs, and US courts have first assessed its 
practical consequences, a thorough review of the relevant case law from across 
the Atlantic is also carried out. 
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The thesis is structured as follows. The first chapter outlines its scope and pur-
pose in order to set the overall scene and provide an introduction into the broader 
context of the patent-antitrust interface. Then, the remainder of the chapter ad-
dresses the main features of the economic and regulatory framework that underlie 
the pharmaceutical sector in both the EU and the US, paying particular attention 
to common approaches as well as divergences. 
The second chapter discusses a selection of recent cases as emerged from the 
case law of antitrust enforcement authorities and courts. To this end, as already 
mentioned, the analysed decisions come from EU, US and national legal systems, 
thus presenting a wide range of examples from different perspectives. 
In the third chapter the issues arising from the analysed cases are thoroughly 
assessed. In particular, the two fundamental categories of anticompetitive con-
ducts as scrutinised in the decisions are addressed, as well as that resulting from 
the combination of restrictive agreements and abuse of dominance, which appears 
as a peculiar infringement within the pharmaceutical sector. 
Finally, concluding remarks are proposed, more in general, as to the current 
balance between the overlapping sets of laws that characterise the industry in 
question, namely competition, patent systems and regulation. 
Of course, the implications of such a complex subject matter spread far and 
wide, and the present work only aims at offering a few glimpses into the most 
compelling issues that antitrust practice has currently been tackling as regards its 
intersection with modern technologies. Indeed, the possibility of being constantly 
confronted with new challenges is also what makes such topics most interesting 
for scholars and practitioners alike, and inspires them to develop their research 
and work even further. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The introductory chapter of the thesis will first present its scope and purpose, 
explaining the reasons that led the author to choose the main topics and to take in-
to account a comparative perspective of the EU and the US legal systems and case 
law. 
Preliminarily, the first part of the chapter will explore the broader topic of the 
debated nature of IPRs and their progressive integration into the human rights dis-
course, given their undeniable aims of protecting the interests of creators, inven-
tors and artists, and contributing to the innovation and progress in society. 
Following these considerations, the choice of a dynamic outlook into the mani-
fold implications of IP regimes will be illustrated. Indeed, the work focuses on the 
complex legal questions surrounding the intersection between patent law and 
competition law: as is understandably very frequent in innovation-intensive sec-
tors, undertakings capitalise on their legitimate IPRs to strenghten and expand 
their businesses, and this behaviour increasingly attracts antitrust scrutiny, which 
is faced with new issues that depart from the practice of other fields of action of 
competition policies. Among those sectors, a specific one will be further selected, 
which is the pharmaceutical industry. In this regard, the above-mentioned legal 
questions arising from the overlap between patent protection and antitrust need to 
strike an additional balance with the fundamental right to health that represents 
the cross-sectional aim of both bodies of law in this industry. 
The second part of the chapter will then address two sets of preliminary con-
siderations that make up a common background to which the following chapters 
refer. More precisely, both the economic and the regulatory framework that dis-
tinguish the pharmaceutical sector will be outlined, in order to provide a general 
overview of the most relevant notions and legal tools recurring in the case law 
analysis and then in the critical assessment. 
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1. SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF THE THESIS 
1.1. A PECULIAR HUMAN RIGHT: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
 
In the general understanding of human rights, IPRs do not immediately come 
to mind when referring to a right possessing the common features of inalienability 
and universality that characterise such a notion. Nonetheless, they have been rec-
ognised at the international level within various catalogues of human rights, even 
though their formal acknowledgment has not always been supported by unani-
mous views on the issue. The choice of focusing on a right whose nature among 
the wider category of fundamental rights is still debated thus seems worthy of a 
more detailed inquiry. 
Even in the first international legal instrument on human rights, namely the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights1 (hereinafter, also UDHR), a principle 
that recalls the concept of intellectual property is enshrined in its Art. 27(2). Ac-
cording to this provision, «[e]veryone has the right to the protection of the moral 
and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production 
of which he is the author». It is remarkable that already in 1948 the drafters of the 
Declaration considered it worth encompassing such a right among those that were 
universally recognised as human rights. At a first reading it appears that the literal 
formulation better adapts to the concept of copyright protection, but it may actual-
ly provide a human rights’ basis for a broader framework of IPRs including indus-
trial property. In fact, the reference to «scientific production» supports the claim 
that the right to protection of moral and material interests in intellectual creations 
also extends to individual inventions regulated for instance by patent laws2. 
                                                        
1 Resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, 217A (III). Universal Declara-
tion on Human Rights, 10 December 1948, A/Res/3/217A, available at www.un-documents.net. As 
is well known, the Declaration was conceived by its drafters as a common minimum standard of 
human rights protection for all nations of the world. Even though it has no binding force, it none-
theless collects rights and principles that are universally deemed to amount to customary interna-
tional law. 
2 In the literature there is however no consensus on this broader interpretation: among those 
who support it, see P.K. YU, Ten Common Questions About Intellectual Property and Human 
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At the international level a further reference comes from the 1966 International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights3 (hereinafter, also ICESCR), 
whose Art. 15(1)(c) resembles the above mentioned provision of the UDHR, lay-
ing down the right «[t]o benefit from the protection of the moral and material in-
terests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is 
the author». 
Even though it possesses binding force, the prescriptive extent of this provision 
is not immediately understandable and it was therefore interpreted by the Com-
mittee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in its General Comment No. 174. 
The interpretative body of the Covenant first distinguished the human rights as-
pects related to the protection of interests in intellectual creations that fall within 
the guarantees of Art. 15(1)(c) from other legal entitlements recognized in IP sys-
tems, which are granted by national or international legislations and limited in 
both time and scope. Indeed, the fundamental right protected by the ICESCR aims 
at safeguarding «the personal link between authors and their creations and be-
tween peoples, communities, and other groups and their collective cultural herit-
age, as well as their basic material interests which are necessary to enable authors 
to enjoy an adequate standard of living», while IPRs «primarily protect business 
and corporate interests and investments»5. 
                                                        
Rights, in 23 Georgia State University Law Review, 2007, pp. 709-753, at pp. 721-726; among 
those commentators who do not share the view of patent protection to be grounded in fundamental 
concepts such as those of human rights, see for example R.C. DREYFUSS, Patents and Human 
Rights: Where is the Paradox?, in New York University School of Law Legal and Economics Re-
search Papers, 2006, No. 38, available at http://ssrn.com. 
3 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by the United Nations General 
Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, in United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 
993, p. 3 ff., available at http://treaties.un.org. It entered into force on 3 January 1976. 
4 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 17 
(2005), The right of everyone to benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests re-
sulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author (article 15, 
paragraph 1(c), of the Covenant), 12 January 2006, E/C.12/GC/17, available at www.refworld.org. 
5 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 17 
(2005), cited above, para. 2. 
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The General Comment then focused on the obligations imposed on State par-
ties to guarantee the full realisation of the right at issue, which generally comprise 
obligations to respect, to protect and fulfil, and on the actions and omissions 
amounting to their violation. Finally, it acknowledged the relevant role also 
played by international organisations, institutions and other non-State actors in 
taking measures to contribute to the effective implementation of Art. 15(1)(c) of 
the ICESCR6. 
The outlined international framework thus confirms a possible integration into 
the human rights discourse of rights that are an expression of interests pertaining 
to the broader concept of IPRs, and the consequential creation of possible syner-
gies and even tensions between the two sets of rights. However, the different lev-
els of protection between human rights-related aspects of IPRs and the national 
and international legal tools concerning IPRs must also be borne in mind, as clear-
ly stated in the General Comment No. 177. 
Moving to the regional level, the European Convention on Human Rights 
(hereinafter, also ECHR) does not contain an express provision similar to Art. 
27(2) of the UDHR or Art. 15(1)(c) of the ICESCR. Nonetheless, the European 
Court of Human Rights (hereinafter, also ECtHR) has recognised a formal refer-
ence for the protection of IPRs within the scope of Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the 
ECHR that establishes the right to property, subject to limits and conditions in its 
exercise8. 
                                                        
6 In this regard the Comment expressly mentions United Nations agencies such as the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the 
Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the World Health Organization 
(WHO), as well as other international actors such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), which 
are all «called upon to intensify their efforts to take into account human rights principles and obli-
gations in their work concerning the protection of moral and material benefits resulting from one’s 
scientific, literary and artistic productions» (UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 17 (2005), cited above, paras. 55-57). 
7 For further comments on the provisions of the UDHR and the ICESCR see M. SSENYONJO, 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law, Oxford-Portland, 2016, pp. 640-642. 
8 For the sake of completeness, Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1 («Protection of property») provides as 
follows: «[e]very natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. 
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The relevant case law is quite settled in this regard, as the first decision dates 
back to 1990. Namely, the European Commission of Human Rights delivered a 
decision on the admissibility of an application brought by Smith Kline and French 
Laboratories Ltd. against the Netherlands concerning the grant of a compulsory 
licence to a competing company in respect of a pharmaceutical patent held by the 
applicant9. The complaint alleged a breach of Art. 6, of Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1 
and of Art. 13 of the ECHR, but the Commission declared the application admis-
sible only with regard to the first and the last provisions. For the purposes of this 
inquiry, however, it is worth stressing that a patent granted by a national legisla-
tion (i.e., under Dutch law) was deemed as «fall[ing] within the scope of the term 
“possessions” in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1)»10, even though no interfer-
ence with the exclusive rights of the patentee was found in the case at hand. Other 
decisions followed this precedent and considered for instance copyrights11, as well 
as patents again12, to be included into a broader understanding of the right to 
property protected by the ECHR. 
                                                        
No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the condi-
tions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provi-
sions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems 
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the 
payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties». 
9  European Commission of Human Rights, decision of 4 October 1990, application no. 
12633/87, Smith Kline and French Laboratories v. the Netherlands, 
CE:ECHR:1990:1004DEC001263387. The case law of both the European Commission and the 
Court of Human Rights referred to in the present work is available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int. 
10 Ibid. 
11  European Commission of Human Rights, decision of 14 January 1998, application no. 
24563/94, Aral, Tekin and Aral v. Turkey, CE:ECHR:1998:0114DEC002456394, regarding a dis-
pute related to commercial rights over artistic materials designed by the applicants. 
12 European Commission of Human Rights, decision of 9 September 1998, application no. 
38817/97, Lenzing AG v. United Kingdom, CE:ECHR:1998:0909DEC003881797, concerning the 
application made by Lenzing in civil proceedings before the British courts in which it had sought 
to bring about changes in the national legal system for registering patents. Here the Commission 
held that there had been no violation of Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR, since the applicant 
was given an opportunity to present its claims regarding the patent before a court having full juris-
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The ECtHR, more recently, directly adjudicated a case concerning IPRs, pre-
cisely the application for registration of the «Budweiser» trademark in Portugal 
that was subject to litigation between the US company Anheuser-Busch Inc. (the 
brewer of Budweiser beer) and the rival Czech company Budejovicky Budvar. 
The latter opposed Anheuser-Busch’s application citing its prior registration of an 
appellation of origin of «Budweiser Bier», which was filed pursuant to a 1968 
agreement between Portugal and Czechoslovakia for the protection of indications 
of source, appellations of origin and other geographical and similar designations. 
A dispute ensued before the Portuguese courts, with the Supreme Court of Portu-
gal ultimately ruling in favour of the Czech company. Consequently, Anheuser-
Busch applied before the ECtHR alleging an infringement of its right to the peace-
ful enjoyment of its possessions protected by Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the 
ECHR, and claiming the Supreme Court’s decision amounted to an expropriation 
preventing the applicant from obtaining the registration of its trademark. The Sec-
ond Section of the ECtHR heard the case and held that, while a trademark surely 
falls within the scope of the above-mentioned provision, «this is so only after final 
registration of the mark, in accordance with the rules in force in the State con-
cerned»13. In the present case Anheuser-Busch was rather the holder of «a condi-
tional right»14 that had been extinguished since it failed to meet the condition that 
it did not infringe third-party rights. Therefore, Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1 was not 
applicable and the rulings given by the Portuguese courts could not have consti-
                                                        
diction over the subject matter. In relation to patents it is worth mentioning that in a previous in-
stance, however, the European Commission of Human Rights held that an application for a patent 
that had been rejected by the competent national authority fell outside the protection granted by 
Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1, because the applicant company «was denied a protected intellectual prop-
erty right but was not deprived of its existing property» (decision of 15 October 1993, application 
no. 19589/92, British American Tobacco Ltd. v. the Netherlands, para. 73; the full-text of the deci-
sion can be found in the subsequent Commission report of 19 May 1994, 
CE:ECHR:1994:0519REP001958992). 
13 European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), judgment of 11 October 2005, applica-
tion no. 73049/01, Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, CE:ECHR:2005:1011JUD007304901, para. 
52. 
14 Ibid., para. 50. 
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tuted an interference with the applicant’s right. The US company later requested 
the referral of the case to the Grand Chamber of the Court, which delivered its fi-
nal judgment on 11 January 200715. With regard to the core issue of whether an 
application for registration of a trademark could fall within the meaning of «pos-
sessions» safeguarded by Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1, the Grand Chamber reached a 
different conclusion and stated that Anheuser-Busch actually «owned a set of pro-
prietary rights – linked to its application for the registration of a trade mark – that 
were recognised under Portuguese law, even though they could be revoked under 
certain conditions»16. Having established that the legal position as applicant for 
trademark registration came within the scope of the provision in question, the 
Grand Chamber examined whether there had been interference with the appli-
cant’s right and established that the Portuguese Supreme Court’s decision was not 
affected by elements of arbitrariness or unreasonableness. It thus affirmed that 
there had been no violation of Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1 in the case at hand. 
From this brief review of ECtHR case law, a different approach to the debated 
interference between IPRs and human rights can be therefore inferred17, which 
needs to be distinguished from the protection provided by the international legal 
instruments mentioned at the beginning of this section. Indeed, within the ECHR 
framework, IPRs are regarded as fundamental rights, in contrast to the rights pro-
vided for in the UDHR and the ICESCR that have a narrower scope pertaining to 
the safeguarding of the moral and material interests of creators over their produc-
tion, which has to be further implemented by State parties and international organ-
                                                        
15 European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber), judgment of 11 January 2007, applica-
tion no. 73049/01, Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, CE:ECHR:2007:0111JUD007304901. For a 
comment on the case see, among others, K.D. BEITER, The Right to Property and the Protection of 
Interests in Intellectual Property – A Human Rights Perspective on the European Court of Human 
Rights’ Decision in Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, in International Review of Intellectual Prop-
erty and Competition Law, 2008, pp. 714-721. 
16 European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber), judgment of 11 January 2007, An-
heuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, para. 78. 
17 For a comprehensive analysis see L.R. HELFER, The New Innovation Frontier? Intellectual 
Property and the European Court of Human Rights, in 49 Harvard International Law Journal, 
2008, pp. 1-52. 
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isations. Moreover, it must be taken into account that in these cases the applicants 
alleging an infringement of their right under Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1 were corpo-
rations, and not individuals. The broad subjective scope of the provision in ques-
tion stems directly from its wording, which refers to «every natural or legal per-
son». Still it is worth stressing it in this context where corporate IPRs may enjoy 
protection under the ECHR18. 
IPRs have then found a definitive recognition in the human rights framework 
thanks to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, whose Art. 17(2) states that 
«[i]ntellectual property shall be protected». In spite of its plain wording, the inter-
pretation of such a provision is rather controversial. The main argument used to 
support the separate mentioning of IP from the general right to property laid down 
by Art. 17(1) is the considerable expansion of EU law in this field, especially 
through secondary legislation19. The formulation of Art. 17(2) is however peculi-
ar, as it departs from the standard of human rights provisions that are usually in-
troduced with the words «everyone has the right to», and makes no reference to 
the limited nature of the right nor to any restrictions in its exercise, contrary to pa-
ra. 1 and its counterpart in the ECHR. In this regard, the accompanying docu-
ments of the Charter have nonetheless specified that «[t]he guarantees laid down 
in paragraph 1 shall apply as appropriate to intellectual property»20. The commen-
tators have therefore argued for a limited impact of the provision at issue, which 
appears, at best, to «point out the specificity of IP in comparison to the general 
right to property»21. 
                                                        
18 This aspect has indeed raised some doubts as to its compatibility in a human rights frame-
work: in this sense see P.K. YU, Ten Common Questions, cited above, pp. 728-730. 
19 See, among others, EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, Commen-
tary of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, June 2006, pp. 168-169, avail-
able at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights. For an overview of the relevant EU second-
ary legislation regarding IPRs in the pharmaceutical sector, see infra, in this Chapter, Section 
2.2.1. 
20 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, OJ C 303 of 14 December 
2007, pp. 17-35, at p. 23. 
21 C. GEIGER, Intellectual Property Shall Be Protected?! – Article 17(2) of the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights of the European Union: a Mysterious Provision with an Unclear Scope, in Euro-
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In light of the above, some considerations can be made. Indeed, a progressive 
interaction between human rights and IPRs cannot be overlooked. While the two 
bodies of law still pursue different aims and develop within separate legislative 
frameworks, it is also true that IP (or, at least, some of its forms) does possess a 
human rights basis that needs to be taken into account, for example, when as-
sessing the scope of a certain IPR, or determining the boundaries of its legitimate 
exercise. For these reasons, a «coexistence approach», as proposed at the interna-
tional level22, seems a convincing theory in order to develop a mutually support-
ive relationship that promotes both innovation and access, and ultimately a gen-
eral increase of human welfare23. As will be explained later in this introductory 
chapter, this view is particularly appropriate to examine the complex issues aris-
ing from the exercise of patent protection within the pharmaceutical sector, which 
constitutes the material field of inquiry of this thesis. 
  
                                                        
pean Intellectual Property Review, 2009, pp. 113-117, at p. 116, who particularly criticises the 
«badly-drafted» provision as it could ultimately «contribute to amplifying the crisis of legitimacy 
that IP is currently facing across Europe» (at p. 117). 
22 See, for example, the following reports drafted by the UN Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC), Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights: Intellectual property rights and human rights. Report of the Secretary-General, 14 
June 2001, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/12; The impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of In-
tellectual Property Rights on human rights. Report of the High Commissioner, 27 June 2001, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13; Intellectual property rights and human rights. Report of the Secretary-
General, 3 July 2001, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/12/Add.1, all available at http://ap.ohchr.org. 
23 It is not the only theory elaborated in this regard: the opposite approach viewing IPRs and 
human rights as being in fundamental conflict has also been proposed. On the issue see further 
L.R. HELFER, Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or Coexistence?, in 5 Minnesota 
Intellectual Property Review, 2003, pp. 47-61. 
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1.2. A DYNAMIC PERSPECTIVE: 
THE INTERFACE BETWEEN COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW 
 
The regulation of IPRs has not only undergone a development in its substantial 
aspects that spanned across several centuries, starting already in the Middle Ages, 
but has also extended its effects to many other legal fields, from civil to criminal 
law, from trade to international relations, as well as to economic policies. For the 
purposes of a scientific inquiry it thus seems particularly interesting to focus on 
one of those dynamic “interferences” of the IP regimes, namely that regarding pa-
tent law and competition law24, for the reasons proposed below. 
In the present technology-driven world, the importance of patent systems can-
not be overstated. Patents have become essential assets for large-capitalised mul-
tinational corporations, as well as smaller undertakings and start-ups, yet their le-
gal framework has not always been consistent with every development in the in-
novation process, especially with regard to certain industrial sectors such as tech-
nologies and life sciences. The existing legal tools are in fact faced with new pa-
tent-related issues (just to name a few: patent thickets, strategic patenting, patent 
                                                        
24 This perspective has attracted much attention in both EU and US specialised literature. For 
example and without exhaustivity, the following works can be mentioned: V. KORAH, The inter-
face between intellectual property and antitrust: The European experience, in 69 Antitrust Law 
Journal, 2002, pp. 801-839; G. GHIDINI, Collisione? Integrazione? Appunti sulla intersection fra 
diritti di proprietà intellettuale e disciplina(e) della concorrenza, in Mercato concorrenza regole, 
2005, pp. 247-272; and by the same Author, Innovation, Competition and Consumer Welfare in 
Intellectual Property Law, Cheltenham-Northampton, 2010; H. HOVENKAMP, M.D. JANIS, M.A. 
LEMLEY, C.R. LESLIE, IP and Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual 
Property Law, 2nd ed., Austin, 2010; S. ANDERMAN, H. SCHMIDT, EU Competition Law and Intel-
lectual Property Rights. The Regulation of Innovation, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2011; G. CAGGIANO, G. 
MUSCOLO, M. TAVASSI (eds.), Competition Law and Intellectual Property. A European Perspec-
tive, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2012; and more recently M. TODINO, Antitrust rules and Intellectual 
Property Rights in the EU and the US – Towards convergence?, in Italian Antitrust Review, 2014, 
No. 2, pp. 25-40; H. HOVENKAMP, Antitrust and the Patent System: A Reexamination, in 76 Ohio 
State Law Journal, 2015, pp. 467-564; G. GHIDINI, Profili evolutivi del diritto industriale, Milano, 
2015, especially pp. 411-487; A. DEVLIN, Antitrust and Patent Law, Oxford, 2016. 
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hold-ups) that have proven difficult to regulate. This phenomenon, together with 
the inherent tension between the exclusionary character of patents – which direct-
ly finds its basis in the above-mentioned recognition of the human rights nature of 
IPRs – and their concurrent aim to promote further innovation, has led to a pro-
gressive overlap with competition and market regulation policies. At first sight, 
these two sets of law appear to stand in stark contrast to one another, as one has in 
mind the patent paradigm’s goal to increase dynamic efficiency and the principle 
of static efficiency underlying a system of free and undistorted competition25. 
From a more comprehensive point of view, there is however a concurrent back-
ground of social-welfare objectives that points towards a convergence between the 
two legal fields26. 
This framework of reconciliation should nevertheless not be overestimated to 
the extent that it can aid resolution to most of today’s questions arising from the 
patent/antitrust interface. It is true that the most pressing issues revolve around the 
continuous attempt to balance the conflicting souls of patent law and competition 
within the overarching aim of pursuing the highest level of consumer welfare and 
innovation. Yet, the answers to determine the boundaries of the two bodies of law 
are necessarily provisional and provided on a case-by-case basis. 
Bearing in mind these general considerations, it is useful to examine in more 
detail the evolving trends developed among enforcement agencies and courts 
when called upon to rule on cases involving the intersection between patent law 
and antitrust. The overview considers the two most important competition law re-
                                                        
25 Quoting from the 1981 judgment delivered by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 
SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, at 1203, which summarizes the tension well: «[t]he 
conflict between the antitrust and patent laws arises in the methods they embrace that were de-
signed to achieve reciprocal goals. While the antitrust laws proscribe unreasonable restraints of 
competition, the patent laws reward the inventor with a temporary monopoly that insulates him 
from competitive exploitation of his patented art». All US decisions cited in the present work are 
available at Westlaw database (www.westlaw.com). 
26 This common background is actually not limited to the patent system, but informs all IP par-
adigms. 
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gimes worldwide, namely the EU and the US legal systems, which also comprise 
the main viewpoints of the whole thesis. 
The more traditional approach has moved along the patent-scope narrative, ac-
cording to which any conduct falling within the scope of a patent’s claims shall be 
immunised from antitrust scrutiny. In sum, it is a matter of ruling whether the 
challenged restraint lay within the patent grant or unlawfully sought to extend that 
scope. In the US system this doctrine already traces back to decisions from the 
first half of the XX century. One of those where the Supreme Court best ex-
pressed the theory, namely Ethyl Gasoline in 194027, it held that «[t]he patent law 
confers on the patentee a limited monopoly, the right or power to exclude all oth-
ers from manufacturing, using or selling his invention. (...) The extent of that right 
is limited by the definition of his invention, as its boundaries are marked by the 
specifications and claims of the patent. (...) [The patentee] may grant licenses to 
make, use, or vend, restricted in point of space or time, or with any other re-
striction upon the exercise of the granted privilege, save only that, by attaching a 
condition to his license, he may not enlarge his monopoly, and thus acquire some 
other which the statute and the patent together did not give»28. 
This doctrine, however, seems to leave certain antitrust issues open: for in-
stance, it could prove ambiguous in a context of vertical integration in which a pa-
tent-tying practice implemented in an internal production could remain well with-
in the scope of the patent and thus lawful under a competition law perspective. 
Furthermore, it appears over-simplistic to the extent that the antitrust scrutiny 
would come down to a question pertaining only to patent law, rather than attempt-
ing an accommodation between the two sets of laws. As will be explained, the pa-
                                                        
27 Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940). The facts of the case referred to 
the gasoline market, where the system of licences on a gasoline-enhancer fluid granted by the pa-
tentee to the refiners was found to be in violation of the Sherman Act because it had «built up a 
combination capable of use, and actually used, as a means of controlling jobbers’ prices and sup-
pressing competition among them» (ibid., at 457). 
28 Ibid., at 456. In particular, in this case the licensing conditions granted by the patentee to the 
refiners were further used as a means to obtain a second monopoly, not covered by its patents, 
over the selling of the patented-fluid-infused gasoline by refiners to jobbers. 
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tent scope theory has indeed been rejected by the recent Actavis ruling of the US 
Supreme Court regarding restrictive agreements in the pharmaceutical industry, 
expressly stating that «patent and antitrust policies are both relevant in determin-
ing the “scope of the patent monopoly” – and consequently antitrust law immuni-
ty – that is conferred by a patent»29. 
Under the EU law framework, in which the IP/antitrust interface is a much 
more recent perspective, a different theoretical approach was initially set out. IPR 
statutes have been traditionally enacted by Member States and these laws could 
potentially run counter to the fundamental objectives of free movement of goods 
and undistorted competition within the EU internal market. When first assessing 
these issues, the Court of Justice has thus distinguished between the notions of ex-
istence and exercise of IPRs: the former was still regulated by national law, while 
the latter could amount to an infringement of EU law and be scrutinised under this 
perspective30. It is easily understandable, however, that the existence of an IPR 
means little when considered separately from its exercise and, moreover, the prac-
tice has showed how anticompetitive restraints can result from contractual rela-
tions between IPRs’ holders and third parties, and more recently from conducts 
that regard the acquisition of the exclusionary right in itself31. 
Indeed, EU case law has gradually shifted towards a position closer to the US 
patent-scope approach, as the aforementioned distinction between existence and 
                                                        
29 F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013), at 2231 (emphasis added). For a thorough 
analysis of this case and its implications, see infra, Chapter 2, Section 2.1.2. 
30 Among the first judgments dealing with this distinction see Court of Justice, judgment of 13 
July 1966, joined cases 56 and 58/64, Établissements Consten S.à.R.L. and Grundig-Verkaufs-
GmbH v. Commission of the European Economic Community, EU:C:1966:41 (at p. 345 it was ex-
plained that the injunction refraining Consten to use the rights granted under national trade-mark 
law in order to hinder parallel imports «[did] not affect the grant of those rights but only limit[ed] 
their exercise to give effect to the prohibition under Art. 85(1)» of the EEC Treaty, now Art. 
101(1) TFUE). All CJEU judgments referred to in the present work are available at 
http://curia.europa.eu. 
31 For a clear assessment of these two perspectives see G. GHIDINI, The Bride and the Groom. 
On the Intersection between Intellectual Property and Antitrust Law, in G. CAGGIANO, G. MUSCO-
LO, M. TAVASSI (eds.), Competition Law and Intellectual Property, cited above, pp. 27-52. 
 16 
exercise of an IPR also encompassed considerations regarding the specific subject 
matter of the right itself. A well-known decision that best illustrates this concept 
is Windsurfing International32 (1986), in which the Court of Justice examined the 
Commission’s competence to evaluate the scope of a patent for the purposes of 
determining a restriction of competition in the context of a licensing agreement. 
More precisely, it was held that a contractual clause requiring «the licensee only 
to sell the patented product in conjunction with a product outside the scope of the 
patent [was] not indispensable to the exploitation of the patent»33, and therefore 
was able to restrict competition under Art. 85(1) of the EEC Treaty (now Art. 
101(1) TFEU). 
The Court of Justice, however, later seemed to depart from the subject matter 
narrative when developing its case law regarding duties to licence imposed on an 
IPR holder34. While under the US scope theory there were rarely cases of antitrust 
liability for a unilateral refusal to sell or licence a patent (or a copyright), under 
EU competition rules an obligation upon the incumbent to share its patented tech-
nologies with rivals has been affirmed in «exceptional circumstances». More pre-
cisely, in the Magill judgment35 (1995) the refusal of an IPR holder to licence or 
supply an indispensable input to a competitor was held as an infringement of Art. 
102 TFEU upon three conditions: (i) the competitor offered a new product for 
which there was a potential consumer demand, (ii) there was no objective justifi-
cation for such refusal, and (iii) the incumbent reserved the secondary market for 
                                                        
32 Court of Justice, judgment of 25 February 1986, case 193/83, Windsurfing International Inc. 
v. Commission of the European Communities, EU:C:1986:75. 
33 Ibid., para. 57. 
34 For a comprehensive comment on finding the right balance when applying competition rules 
to licensing agreements, see L. PEEPERKORN, IP Licences and Competition Rules: Striking the 
Right Balance, in World Competition, 2003, pp. 527-539. 
35 Court of Justice, judgment of 6 April 1995, joined cases C-241 P and C-242/91 P, Radio Te-
lefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications Ltd (ITP) v. Commission of the Eu-
ropean Communities (“Magill”), EU:C:1995:98. For a specific comment see, in the Italian litera-
ture, C.M. SARACINO, Il caso IMS Health: proprietà intellettuale e diritto antitrust, in Rivista ital-
iana di diritto pubblico comunitario, 2005, pp. 676-695. 
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itself by excluding all competition in that market36. The EU Court has further de-
fined this exceptional-circumstances test in subsequent decisions37, particularly 
recalling the need that the refusal excluded «any effective competition»38 in the 
downstream market39. 
This trend therefore seems to point to an accommodation of IPRs within the 
EU competition law framework that acknowledges the contribution to innovation 
and economic welfare deriving from the legitimate exercise of such rights but, at 
the same time, limits them whenever they pose a threat to effective competition in 
a given market. In other words, it is up to competition rules (and not to patent 
laws) to define the boundaries between lawful exercise and exceptional circum-
stances40. 
                                                        
36 Ibid., paras. 54-56. 
37 The following cases can be recalled in this regard: Court of Justice, judgment of 26 Novem-
ber 1988, case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs- und 
Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, Mediaprint Zeitungsvertriebsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG 
and Mediaprint Anzeigengesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, EU:C:1998:569; judgment of 29 April 
2004, case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, 
EU:C:2004:257. 
38 Court of First Instance, judgment of 17 September 2007, case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. 
Commission of the European Communities, EU:T:2007:289, para. 332. 
39 For an overview of this body of case law see, among others, J. KALLAUGHER, Existence, 
Exercise and Exceptional Circumstances: The Limited Scope for a More Economic Approach to 
IP Issues under Article 102 TFEU, in S. ANDERMAN, A. EZRACHI (eds.), Intellectual Property and 
Competition Law. New Frontiers, Oxford-New York, 2011, pp. 113-140; A. MUSELLI, I diritti di 
proprietà intellettuale e l’abuso di posizione dominante – Rassegna delle decisioni comunitarie 
(1998-2010), in Concorrenza e mercato, 2012, pp. 425-445; A. EZRACHI, M. MAGGIOLINO, Euro-
pean Competition Law, Compulsory Licensing and Innovation, in Journal of European Competi-
tion Law & Economics, 2012, pp. 595-614; T.C. VINJE, A. VAN ROOIJEN, The Relationship be-
tween Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Laws, in N. WILKOF, S. BASHEER (eds.), Over-
lapping Intellectual Property Rights, Oxford, 2012, pp. 365-386; C. QUATTROCCHI, Osservazioni 
circa l’applicazione della dottrina dell’essential facility al settore della proprietà intellettuale, in 
AA.VV., Studi in onore di Augusto Sinagra, vol. IV, Roma, 2013, pp. 255-275. 
40 See S. ANDERMAN, Overplaying the innovation card: The stronger intellectual property 
rights and competition law, in P. DRAHOS, G. GHIDINI, H. ULLRICH (eds.), Kritika: Essays on Intel-
lectual Property, vol. I, Cheltenham-Northampton, 2015, pp. 17-58, at pp. 30-31. 
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After analysing the state of play through case law pertaining specifically the 
pharmaceutical sector, in the final chapter it will be argued how the balance be-
tween patent laws and competition has currently been struck in both the EU and 
the US. 
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1.3. A SPECIFIC SECTOR: THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
 
The choice of a sector-specific perspective to further define the material scope 
of the present work has been made with the precise purpose of providing a practi-
cal viewpoint into the manifold contexts in which the patent/antitrust intersection 
has developed, especially in recent years. 
Within the pharmaceutical industry, the tension outlined above between the 
characteristic principles of patent laws and competition policies is particularly 
common. On the one hand, innovation pushes towards the invention of new drugs 
requiring large investments and R&D activity, which the pharmaceutical compa-
nies are willing to make upon the condition of benefiting from strong patent pro-
tection. On the other hand, like all undertakings they have to comply with compe-
tition rules whose priority in this specific industry is to promote patients’ welfare 
by ensuring access to therapy at reasonable prices and conditions41. 
In addition, the pharmaceutical industry’s features as a heavily regulated sector 
on both national and supranational levels42 have contributed to an increasingly in-
tensive scrutiny into the exercise of patent rights under competition law para-
                                                        
41 For a general assessment of the IP/antitrust implications in the pharmaceutical sector see, 
among others, S. PRIDDIS, S. CONSTANTINE, The Pharmaceutical Sector, Intellectual Property 
Rights, and Competition Law in Europe, in S. ANDERMAN, A. EZRACHI (eds.), Intellectual Proper-
ty and Competition Law, cited above, pp. 241-275; M.A. CARRIER, Competition law and enforce-
ment in the pharmaceutical sector, in A. EZRACHI (ed.), Research Handbook on International 
Competition Law, Cheltenham-Northampton, 2012, pp. 521-544; Á. GARCÍA VIDAL (dir.), Pa-
tentes farmacéuticas y Derecho de la competencia, Navarra, 2015; C. TESAURO, La concorrenza 
nel settore farmaceutico, in E.A. RAFFAELLI (ed.), Antitrust fra diritto nazionale e diritto 
dell’Unione europea. XI Convegno, Bruxelles, 2015, pp. 371-387; L. HANCHER, W. SAUTER, A 
dose of competition: EU antitrust law in the pharmaceutical sector, in Journal of Antitrust En-
forcement, 2016, pp. 381-410; G. PITRUZZELLA, G. MUSCOLO (eds.), Competition and Patent Law 
in the Pharmaceutical Sector: An International Perspective, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2016. See also 
the results and the key findings of the 121st Meeting of the OECD Competition Committee held on 
18-19 June 2014, in particular the Discussion on Competition and Generic Pharmaceutical where 
the invited experts were Prof. C.S. Hemphill and Mr. R. Subiotto, available at www.oecd.org. 
42 See infra, in this Chapter, Section 2.2, for an overview of the sector-specific regulatory 
framework in the EU and the US legal systems. 
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digms. Judicial and enforcement authorities have in fact carried out competition 
law investigations concerning the possible exploitation of regulatory loopholes 
that amount to an anticompetitive conduct, even though it may formally appear 
consistent with the given legal framework. In this regard, conducts involving 
abuses of dominance as well as restrictive agreements pose challenging legal 
questions that are unique to the industry at issue, and, in some cases, are only be-
ginning to be addressed. The second chapter of the thesis will thoroughly analyse 
and discuss the most relevant case law and practice that have emerged in the EU 
and the US legal systems. 
More generally, in the pharmaceutical industry the interface between patent 
protection and antitrust is also faced with the concurring need to strike a balance 
with particularly sensitive interests, as the human right to health represents a 
common minimum standard underlying the whole sector. Indeed, the fundamental 
objectives of providing fair and affordable access to treatment as well as safe and 
effective medicines further qualify both the bodies of law at issue. This conflict-
ing scenario has been subject to growing attention by the international communi-
ty, especially on the account of the least-developed countries, which led to the 
adoption, within the WTO framework, of the Declaration on the TRIPS Agree-
ment and Public Health on 14 November 2001 (also known as the «Doha Declara-
tion»)43. This legal instrument evidenced the intention of WTO members to sup-
port the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement in a way that is consistent with 
the principles of public health and access to medicines44. In particular, it affirmed 
                                                        
43  WTO, Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session (Doha, 9-14 November 2001), 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 20 November 2001. 
44 For further comments on the Declaration see, among others, F.M. ABBOTT, The Doha Decla-
ration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: Lightning a Dark Corner at the WTO, in Jour-
nal of International Economic Law, 2002, pp. 469-505; C.M. CORREA, Implications of the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS agreement and Public Health, June 2002, available at www.who.int. 
More in general on the issue see also J. SELLIN, Access to Medicines. The interface between pa-
tents and human rights. Does one size fit all?, Cambridge-Antwerp-Portland, 2014, pp. 225-289; 
B. CARAVITA DI TORITTO, Balancing the Human Right to Health with the Competition Law and 
the Intellectual Property Regime, in G. PITRUZZELLA, G. MUSCOLO (eds.), Competition and Patent 
Law in the Pharmaceutical Sector, cited above, pp. 53-66. 
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the right of WTO members to use the flexibility provided by the TRIPS Agree-
ment for the specific purpose of guaranteeing the right to health. Among such 
flexibilities, the Declaration recalled the tools of compulsory licences45, parallel 
imports46 and exceptions to patent rights47. As to its legal value, even though dec-
larations are not specifically regulated in the WTO regime, it can be argued that it 
specified the scope of application of certain TRIPS provisions with regard to pub-
lic health issues, and therefore has a similar effect to an authoritative interpreta-
tion of the Agreement. 
The principles expressed in the Doha Declaration, moreover, appear to be well 
adjusted into the progressive integration of IPRs into the human rights discourse 
that has been previously contextualised. In particular, it constitutes a workable ex-
ample of the mentioned coexistence approach between the two sets of rights, 
bringing together the contrasting aspects of innovation and access to knowledge 
towards the ultimate aim of promoting social and economic welfare within the 
specific area of public health. 
For these reasons, the pharmaceutical industry sets itself a privileged frame-
work in which the traditional paradigms of patent laws and competition are tested 
against new and evolving legal issues, thus offering a scientific challenge that is 
worth engaging in.  
                                                        
45 Art. 5(b) of the Declaration states that «[e]ach Member has the right to grant compulsory li-
cences and the freedom to determine the ground upon which such licences are granted», thus spec-
ifying the legal tool already provided for in Art. 31 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
46 Art. 5(d) of the Declaration refers to the possibility of authorising parallel imports of phar-
maceutical products under the doctrine of exhaustion of rights pursuant to Art. 6 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, adding that «[e]ach Member [is] free to establish its own regime for such exhaustion 
without challenge». 
47 In this regard the reference is to Art. 30 of the TRIPS Agreement, according to which Mem-
bers can enact limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent upon conditions that 
they «do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasona-
bly prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner». For an example that pertains specifical-
ly to the pharmaceutical sector, the so-called “Bolar exception” can be mentioned, which both the 
EU and the US legal systems have introduced: on this issue see infra, in this Chapter, Sections 
2.2.1 and 2.2.2. 
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2. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 
2.1. ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
 
Although this thesis examines the previously outlined interface between IP and 
antitrust in the pharmaceutical sector from a legal perspective, it seems however 
appropriate to consider some aspects that need to be taken into account also from 
an economic viewpoint. Indeed, as well known, competition law itself relies heav-
ily on economic theories and studies in all of its policy areas (for instance to de-
termine market structures, or substitutability between certain products, etc.). Re-
garding the industry at issue, the supply chain in particular presents certain fea-
tures that characterises the supply and the demand side, respectively. In addition, 
the distribution channels as well play a relevant role within this market structure. 
A brief overview of these sector-specific features will thus be carried out. 
Regarding the supply side, pharmaceutical undertakings are commonly divided 
into two categories: originators and generics. The former are R&D-based compa-
nies, which manufacture pioneer drugs starting from their development through 
research, tests and trials, obtaining patent protection and the necessary marketing 
authorisations, and finally placing them onto the market. These firms are typically 
large multinationals that act both at a global and a local level through various 
branches and subsidiaries. Some originators, however, take the form of smaller-
sized businesses specialising in a narrower therapeutic area, which usually enter 
into licence or sale agreements with larger undertakings. 
On the contrary, generic companies produce and sell medicinal products con-
taining the same active pharmaceutical ingredient (API) as a patented drug after it 
has lost its exclusivity status. Generics are sold at a much lower price than the ref-
erence drug, thus promoting competitive dynamics between the two product ver-
sions and allowing lower expenditures for public healthcare budgets. The product 
development of generic products typically starts several years before the loss of 
exclusivity granted by patent or Supplementary Protection Certificates (SPCs), 
and in this timeframe potential anticompetitive conducts are subjected to close 
scrutiny by enforcement authorities and courts. 
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In between the supply and the demand sides, the pharmaceutical distribution 
chain has a number of relevant actors, namely wholesalers and pharmacies48. 
More precisely, the first category of distributors acts between manufactures (both 
originators and generics) and pharmacies by delivering medicines within given 
geographical areas and ensuring certain amounts of stocks. In the EU legal sys-
tem, wholesale distribution has been furthermore qualified as a public service, 
thus requiring the performance of the specific obligation to «ensure appropriate 
and continued supplies of (…) medicinal product[s] to pharmacies and persons 
authorised to supply medicinal products so that the needs of patients in the Mem-
ber State in question are covered»49. 
As to the demand side, a further categorisation that pertains exclusively to the 
sector in question is observed: it is in fact divided into patients, doctors, hospitals 
and (where provided) healthcare systems/insurers. The interrelationships among 
these actors is rather peculiar, in that a high level of information asymmetry is 
perceived between doctors, who prescribe the medicine, and patients, who are the 
                                                        
48 A further category of actors, i.e. parallel traders, is active within the distribution chain, espe-
cially in the EU where the differential pricing create the conditions to profit from the purchase and 
resale of pharmaceutical products between low-price and high-price Member States. This aspect, 
however, falls partly outside the scope of the thesis, as it entails a different set of considerations 
referring to the regulation of public economic policies, and it will therefore not specifically dis-
cussed. For a comprehensive assessment see, among others, C. STOTHERS, Parallel Trade in Eu-
rope, Oxford, 2007; with particular regard to the pharmaceutical industry see L.G. GRIGORIADIS, 
The Application of EU Competition Law in the Pharmaceutical Sector: The Case of Parallel 
Trade, in European Business Law Review, 2014, pp. 141-201; K.R. BREKKE, T.H. HOLMÅS, O.R. 
STRAUME, Price regulation and parallel imports of pharmaceuticals, in Journal of Public 
Economics, 2015, pp. 92-105. 
49 Art. 81 of the Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 No-
vember 2001 on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use, OJ L 311 of 
28 November 2001, pp. 67-128. On this aspect, see also Court of Justice, 16 September 2008, 
joined cases C-468 to C-478/06, Sot. Lélos kai Sia EE and Others v. GlaxoSmithKline AEVE 
Farmakeftikon Proïonton, formerly Glaxowellcome AEVE, EU:C:2008:504 (for a comment on the 
decision see for example S. BASTIANON, Il caso Sot. Lélos kai Sia EE e il binomio diritto della 
concorrenza-importazioni parallele nel settore farmaceutico, in Il Diritto dell’Unione europea, 
2009, pp. 589-606). 
 24 
actual consumer but whose role in choosing the product is miminal. Moreover, 
prescribing doctors are not the ones who actually bear the costs of the medicines, 
because the related expenses are placed upon private insurance providers or public 
healthcare systems (and, at times, upon patients themselves in the form of co-
payments). This impacts directly on the degree of price elasticity since the doc-
tors’ prescribing behaviour tends to be insensitive to changes in the price of a giv-
en medicine. 
The mentioned economic factors are therefore relevant for the analysis of case 
law and practice within the pharmaceutical sector, as well as its subsequent criti-
cal assessment, and, where appropriate, they will be further referred to in these 
specific contexts. 
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2.2. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF THE 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
2.2.1. IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
Within the EU institutional framework health policy in general is included 
among the shared competences between the EU and its Member States. More pre-
cisely, Art. 168(4)(c) TFEU50 lists the circumstances in which the EU can exercise 
such competence, namely by means of legislative measures, adopted by the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council, «setting high standards of quality and safety for 
medicinal products and devices for medical use». Besides these specific cases, 
healthcare is governed by domestic legislation and the EU exercises a supporting 
competence, particularly «encourag[ing] cooperation between the Member States 
to improve the complementarity of their health services in cross-border areas» as 
provided by Art. 168(2) TFEU. 
Among the various aspects included in such broad competence the pharmaceu-
tical sector, as already mentioned, is characterised by an extensive regulation at 
both supranational and national level51. In particular, there are two policy areas 
                                                        
50 The now explicit competence set forth in said provision has its predecessors in Art. 129 of 
the EEC Treaty and Art. 152 of the EC Treaty, which both recognised an involvement of the 
Community in health-related matters. The major innovation of the current provision resides in the 
substantial expansion as to the range and definition of the EU competence in this field of law. See 
further S.L. GREER, T.K. HERVEY, J.P. MACKENBACK, M. MCKEE, Health law and policy in the 
European Union, in 381 The Lancet, 2013, pp. 1135-1144; M. GUY, W. SAUTER, The History and 
Scope of EU Health Law and Policy, in CCP Working Papers, January 2016, No. 16-2, available 
at http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk; in the Italian literature M. MIGLIAZZA, Commento all’art, 168 
TFUE, in F. POCAR, M.C. BARUFFI (dir.), Commentario breve ai Trattati dell’Unione europea, 2a 
ed., Padova, 2014, pp. 1039-1042. 
51 For a comprehensive analysis and further references see, among others, L. HANCHER, The 
EU pharmaceutical market: parameters and pathways, in E. MOSSIALOS, G. PERMANAND, R. 
BAETEN, T.K. HERVEY (eds.), Health systems in Europe: The role of European Union law and 
policy, Cambridge, 2010, pp. 635-682; D. CURLEY, M.H.J. VAN DEN HORST, Patents and Regulari-
ty Data Exclusivity for Medicinal Products, in N. WILKOF, S. BASHEER (eds.), Overlapping Intel-
lectual Property Rights, cited above, pp. 119-136; H. MISCHE, E. KAMILANOVA, D. SCHNICHELS, 
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where these legal systems overlap, at least to some extent: the first one is patent 
protection and the second regards marketing authorisation (MA) procedures. In-
stead, pursuant to Art. 168(7) TFEU a third relevant policy area concerning distri-
bution, pricing and reimbursement of drugs remains a matter of Member States’ 
competence, in which the main actors are the respective national health systems 
(NHS). 
With regard to patent laws in Europe, as is well known the relevant interna-
tional legislation is provided by the 1973 European Patent Convention (EPC)52, 
which established the European Patent Organisation – whose bodies are the Euro-
pean Patent Office (EPO) and the Administrative Council – and set forth the sub-
stantive rules for granting a European patent53. Once granted, the protection so 
conferred practically amounts to possessing a bundle of national patents that need 
to be validated in each State party and are subject to domestic enforcement pro-
ceedings. The term of extension of the European patent is twenty years from the 
date of filing the application (Art. 63 EPC), during which its holder is entitled to 
exclusive commercial exploitation of the patented invention. 
Within the international legal framework, the filing of a European divisional 
application is further regulated (Art. 76 EPC). This is possible only as to subject 
matter that does not extend beyond the contents of the parent application to which 
the divisional refers, and, most commonly, such application is filed whenever the 
parent does not meet the requirement of unity of invention as provided in Art. 82 
EPC. If the divisional application does satisfy these conditions, it is regarded as 
                                                        
Pharma, in J. FAULL, A. NIKPAY (eds.), Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition, 3rd ed., Ox-
ford, 2014, pp. 1869-1876; M.I. MANLEY, M. VICKERS (eds.), Navigating European Pharmaceuti-
cal Law. An Expert’s Guide, Oxford, 2015; S. SHORTHOSE (ed.), Guide to EU Pharmaceutical 
Regulatory Law, 6th ed., Alphen aan den Rijn, 2015. 
52 The Convention entered into force in 1978 and the contracting States are now 38 (including 
all 28 EU Member States). Moreover, there are other States which have an extension (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Montenegro) or validation agreement (Morocco, Moldova) with the European Patent 
Office, although are not parties to the Convention. The complete list of contracting States and the 
official texts of the EPC are available at www.epo.org. 
53 Art. 52 EPC, in particular, recalls the basic requirements for the patentability of an invention, 
namely that it be new, involve an inventive step and be susceptible of industrial application. 
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having the same date of filing and priority date as the parent application, and the 
contracting States designated in the latter are deemed to be designated in the divi-
sional as well. 
The scope of application of EPC rules is of course general, thus also covering 
drugs and pharmaceutical products, but at the EU level, a sector-specific legisla-
tion closely related to the European patent system is provided. Indeed, Regulation 
(EC) No. 469/200954 envisages the legal tool of supplementary protection certifi-
cates (SPCs), which grant extended protection over the active ingredient of a med-
icine for a limited period of up to five years, so allowing a pharmaceutical com-
pany to recoup from the time and the significant investments required to bring the 
product onto the market. Despite the EU legal framework, SPCs are actually 
based on either a national patent or a European patent designating one or more 
contracting States, and therefore are granted and maintained by national patent of-
fices. 
In summary, according to Art. 3 of the Regulation an SPC can be granted in a 
Member State provided that the medicinal product is protected by a basic patent in 
force for which it has received a MA in that State, and no prior certificate has 
been issued for the same product. The application for an SPC shall be lodged in 
each Member State where such protection is sought within six months from the 
date on which a MA was granted in that State, and the duration of the certificate is 
calculated from the date of the first MA for the product granted anywhere in the 
EEA. Given the relevance of this piece of legislation on the competitive dynamics 
within the pharmaceutical industry, a substantial case law has developed with re-
                                                        
54 Regulation (EC) No. 469/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 
2009 concerning the supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products, OJ L 152 of 16 
June 2009, pp. 1-10, which repealed Regulation (EEC) No. 1768/92, OJ L 182 of 2 July of 1992, 
p. 1-5. It is worth mentioning that this is not the only category of SPC regulated by EU legislation, 
as also a second one concerning plant protection products is provided for: see Regulation (EC) No. 
1610/96 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 1996 concerning the creation of 
a supplementary protection certificate for plant protection products, OJ L 198 of 8 August 1996, 
pp. 30-35. For a comprehensive analysis see for example T. GORAYA, Supplementary Protection 
Certificates, in S. SHORTHOSE (ed.), Guide to EU Pharmaceutical Regulatory Law, cited above, 
pp. 201-226. 
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gard to the interpretation of the Regulation’s provisions55, as well as to its imple-
mentation. This latter perspective will be particularly examined in the following 
chapter. 
Moving to MA procedures, the general EU law provisions are laid down in the 
Directive 2001/83/EC56 that requires the prior issue of such authorisation before 
placing any medicinal product on the market of a given Member State. In this re-
gard, there are two possible routes that pharmaceutical companies may choose. 
On the one hand, the request for MA can be submitted to the competent national 
authority and then recognised in other EU Member States by means of the mutual 
recognition procedure (National Procedure), or it can be obtained in several 
Member States at the same time through a single application submitted to a na-
tional authority acting as a so-called Reference Member State (Decentralised Pro-
cedure)57. On the other hand, a MA that is valid throughout the EU can be granted 
by submitting the application to the European Medicine Agency (EMA) 58 (Cen-
tralised Procedure)59. 
                                                        
55 For a more thorough assessment of the still-evolving case law see, recently, M. SCUFFI, I 
certificati complementari di protezione: l’evoluzione della giurisprudenza sui termini di pro-
lungamento brevettuale e l’ambito di protezione, in Rivista di Diritto Industriale, 2015, I, pp. 5-
17; C. GALLI, Innovazione e concorrenza nella giurisprudenza UE in materia di SPC, in Il Diritto 
industriale, 2016, pp. 111-124; F. PAPADOPOULOU, Supplementary protection certificates: still a 
grey area?, in Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, 2016, pp. 372-381. 
56 Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use, 
cited above. 
57 This alternative procedure was introduced by the Directive 2004/27/EC of the European Par-
liament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 amending Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community 
code relating to medicinal products for human use, OJ L 136 of 30 April 2004, pp. 34-57. 
58 The EMA is an agency of the EU whose main tasks consist in the scientific evaluation, su-
pervision and safety monitoring of medicines used throughout the EU. For a comprehensive as-
sessment on the role of decentralised agencies within the European institutional framework see, in 
the Italian literature, V. SALVATORE, Commento all’art. 298 TFUE, Sezione 2. Agenzie e altri or-
ganismi UE, in F. POCAR, M.C. BARUFFI (dir.), Commentario breve ai Trattati dell’Unione eu-
ropea, 2a ed., Padova, 2014, pp. 1431-1435; and by the same Author (ed.), Le Agenzie dell’Unione 
europea. Profili istituzionali e tendenze evolutive, Pavia, 2011 (in this volume, with particular re-
gard to the EMA, E. PAVIONE, Economia sociale di mercato e nuovi rapporti di partenariato pub-
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Within these national or EU procedures, an application for a MA may follow 
different patterns according to the nature and the scope of the data to be submit-
ted, which consider the results of the expensive and time-consuming pharmaco-
logical, toxicological and clinical trials conducted by pharmaceutical companies 
during the drug development process. Besides an ordinary procedure that requires 
the submission of a full application, there are two alternatives, namely the 
abridged and the hybrid abridged procedure, which allow the applicant, upon cer-
tain conditions, to refer to data already included in a MA for a reference medicinal 
product60. More precisely, the former is provided for a generic version of the 
product falling within the meaning given in Art. 10(2)(b) of the Directive 
2001/83/EC61, whereas the latter is envisaged for a product that does not meet the 
criteria of biological equivalence to a reference drug and thus requires the submis-
sion of further data to support the MA application. 
                                                        
blico-privato: l’esperienza dell’iniziativa per le medicine innovative (IMI) e il coinvolgimento 
dell’Agenzia Europea per i Medicinali, pp. 193-212). 
59 This procedure finds a more specific legal framework in Regulation (EC) No. 726/2004 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 laying down Community proce-
dures for the authorisation and supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use 
and establishing a European Medicines Agency, OJ L 136 of 30 April 2004, p. 1-33. 
60 For the limited purposes of this inquiry, the provisions regarding reference biological prod-
ucts and biosimilars will not be taken into account. 
61 According to said provision, a generic product is «a medicinal product which has the same 
qualitative and quantitative composition in active substances and the same pharmaceutical form as 
the reference medicinal product, and whose bioequivalence with the reference medicinal product 
has been demonstrated by appropriate bioavailability studies. The different salts, esters, ethers, 
isomers, mixtures of isomers, complexes or derivatives of an active substance shall be considered 
to be the same active substance, unless they differ significantly in properties with regard to safety 
and/or efficacy. In such cases, additional information providing proof of the safety and/or efficacy 
of the various salts, esters or derivatives of an authorised active substance must be supplied by the 
applicant. The various immediate-release oral pharmaceutical forms shall be considered to be one 
and the same pharmaceutical form. Bioavailability studies need not be required of the applicant if 
he can demonstrate that the generic medicinal product meets the relevant criteria as defined in the 
appropriate detailed guidelines». 
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These abridged procedures are reasonably aimed at avoiding repetitions in the 
already costly clinical trials for drugs that are bioequivalent or at least present cer-
tain common features in relation to a reference medicine. At the same time, how-
ever, the originators companies must be rewarded as well for their investments in 
developing innovative treatments. The legislative balance between these conflict-
ing interests has been struck in the form of «pharma-specific data protection 
rights»62 that regard the results of tests and trials submitted for the purposes of a 
MA procedure. Indeed, the Directive 2001/83/EC provides that an eight-year pe-
riod of data exclusivity shall elapse before MA authorities can process an 
abridged application for a generic version of a drug. In other words, during such 
time only the originator that conducted the trials is allowed to apply for a MA, 
and to subsequently use it. Moreover, the same piece of legislation also grants an 
additional two to three-year protection before third parties that obtained a MA 
through an abridged application can bring their product onto the market63. 
Another feature of the MA system that needs to be taken into account is that 
said authorisation, in general, only relies on the basis of scientific criteria concern-
ing the quality, safety and efficacy of the given drug64, while the status of the pa-
tent protection for the originator reference product plays no role under this per-
                                                        
62 The definition is proposed by H. MISCHE, E. KAMILANOVA, D. SCHNICHELS, Pharma, cited 
above, p. 1874. 
63 The relevant rules on data and marketing exclusivity are provided for in Art. 10(1) of the Di-
rective 2001/83/EC. Considering the cumulative period of protection granted, they are commonly 
known as “8+2(+1)” (the additional year of marketing exclusivity specifically requires that during 
the first eight years the MA holder has obtained «an authorisation for one or more new therapeutic 
indications which, during the scientific evaluation prior to their authorisation, are held to bring a 
significant clinical benefit in comparison with existing therapies»: Art. 10(1), fourth subpara-
graph). 
64 See Arts. 126 of the Directive 2001/83/EC and 81 of Regulation (EC) No. 726/2004, provid-
ing that the grounds of refusal, suspension or revoking of a MA are only those set forth in the two 
legal instruments, among which the status of a patent is not included.  
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spective. Consequently, in the EU framework the so-called “patent linkage”65 is 
not provided for in this context, as opposed to other regulatory systems. 
As regards MA procedures, the so-called “Bolar provision”66 or research ex-
emption must also be mentioned. The term refers to Art. 10(6) of the Directive 
2001/83/EC67, under which generic manufacturers are exempted from infringe-
ment of patents or SPCs granted for medicinal products when conducting the nec-
essary studies and trials with a view of obtaining MA for their drugs. This 
amounts to a safe harbour allowing them to carry out R&D while the reference 
product is still patent-protected and, thus, to apply for MA as soon as the period of 
data exclusivity has elapsed. 
As to the pricing and reimbursement of drugs, as already mentioned, the legis-
lative competence primarily lies with the Member States. In this regulatory con-
text as well, national policies need to strike a complex balance between the objec-
tives of ensuring fair access to treatments for the patients, granting incentives for 
originator companies and maintaining sustainable healthcare budgets. Moreover, 
the legislation enacted by Member States in this regard must comply with the pro-
visions of the Directive 89/105/EC68 (the so-called “Transparency Directive”), 
                                                        
65 The notion comes from the practice of linking regulatory approval for a generic version of a 
drug to the patent status of the originator reference product. For an overall framework of linkage 
regulations see R.A. BOUCHARD ET AL., Structure-Function Analysis of Global Pharmaceutical 
Linkage Regulations, in 12 Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology, 2011, pp. 391-457; 
with specific regard to the Italian legal system L. ARNAUDO, Il patent linkage nel settore farma-
ceutico e nell’ordinamento italiano, in Mercato concorrenza regole, 2014, pp. 355-364. 
66 The term “Bolar” comes from the judgment rendered by the US Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit in the case Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. 
Cir. 1984). The decision and the subsequent legislative amendments in the US legal systems are 
further discussed infra, in this Chapter, Section 2.2.2. 
67 Also this provision was not provided for in the original draft of said legal instruments, but 
was subsequently introduced by the Directive 2004/27/EC. 
68  Council Directive 89/105/EEC of 21 December 1988 relating to the transparency of 
measures regulating the prices of medicinal products for human use and their inclusion in the 
scope of national health insurance systems, OJ L 40 of 11 February 1989, pp. 8-11. The European 
Commission later proposed to amend this piece of legislation in order to adapt its provisions to the 
evolving trends within the pharmaceutical sector (see Proposal for a Directive of the European 
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which sets forth certain requirements of transparency, objectivity and verifiability 
for pricing and reimbursement procedures. Since the present work mainly focuses 
on anticompetitive dynamics between undertakings within the pharmaceutical in-
dustry, an in-depth analysis regarding pricing and reimbursement procedures falls 
partly outside its scope69. Nonetheless, some overall remarks on the main driving 
factors within this policy area are worth mentioning. Moreover, certain features of 
pricing and reimbursement systems implemented in specific Member States will 
be illustrated, where relevant, also in the case law analysis carried out in the fol-
lowing chapter. 
In general, the price of a given drug is made up of different values, based pri-
marily on the ex-factory price to which the margins for wholesalers, pharmacists 
and taxes are added to form the retail price level. The reimbursement then consists 
in the percentage of such a retail price that is paid by public healthcare systems, 
while the remaining part, known as co-payment, is charged to the patients and (if 
any) private supplementary insurance. Most EU Member States directly control 
the price of reimbursed medicines, while others have implemented systems where 
pharmaceutical companies are allowed to freely set their initial price levels. In this 
latter case, however, the price control is still indirectly exercised to the extent that 
drugs will benefit from reimbursement only up to a certain amount or on condi-
tion that the price is considered acceptable70. Further elements to consider in this 
regard are the requirements and conditions imposed by domestic legislation on the 
demand side, namely on prescribing doctors and pharmacists, which affect the fi-
nal decision towards a certain medicinal product (e.g. by imposing generic substi-
                                                        
Parliament and of the Council relating to the transparency of measures regulating the prices of 
medicinal products for human use and their inclusion in the scope of public health insurance sys-
tems, COM(2012) 84 final of 1 March 2012, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu), but the pro-
posal was withdrawn with the adoption of its 2015 Work Programme. 
69 For a thorough assessment see, among recent studies, A. BELLONI, D. MORGAN, V. PARIS, 
Pharmaceutical Expenditures and Policies: Past Trends and Future Challenges, in OECD Health 
Working Papers, 2016, No. 87, available at www.oecd-ilibrary.org. 
70 In particular, the EU countries that have adopted such a system of indirect control are Den-
mark, Germany and the United Kingdom. 
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tution unless there is a medical necessity for choosing a specific drug, or by re-
warding prescribing behaviours whenever a certain budget or quota is respected). 
The EU pharmaceutical industry, as outlined above in its main features, was 
subject to a comprehensive inquiry launched by the European Commission in 
January 200871 and finalised on 8 July 200972 (the Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry, 
hereinafter also «Inquiry»). Its purpose was an assessment of the state of play as 
to competition in the industry at issue in response to some concerns expressed 
with regard to frequent delays in the entry of generic drugs into the market and an 
apparent decline of new medicines produced by originator companies. 
The initiative fell within the wider EU policy objective of «providing European 
patients with safe, effective and affordable medicines, while at the same time cre-
ating a business environment that stimulates research, boosts valuable innovation 
and supports the competitiveness of the industry»73. To pursue the evaluation, the 
Commission limited its scope to prescription medicines for human use, selecting 
219 substances, and monitored the competitive behaviour of 43 originator compa-
nies and 27 generic manufacturers from 2000 to 2007. Both the subjective and the 
product scope allowed a reliable portion of the EU pharmaceutical market to be 
considered, given that the selected molecules accounted for 50% of the overall 
turnover of prescription drugs in 2007 and the selected companies represented 
80% of the relevant turnover. 
                                                        
71 Commission decision of 15 January 2008 initiating an inquiry into the pharmaceutical sector 
pursuant to Article 17 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003, case No. COMP/D2/39.514, avail-
able at http://ec.europa.eu/competition. 
72 Communication from the Commission, Executive summary of the Pharmaceutical Sector In-
quiry Report, COM(2009) 351 final of 8 July 2009, accompanied by Technical annexes forming 
the Final Report of the Inquiry. It was also preceded by a Preliminary Report issued on 28 No-
vember 2008. All the mentioned documents are available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition. For a 
comment on the findings of the Inquiry see D. SCHNICHELS, S. SULE, The Pharmaceutical Sector 
Inquiry and its Impact on Competition Law Enforcement, in Journal of European Competition 
Law & Practice, 2010, pp. 93-11; D. STAUDER, S. ABEL, T. FRIEDE (Hrgs.), Sektoruntersuchung 
Pharma der Europäischen Kommission – Kartellrechtliche Disziplinierung des Patentsystems?, 
Köln, 2010. 
73 Executive summary of the Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Report, cited above, para. 1. 
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Briefly recalling the main findings of the Inquiry, the Commission divided 
them into issues arising from competition between originators and generics74, and 
issues arising from competition between originators75. 
As to the former, the study focused on the dynamics that occur towards the end 
of the product life cycle, when the loss of the exclusivity granted by the patent is 
approaching and generic competitors are preparing to enter the market. To this 
end, a list of conducts implemented by pioneers in order to extend the breadth and 
duration of their patents was provided (so-called “tool-box” of instruments): the 
analysed practices referred to patent-filing strategies (e.g. patent clusters and vol-
untary divisional patent applications), patent-related litigation, oppositions and 
appeals before the EPO, patent settlements and other types of agreements, litiga-
tion in administrative proceedings for marketing authorisation or pricing and re-
imbursement of drugs, and life cycle strategies for second generation products 
(i.e. new therapeutic uses of products, or new formulations within the same indi-
cation). The data collected in this regard confirmed that these conducts contribute 
to a delayed generic entry into the market76. Yet this finding appeared more of an 
assumption than an evidence-based inference, considering that the EU institution 
fell short of establishing a causal link between the possible anticompetitive behav-
iours of originators and the delay of generic entry77. Moreover, the Commission 
seemed to overlook some of the features of the sector-specific legislative frame-
work that play an actual role in this context. 
As to competition between originators, the considered behaviours, such as de-
fensive patent strategies, dispute settlements through licensing agreements or oth-
                                                        
74 Ibid., para. 3.2. 
75 Ibid., para. 3.3. 
76 On average, the generic entry was calculated after seven months once the originator lost its 
exclusivity on a certain medicine. For the highest selling products, the elapsed time reduced to 
four months (see Executive summary of the Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Report, cited above, 
para. 2.1.2). 
77 This point is particularly stressed by D. ROSENBERG, A view of the research-based industry, 
in D. STAUDER, S. ABEL, T. FRIEDE (Hrgs.), Sektoruntersuchung Pharma der Europäischen Kom-
mission, cited above, pp. 51-72, at pp. 67-69. 
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er types of agreements, were found to have an impact on innovation and the diffi-
culties in bringing new medicines into the market. 
On the basis of this assessment, the EU antitrust enforcer reached its conclu-
sions and proposed a number of initiatives that could be undertaken in the sector 
with the aim of creating a more competitive environment. 
Preliminarily it underlined the necessary coexistence of IP laws and competi-
tion since both promote new developments and investments in R&D, but, at the 
same time, it reminded that the exercise of patent rights shall not be «immune 
from competition law intervention». In accordance with its main findings, the 
above-mentioned issues were identified as worthy of further scrutiny by the 
Commission and National Competition Authorities (NCAs). 
Moreover, particular attention was paid to patent settlement agreements be-
tween pioneers and generic manufacturers. These conducts were in fact subject to 
a more focused monitoring, which so far has led to seven periodical Reports as 
follow-up to the Inquiry. In this context, the Commission introduced a categorisa-
tion of settlement agreements based on the combination of two elements: whether 
the agreement poses a limitation on generic entry, and whether a value transfer 
from the brand firm to the generic producer is envisaged. Three categories have 
thus been singled out: agreements not restricting generic entry into the market are 
characterised as A-type, while those posing such limitation (B-type category) are 
further subdivided into B.I settlements, which do not involve a value transfer from 
the originator to the generic, and B.II settlements, which do include this additional 
element. 
The Commission has reaffirmed in its monitoring Reports that the B.II catego-
ry is likely to attract the highest degree of antitrust scrutiny. However, any agree-
ment would need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. The last one of these 
Reports, covering the period from January to December 2015, was published on 
13 December 201678 and confirmed the general trend of a continued use of patent 
settlements in the European pharmaceutical sector. The total number of agree-
                                                        
78  All Reports on the Monitoring of Patent Settlements are available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition. 
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ments concluded throughout the mentioned period appears to have substantially 
increased as compared to the last year of monitoring, even though it did not ex-
ceed the peaks reached in previous years79. 
With regard to policy recommendations, in the Inquiry the EU institution con-
firmed its efforts towards the creation of a unified patent system and the adoption 
of the legal instruments related thereto, as well as streamlined marketing authori-
sation processes and improved pricing and reimbursement procedures. These 
aims, however, did not appear to be particularly innovative, as they have been al-
ready pointed out by the Commission in other instances80. 
The issues highlighted in the Inquiry, in particular concerning competition be-
tween originators and generics, are still much debated to this day. In fact, it was 
followed by an active antitrust enforcement that led to the opening of several in-
vestigations against pharmaceutical companies regarding alleged violations of 
Art. 101 and/or Art. 102 TFEU at both EU and national levels. In some cases the 
decisions have been appealed before the courts, thus providing for a further evalu-
ation of the potential anticompetitive conducts. A thorough analysis and subse-
quent critical assessment of this body of case law will be carried out in the follow-
ing chapters. 
  
                                                        
79 More precisely, 125 settlements between originators and generics were concluded in 2015, 
compared to 76 in 2014, 146 in 2013, 183 in 2012, 120 in 2011, 89 in 2010 and 73 in 2009. In this 
regard it should be specified that the considerable increase of agreements in the years 2012-2013 
was partly due to the enactment of a Portuguese law (No. 62/2011, published on 12 December 
2011), under which any dispute on IPRs relating to pharmaceuticals shall be settled by mandatory 
arbitration. 
80 In relation to the improvement of the patent system see for example the Communication 
from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Enhancing the patent system in 
Europe, COM(2007) 165 final of 3 April 2007; regarding the procedural framework for marketing 
drugs see, among others, the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 
Safe, Innovative and Accessible Medicines: a Renewed Vision for the Pharmaceutical Sector, 
COM(2008) 666 of 10 December 2008. Both are available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu. 
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2.2.2. IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
As opposed to the EU legal system, in the US a sector-specific regulatory 
framework for the pharmaceutical industry has been provided. The Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 81  (best known as the 
Hatch-Waxman Act) represents the landmark piece of legislation in this area, 
passed by the Congress with the intention of increasing competition from generic 
drugs by streamlining their application process and favouring the incentives of 
challenging invalid patents. 
On the one hand, the Act allows generics manufacturers to file an Abbreviated 
New Drug Application (hereinafter also ANDA) with the Food and Drug Admin-
istration (hereinafter also FDA) on the condition that they demonstrate the bioe-
quivalence (i.e. the same active ingredients and performance) between the generic 
product and a patented drug already listed in the Approved Drug Products with 
Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluation (also known as the Orange Book) 82. 
On the other hand, the filing of an ANDA can be referred to the marketing of a 
generic either before or after the expiry of the relevant patents of the bioequiva-
lent brand product. When a pre-expiration marketing is sought, the generic manu-
facturer is moreover required to certify that such patents are invalid or not in-
                                                        
81 Public Law No. 98-417, Sept. 24, 1984, 98 Stat. 1585, which amended, among others, the 
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S. Code, Chapter 9 - FD&C Act) as regards to the 
procedures for new drugs applications. For an exhaustive comment of all the provisions intro-
duced, see, among others, E.J. FLANNERY, P.B. HUTT, Balancing Competition and Patent Protec-
tion in the Drug Industry: the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 
in 40 Food Drug Cosmetic Law Journal, 1985, pp. 269-309; for a perspective on the future chal-
lenges and proposed amendments to the Act, see A.S. KESSELHEIM, J.J. DARROW, Hatch-Waxman 
Turns 30: Do We Need a Re-Designed Approach for the Modern Era?, in 15 Yale Journal of 
Health Policy, Law and Ethics, 2015, pp. 293-347. 
82 The listing of a new drug in the Orange Book and the consequent marketing approval comes 
at the end of a time-consuming and high-risk process, in which a brand company must submit a 
New Drug Application (NDA) to the FDA demonstrating the safety and effectiveness of its prod-
uct through expensive clinical trials. For an overview of the requirements for the submission of 
such applications, see www.fda.gov. 
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fringed by the new drug. This, known as a «Paragraph-IV Certification», amounts 
to an actual infringement of the patents held by the brand firm and has precise 
consequences under the regime provided by the Hatch-Waxman Act. In fact, if the 
patent challenge is successful, and the generic producer was the first to have filed 
an ANDA with a Paragraph-IV Certification, it is entitled to a 180-day exclusivity 
right whereby the new generic drug and the originator product are the only com-
petitors in the given market. The patent holder may nevertheless decide to bring a 
lawsuit against the generic manufacturer within 45 days from the receipt of notice 
of the Paragraph-IV Certification, thus automatically staying the ANDA proceed-
ings for a maximum duration of 30 months. 
To compensate the potential anticompetitive restraints that a strategic use of 
these two main features of the regulatory framework could bring about, Title XI 
of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 
200383 introduced some amendments to the regime provided under the Hatch-
Waxman Act. 
As far as the 30-month stay is concerned, the 2003 rules place a limit of one 
stay per ANDA, which can only be referred to patents listed in the Orange Book 
before the filing of the application. Therefore, no additional 30-month stay could 
be triggered in relation to new patents concerning the same drug that an innovator 
may have listed and the generic company need to have filed an ANDA thereto. 
Moreover, with regard to the 180-day exclusivity, the Medicare Act establishes 
a list of forfeiture events related to the failure of the first ANDA applicant with a 
Paragraph-IV Certification to get the new drug on the market. The purpose of this 
provision is thus to prevent the first generic manufacturer challenging the innova-
tor’s patents, to take advantage of its exclusivity right as a way of delaying com-
petition84.  
                                                        
83 Public Law No. 108-173, Dec. 8, 2003, 117 Stat. 2066. 
84 See S.M. GREENE, A Prescription for Change: How the Medicare Act Revises the Hatch-
Waxman to Speed Market Entry of Generic Drugs, in 30 Journal of Corporation Law, 2005, pp. 
309-356, for a comment on the case law dealing with the abuse of the above-mentioned provisions 
and an evaluation of the amendments introduced by the 2003 rules.  
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The role played by settlements within this regulatory framework, especially be-
fore the expiration of the patents related to the brand product, can therefore be of 
great importance85, as will be further discussed in the third chapter of the thesis86. 
By settling the patent challenge with the first generic manufacturer to have filed 
an ANDA with a Paragraph-IV Certification, the innovator agrees to pay a large 
sum in exchange for withholding the generic entry into the market. Considering 
the mentioned 180-day exclusivity that follows from such an ANDA application, 
no other generic firm would be entitled to enter the market and a considerable an-
ticompetitive harm would be caused. 
Moreover, within the US regulatory framework, another aspect that is worth 
mentioning is the statutory research exemption rule (the so-called “safe harbour 
statute”) provided for in 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)87. Mirroring the already examined 
Bolar provision in the Directive 2001/83/EC, this rule was introduced by the 
Hatch-Waxman Act following the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit in the case Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical 
Co88, where it was held that the legal framework at the time did not exempt the 
activities carried out for experimental purposes, and subsequent submission of 
testing data to a regulatory agency, from patent infringement. The aim of said 
amendment was therefore to allow a faster route to the market for generic prod-
                                                        
85 See extensively C.S. HEMPHILL, Paying for delay: pharmaceutical patent settlement as a 
regulatory design problem, in 81 New York University Law Review, 2006, pp. 101-167, at pp. 124-
125. 
86 See infra, Chapter three, Sections 3.1 and 3.3. 
87 The rule, more precisely, reads as follows: «[i]t shall not be an act of infringement to make, 
use, offer to sell, or sell within the United States or import into the United States a patented inven-
tion (other than a new animal drug or veterinary biological product (as those terms are used in the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913) which is primarily manufac-
tured using recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA, hybridoma technology, or other processes in-
volving site specific genetic manipulation techniques) solely for uses reasonably related to the de-
velopment and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, 
use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products». 
88 Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cited 
above. 
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ucts that were equivalent to already approved drugs, in accordance with the gen-
eral policy objectives of the Act itself89. 
                                                        
89 For a further analysis of the provisions, as well as its practical application, see for example 
A.C. SERVER, Application of the Hatch-Waxman Act’s Safe Harbor Provision Following Momen-
ta, in 13 The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law, 2013, pp. 1-67. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
CASE LAW ANALYSIS 
 
SECTION ONE 
CASE LAW ON RESTRICTIVE AGREEMENTS 
 
Taking into account the findings of the 2009 Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry, 
this section will discuss a selection of follow-up cases regarding practices be-
tween originator companies and generic producers, as well as between pioneers, 
that potentially infringe Art. 101 TFEU. 
With regard to the former, the focus is set in particular on reverse payment set-
tlement agreements, which have been dealt with by the European Commission in 
four probes (one is still pending) as a result of the above-mentioned findings of 
the Sector Inquiry in this specific context. One of the decisions issued by the EU 
institution has also been tested by the General Court, and thus the legal assess-
ment acquires even more significance.  
Then, a comparison with the landmark US Supreme Court ruling in the Actavis 
case is presented in order to assess differences and similarities of its approach 
with the legal reasoning of the EU institution. 
This overview ends with an analysis of practice in Member States, namely that 
of the UK where reverse payment settlements have been investigated by the Com-
petition and Markets Authority (hereinafter also CMA) in the Paroxetine case. 
As to competition between originators, the analysis takes into account the prac-
tice of another Member State – Italy – regarding the dispute in which the Italian 
Competition Authority (hereinafter also ICA) opposed the brand companies 
Roche and Novartis. 
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2.1.1. IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
The Commission directed its antitrust scrutiny under Art. 101 TFEU towards 
reverse payment agreements concluded between originator companies and generic 
manufacturers. They form part of the most comprehensive category of patent set-
tlements, which is subject to the follow-up monitoring activity of the EU enforcer 
as mentioned in the previous section. Their distinctive feature resides in the value 
transfer flowing from the brand producer to the generic as a form of compensation 
for delaying the entry into the market of the generic’s competing product and set-
tling the patent litigation between them. Therefore, these agreements qualify as 
«reversed» in the sense that the direction of the value transfer is opposite to the 
one that usually occurs when settling patent disputes. They are also known as 
«pay-for-delay» because of their effect of excluding generic competition from the 
given market for the time agreed upon1. It should be noted, however, that such a 
definition of pay-for-delay agreements actually has a broader scope than the no-
tion of reverse payment settlements, insofar as the former also applies where a 
value transfer in exchange for a delayed entry in the market takes place without 
being agreed upon in a patent dispute. 
Furthermore, the value transfer at issue can take different forms depending on 
the terms of the agreement that the parties opt for: the basic scheme entails a di-
rect cash payment from the patentee to the generic company, but there are also 
other types of value transfer such as distribution or licensing agreements, and 
side-deals on authorised generic drugs (hereinafter also AG) or co-promotion 
agreements. The manifold arrangements actually constitute an element that needs 
to be properly considered when assessing a potential infringement of Art. 101 
TFEU, as the agreement needs to undergo a cost/benefit analysis whereby a prop-
er transfer of value should be acknowledged only if «the cost to the payer appre-
                                                        
1  See L. ARNAUDO, Dispute farmaceutiche e concorrenza: il caso Lundbeck, in Il Foro 
italiano, 2015, IV, cc. 326-332. 
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ciably exceeds what they otherwise receive»2. This view is also confirmed in the 
Commission’s Inquiry, according to which the competition law evaluation re-
quires an «in-depth analysis of the individual agreement» on the basis of the «fac-
tual, economic and legal background»3. However, as it will be further underlined, 
the EU watchdog has then distanced itself from this effects-based approach and 
rather applied in its decisions the stricter legal standard of a restriction of competi-
tion by object. 
 
Lundbeck case. 
The first Commission decision on this matter was issued on 19 June 2013 in 
the Lundbeck case4. The agreements entered into between 2002 and 2003 by the 
involved pharmaceutical companies (Lundbeck, Alpharma, Merck, Arrow and 
Ranbaxy) were found to infringe Art. 101 TFEU (and Art. 53 of the EEA Agree-
ment, which has the same scope), and the drugmakers were consequently fined. 
The factual background of the case refers to the blockbuster antidepressant 
drug citalopram, which the Denmark-based company Lundbeck marketed in the 
EEA under the brand names «Celexa» and «Cipramil». The originator held both 
                                                        
2 P. TREACY, S. LAWRANCE, Intellectual Property Rights and Out of Court Settlements, in S. 
ANDERMAN, A. EZRACHI (eds.), Intellectual Property and Competition Law. New Frontiers, Ox-
ford-New York, 2011, pp. 277-302, at p. 290. 
3  Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Final Report, 8 July 2009, para. 1530, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition. 
4 Commission decision of 19 June 2013, case AT.39926, Lundbeck, published on 19 January 
2015, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition; see also the press release IP/13/563, available 
at http://europa.eu/rapid. For further comments on the case see A. GIANNACCARI, «Pay for delay» 
nel settore farmaceutico: il caso Lundbeck, in Mercato concorrenza regole, 2014, pp. 561-570; L. 
ARNAUDO, Dispute farmaceutiche e concorrenza, cited above; A. ZULLI, A. ROBERT, C. BURTON, 
P. BOGAERT, The Commission’s Lundbeck Decision: A Compass to Navigate between Scylla and 
Charybdis?, in Intellectual Property and Technology Law Journal, 2015, No. 6, pp. 3-17; D. 
GERADIN, D.H. GINSBURG, G. SAFTY, Reverse Settlements in the European Union and the United 
States, in G. PITRUZZELLA, G. MUSCOLO (eds.), Competition and Patent Law in the Pharmaceuti-
cal Sector: An International Perspective, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2016, pp. 125-146, at pp. 139-143; 
V. SCHRÖDER, Pay-for-delay settlements in the EU: did the Commission go too far?, in European 
Competition Law Review, 2016, pp. 506-512. 
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product patents on citalopram and process patents to produce the active product 
ingredient (hereinafter also API) that were granted in most Western European 
countries between 1977 and 1985, but the drug was only introduced in the EEA 
markets in the mid-1990s. Therefore, the available time to exploit the product was 
relatively short, as the patent expiry of the compound in a significant number of 
European countries was due in 2002. Lundbeck started setting up a strategy to 
face the approaching generic entry into the citalopram market, which comprised 
the filing of numerous patent applications for manufacturing processes of the API, 
including a new crystallisation process, and persuading generic manufacturers to 
stop their efforts to enter the market. The ultimate goal was to create a «window 
of opportunity»5 for Lundbeck’s successor product escitalopram before the entry 
of generic citalopram, in order to switch the patients to the new drug and to ensure 
continued high turnover and profitability. The strategy was partly successful, as 
Lundbeck managed to eliminate the competitive threat of the earliest generic API 
producers between 1999 and 2000, though other manufacturers kept on planning 
their entry. Following the expiry of the product patent, the originator thus re-
sponded by threatening, or in some instances actually starting, infringement litiga-
tion in 9 different EEA contracting States using its remaining process patents. 
Moreover – and this is the most relevant conduct from a competition law perspec-
tive – to the other generic suppliers that appeared undeterred by the legal disputes, 
Lundbeck offered to reach separate agreements in which the originator transferred 
lump sums of money to the generic companies in exchange for the delay, for a 
given period of time, in entering into the citalopram market with their versions of 
the product. It is worth noting that even though these agreements were concluded 
against the background of patent litigation, they did not actually resolve the un-
derlying disputes, but «rather postponed generic entry for a certain period of time, 
leaving open what would happen afterwards»6. Therefore, they should not be re-
garded as patent settlements in the narrower sense, but the case is nonetheless to 
be included in the pay-for-delay category. 
                                                        
5 Commission decision of 19 June 2013, Lundbeck, cited above, paras. 135-143. 
6 Ibid., para. 194. 
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As to the merits of the case, the Commission adopted a three-pronged approach 
to carry out its assessment of the agreements between Lundbeck and the four ge-
neric manufacturers. Firstly, it had to establish whether the involved undertakings 
«were at the time of the events at least potential competitors»7 taking into account 
the originator’s existing patents. In this regard the EU antitrust enforcer observed 
that Lundbeck’s patent protection on the API had already expired by January 2002 
in most EEA contracting States, and that the remaining process patents were not 
capable of blocking all marketable versions of the citalopram compound. There-
fore, potential competition from the generic undertakings was not only theoreti-
cally possible, but also very likely, once they had obtained the necessary market-
ing authorisation. It is also worth mentioning that the Commission disregarded 
Lundbeck’s claim according to which the generic undertakings could not be con-
sidered potential competitors because they were manufacturing their products by 
infringing its patents. Indeed, the EU institution reminded that as long as a court 
had not ruled on the infringement proceedings, the generic versions of the drug 
could only be regarded as potentially infringing, and the generic suppliers may 
nonetheless resort to an amended and non-infringing process to produce the rele-
vant API. 
Then the Commission analysed the restriction of competition pursuant to Art. 
101(1) TFEU for the case at hand. After holding that a settlement concluded in the 
context of a patent dispute between originators and generics would normally not 
infringe said provision if the agreed conditions did not overcome the rights grant-
ed by patent law, the EU antitrust authority underlined, however, that «the means 
used by patent holders to defend their rights matter»8. In fact, even though the 
limitations provided in such a settlement do not go beyond the substantive scope 
of a patent, they are still likely to run afoul of EU competition law if they result 
from a transfer of value flowing in favour of the generic companies and inducing 
them to refrain from entering the market with their competing products. The in-
fringement is all the more likely when said restrictions overcome the exclusionary 
                                                        
7 Commission decision of 19 June 2013, Lundbeck, cited above, paras. 610-636. 
8 Ibid., para. 641. 
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boundaries of patent protection, given that they could have never been obtained 
even through a court ruling. This second circumstance precisely occurred in the 
Lundbeck case: on the one hand, competition in the citalopram market was in 
principle open upon expiration of the originator’s patent on the API and, on the 
other hand, the commitment from the generic undertakings to delay their entry for 
a given period could not be justified on the basis of the process patents still in 
force, because their scope was «limited to the particular process covered by that 
[exclusive right] and products directly obtained by the patented process»9. More-
over, the Commission noted that it was actually in the interests of both parties to 
enter into an agreement like those in question. For the originator company it 
would evidently eliminate the risk of a court ruling establishing the invalidity or 
the non-infringement of its patent and the consequent loss of a significant amount 
of profits, but the generic manufacturer would benefit as well, by making the 
same earnings, or even more, as when entering the market with its competing 
product, but without any of the risks related thereto. 
Thirdly, the Commission examined the amount of value transferred from 
Lundbeck to the generic companies in each settlement. This assessment confirmed 
that the payment agreed upon in exchange for the commitment not to enter the 
market ultimately influenced the parties’ anticompetitive behaviour also from an 
economic point of view. 
The legal consequence of said circumstances is therefore the existence of a re-
striction of competition by object under Art. 101(1) TFEU, because the value 
transfer from the originator to the generic undertakings had the very purpose of 
limiting the entry into the market of potential competitors. 
Having considered the infringement of Art. 101(1) TFEU as founded, the 
Commission furthermore examined possible justifications pursuant to Art. 101(3) 
of the same Treaty (and Art. 53(3) of the EEA Agreement). In this regard, it con-
cluded that none of the involved companies submitted enough evidence to sub-
stantiate the four cumulative conditions required to benefit from an individual ex-
emption, particularly the one regarding the efficiency gains claimed by the parties. 
                                                        
9 Ibid., para. 642. 
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Both the originator and the generic manufacturers have lodged an appeal with 
the EU General Court for the annulment of the decision, questioning, in particular, 
the Commission’s assessment of potential competition and the finding of a re-
striction of competition by object under Art. 101(1) TFEU. The EU Court deliv-
ered its judgments on 8 September 2016, rejecting all pleas in law raised by the 
applicants and dismissing the actions in their entirety10. Given that these rulings 
share a common line of reasoning concerning the main issues at stake, they can be 
examined together under this perspective. With regard to the argument that 
Lundbeck and the generics were potential competitors at the time the agreements 
were concluded, it maintained that the Commission had carried out a thorough as-
sessment, regarding each of the generic undertakings involved, of «the real con-
crete possibilities they had of entering the market»11. Indeed, such finding was 
supported by objective evidence12, having established that each of the generic un-
dertakings already had (or could have obtained within reasonable time) a non-
infringing version of the drug about to enter the market when the agreements with 
                                                        
10 General Court, judgments of 8 September 2016, case T-460/13, Sun Pharmaceutical Indus-
tries Ltd, formerly Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd and Ranbaxy (UK) Ltd v. European Commission, 
EU:T:2016:453; case T-467/13, Arrow Group ApS and Arrow Generics Ltd v. European Commis-
sion, EU:T:2016:450; case T-469/13, Generics (UK) Ltd v. European Commission, 
EU:T:2016:454; case T-470/13, Merck KGaA v. European Commission, EU:T:2016:452; case T-
471/13, Xellia Pharmaceuticals ApS and Alpharma, LLC, formerly Zoetis Products LLC v. Euro-
pean Commission, EU:T:2016:460; case T-472/13, H. Lundbeck A/S and Lundbeck Ltd v. Europe-
an Commission, EU:T:2016:449. All CJEU judgments cited in the present work are available at 
http://curia.europa.eu. For further comments see B. BATCHELOR, H. SHERATON, F. CARLIN, M. 
HEALY, Lundbeck raises more questions than answers on “pay for delay” settlements; creates 
damaging divergence from US law, in European Competition Law Review, 2017, pp. 3-7; R. 
SUBIOTTO, J. FIGUS DIAZ, Lundbeck v Commission: Reverse Payment Patent Settlements as Re-
striction of Competition by Object, in Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2017, pp. 
27-29. 
11 General Court, judgment of 8 September 2016, Lundbeck, cited above, para. 142. 
12 The General Court underlined that the Commission had in fact considered various circum-
stances in this regard, among which the significant investments undertaken by the generic manu-
facturers in order to prepare their entry into the market and the fact that some of them had already 
obtained a MA for their products. 
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Lundbeck were concluded. According to the Court, this was sufficient to state that 
the generics exerted effective competitive pressure on the originator, without the 
Commission being required to show that they would have been able to actually 
enter the market with a commercially viable and non-infringing process during the 
term of the agreements. 
As to the existence of a restriction by object within the meaning of Art. 101(1), 
which represents the core argument of the contested decision, the General Court 
carried out a comprehensive assessment ultimately confirming such strict legal 
standard. First of all, it acknowledged, however, that the mere presence of a re-
verse payment in the context of a patent settlement does not by itself raise compe-
tition law concerns. What distinguished the agreements at issue was rather the fact 
that they replaced, by means of reverse payments, the uncertainty deriving from a 
situation of potential competition with the certainty that the generic undertakings 
would not have entered the market with their products during the term of the 
agreements. The payments, in fact, amounted to a «buying-off of competition»13, 
which did not actually reflect the strength of the underlying patents, as it would be 
in the context of a proper settlement. The General Court further qualified the 
agreements between Lundbeck and the generics undertakings as «market exclu-
sion agreements»14, which is as an extreme form of the desire to share a market 
and limit production resulting from the combination of points (b) and (c) of the 
non-exhaustive list provided in Art. 101(1) TFEU. Therefore, on the basis of ob-
jective evidence, it concluded that the agreements in question restricted competi-
tion «in a sufficiently serious manner as to be classified as a restriction ‘by ob-
ject’». As it will be thoroughly discussed in the last chapter15, the standard applied 
by the Commission and confirmed by the General Court was considered to be 
consistent with previous CJEU case law on the distinction between restrictions of 
                                                        
13 General Court, judgment of 8 September 2016, Lundbeck, cited above, para. 352. 
14 This notion is recurring in the mentioned decisions of the General Court: see judgments of 8 
September 2016, Sun Pharmaceuticals, cited above, para. 222; Arrow Group, cited above, para, 
230; Merck, cited above, para. 210; Xellia Pharmaceuticals, cited above, para. 267; Lundbeck, cit-
ed above, para. 435. 
15 See infra, Chapter three, Section 3.1. 
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competition by object and by effect, and therefore an assessment of their anticom-
petitive effects in light of the legal and economic context was not required. This 
conclusion, moreover, was not excluded by the circumstance that the Commission 
had not ruled in the past on whether this type of agreement constitutes a re-
striction by object or by effect16. 
The General Court has also explicitly rejected the legal standard of the scope-
of-the-patent test to assess patent settlement agreements under Art. 101.1 TFEU, 
referring to the approach already adopted by the US Supreme Court in Actavis17. 
In this regard, it held that such a test proved to be problematic in a competition 
law context and, in any case, it is based on a subjective evaluation of the scope of 
the patent and its validity taken by the involved companies. In any case, the 
agreements at issue went even beyond the specific subject matter of Lundbeck’s 
IPRs, because they did not include the right to pay potential competitors in ex-
change for the commitment not to enter the market with their products. 
On 18 November 2016, Lundbeck filed an appeal with the Court of Justice, 
asking to set aside the General Court judgment18. 
The first judgments by a EU court concerning reverse payment settlements thus 
confirm the narrow approach already taken by the Commission, even though the 
case law is still developing and appears to have further questions to assess in this 
matter. 
 
Johnson&Johnson and Novartis case. 
The second Commission decision was rendered on 10 December 2013 and 
concerned the brand drugmakers Johnson&Johnson (J&J) and Novartis, which 
                                                        
16 Also this argument is a common ground of all the General Court’s decisions regarding the 
Lundbeck case: see judgments of 8 September 2016, Sun Pharmaceuticals, cited above, para. 272; 
Arrow Group, cited above, para, 281; Generics (UK), cited above, para. 151; Merck, cited above, 
para. 212; Xellia Pharmaceuticals, cited above, para. 319; Lundbeck, cited above, para. 438. 
17 General Court, judgment of 8 September 2016, Lundbeck, cited above, paras. 478-516. 
18 Case C-591/16 P, H. Lundbeck A/S, Lundbeck Limited v. European Commission, OJ C 30 of 
30 January 2017, p. 25. 
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were held liable under Art. 101(1) TFEU and fined for entering into a co-
promotion agreement through their respective subsidiaries19. 
The facts of the case involve fentanyl, a synthetic opioid that is used to treat 
chronic pain and was introduced to the market by J&J in the 1960s. Its compound 
patent expired in 1982 and has been commercialised in the European market in 
various forms, the most common of which is the transdermal patch. The first type 
of product developed by the pioneer company was the depot (or reservoir) patch, 
while the second-generation product was the matrix patch, which replaced the 
previous version of the medicine after the expiry of the data exclusivity for the 
purposes of marketing authorisation. In the Netherlands, in particular, even 
though no granted patent protected either versions of the product, the depot patch 
lost its exclusivity on 4 March 2004 and the matrix patch was launched in August 
of the same year. Generic competitors were therefore preparing to enter the mar-
ket with their own depot patches. Novartis’ Dutch subsidiary Hexal B.V./Sandoz 
B.V. was in an advanced stage of development and was expected to launch its 
product in the second quarter of 2005. However, this launch never took place be-
cause of a subsequent agreement concluded in July 2005 between Hexal/Sandoz 
and J&J’s Dutch subsidiary Janssen-Cilag B.V., which was already marketing the 
matrix patch in said Member State. Under the terms of the agreement Hex-
al/Sandoz committed to promote Janssen-Cilag’s matrix patch within the Nether-
lands by providing a series of non-specified services, whereas Janssen-Cilag 
granted monthly payments to its competitor. The parties also concluded an adden-
dum to further extend the validity of the agreement for another year, until 10 July 
2007, but it was eventually terminated beforehand on 15 December 2006. The co-
operation however continued in the form of a supply agreement that granted Hex-
al/Sandoz the non-exclusive right to purchase and sell fentanyl patches under its 
                                                        
19  Commission decision of 10 December 2013, case AT.39685, Fentanyl, published on 5 
March 2015, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition; see also the press release IP/13/1233, 
available at http://europa.eu/rapid. For further comments see D. GERADIN, D.H. GINSBURG, G. 
SAFTY, Reverse Settlements, cited above, pp. 139-143; D.W. HULL, M.J. CLANCY, The Application 
of EU Competition Law in the Pharmaceutical Sector, in Journal of European Competition Law & 
Practice, 2016, pp. 150-161, at p. 153 f. 
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generic brand. In parallel, the same supply agreement was concluded also with a 
third independent party. 
Preliminarily it must be borne in mind that this case needs to be distinguished 
from the others investigated by the Commission in this context. In fact, the co-
promotion agreement between Janssen-Cilag and Hexal/Sandoz did not relate to 
patent litigation, as no patent protection on the compound was in force in the 
Netherlands at the time of the agreement, and the data exclusivity had already ex-
pired. Nonetheless, the EU institution adopted a legal reasoning similar to the 
Lundbeck case. 
Also in this case the concept of potential competition played a major role in the 
assessment20. Hexal/Sandoz was not only capable of entering the Dutch fentanyl 
market with its generic version of depot patches, but the evidence showed that it 
was also very close to doing so by August 2005 at the latest, when the originator’s 
second-generation product was about to be launched. Therefore, J&J perceived 
the generic company as its most advanced potential competitor. 
Then the Commission analysed in detail the content, objectives and implemen-
tation of the agreement in question. On the one hand, it considered the co-
promotion activities required from Hexal/Sandoz under the terms of the agree-
ment, concluding that they were actually limited in their scope and «of only mar-
ginal importance for Janssen-Cilag» 21 . On the other hand, it focused on the 
«prominent feature»22 of the agreement, namely the termination clause installing a 
non-entry mechanism. More precisely, the provision of immediate termination of 
the agreement by Janssen-Cilag in case of generic entry by Hexal/Sandoz, paired 
up with the value transfer that considerably exceeded the generic’s expected prof-
its, rendered the launch of Hexal/Sandoz’s competing product «financially com-
pletely unattractive»23. Moreover, the mentioned objective elements were con-
firmed by the intentions of the parties, who acted in full knowledge of the impli-
cations of their agreement. 
                                                        
20 Commission decision of 10 December 2013, Fentanyl, cited above, paras. 226-256. 
21 Ibid., para. 310. 
22 Ibid., para. 314. 
23 Ibid. 
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As to the legal assessment of the infringement ensuing from said agreement, 
the Commission confirmed the approach adopted in Lundbeck and concluded with 
a finding of a restriction of competition by object under Art. 101(1) TFEU. In-
deed, the agreement made it possible for Janssen-Cilag to maintain its supra-
competitive prices on the fentanyl patch market and to share them with a potential 
competitor that would have posed a serious threat to its monopoly. The case is 
thus included in the broader «pay-for-delay» category and follows the Commis-
sion’s precedent on this matters. 
 
Servier case. 
The EU antitrust enforcer issued its third (and so far last) decision in this re-
gard on 9 July 201424. The Servier case provides the most comprehensive assess-
ment of a proper patent settlement under a competition law perspective, because 
an infringement of both Arts. 101 and 102 TFEU was found, and in addition the 
restriction on competition pursuant to Art. 101(1) was examined under both by 
object and by effect legal standards. 
The factual context refers to perindopril, a drug used in the area of cardiovas-
cular diseases that was developed by the French company Servier and marketed 
under the brand names «Coversyl» and «Prestarium». The compound patent was 
granted in 1981 and during the 1980s the protection was also obtained for a num-
ber of key processes required for its preparation. The medicine became a block-
buster over the years and therefore Servier devised a strategy against the entry of 
generic competition in preparation of the expiry of its patents, which occurred on 
29 September 2001 for the compound patent (prolonged until 2003 in some 
                                                        
24 Commission decision of 9 July 2014, case AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), published on 14 
July 2015 in a provisional non-confidential version available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition; 
see also the press release IP/14/799, available at http://europa.eu/rapid. For further comments see 
A. EUFINGER, „pay-for-delay-agreements” als wettbewerbswidrige Patentverlängerungen im 
Pharmabereich, in Pharmarecht, 2015, pp. 385-390; C. DESOGUS, Manovre di avvicinamento tra 
l’Europa e gli Stati Uniti: il caso Servier sui patent settlements, in Mercato concorrenza regole, 
2016, pp. 249-278; D. GERADIN, D.H. GINSBURG, G. SAFTY, Reverse Settlements, cited above, pp. 
139-143; V. SCHRÖDER, Pay-for-delay settlements in the EU, cited above. 
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Member States through SPC extensions). The originator’s scheme comprised sev-
eral practices, including the filing of a patent cluster25, the acquisition of alterna-
tive technologies to produce the API 26 , the conclusion of patent settlements 
agreements and, ultimately, the switch to its own second-generation product that 
had already obtained both patent protection (until 2023) and marketing authorisa-
tion, even though it did not possess an actual added therapeutic value. With par-
ticular regard to the patent agreements, they were concluded between 2005 and 
2007 to settle the challenges brought against Servier’ secondary patents by the 
most advanced competitors at that time, namely Niche/Unichem, Matrix, Teva, 
Krka and Lupin. The generic companies committed to end the patent litigation 
and refrain from launching their competing products in exchange for large cash 
payments and other inducements from Servier. 
The Commission first assessed the alleged infringement under Art. 101(1) 
TFEU. After recalling previous CJEU case law, in particular the 2008 Irish Beef 
judgment27 on the concept of «agreement having as its object the restriction of 
competition», the EU institution carried out a three-pronged analysis of the patent 
settlements in question, similarly to it did in the Lundbeck case. On the basis of 
the legal and economic background in which the agreements were reached, that is 
a context of patent litigation entailing uncertainty as to the infringement and the 
                                                        
25 Some of them were labelled as «paper patents» by Servier itself, however other process pa-
tents had the potential to hinder generic competition in the relevant market. In particular, the ‘947 
patent was strategically important as it covered the crystalline alpha form of the compound, which 
the vast majority of generic manufacturers implemented as alternative way to synthesise perin-
dopril. It was granted by the EPO in 2004, but later revoked by decision of 6 May 2009. Also, the 
validity of the ‘947 patent was challenged in several national jurisdictions, for example before the 
Court of Appeal of England and Wales.  
26 In this regard the Commission drew its attention particularly to the acquisition of the patent 
applications and know-how of the Swiss company Azad regarding an advanced non-alpha form for 
manufacturing perindopril API. The agreement with Azad took place in 2004. For a specific com-
ment see O. GURGULA, Anti-competitive patent acquisitions in the pharmaceutical industry, in Eu-
ropean Competition Law Review, 2017, pp. 35-38. 
27 Court of Justice, 20 November 2008, case C-207/09, Competition Authority v. Beef Industry 
Development Society Ltd and Barry Brothers (Carrigmore) Meats Ltd, EU:C:2008:643. 
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validity of the exclusionary rights, it was established that the mere existence of 
Servier’s remaining patents «did not bar all scope for potential or actual competi-
tion»28 from the generic companies. Then, the Commission considered the con-
tents of the settlements, in particular the contractual limitations imposed on the 
generic manufacturers and the transfer of value in a form of a reverse payment 
from the patent holder to the generics. In this regard it was again stressed that 
where said agreements are «affected by elements extraneous to the dis-
pute/litigation»29, notably payments and other inducements, they would impose 
limitations on the independent choices of the competitors in violation of Art. 
101(1) TFEU, even if they do not overcome the material scope of the underlying 
patent. These considerations led the EU authority to conclude that there was a re-
striction of competition by object, in accordance with its previously examined de-
cisions, given the settlements’ capacity to collusively remove potential competi-
tors and to affect the structure of the market. 
The Commission’s evaluation under Art. 101(1) TFEU went even further, ana-
lysing «for the sake of completeness, (…) the likely restrictive effects of the 
agreements on competition»30. The Servier decision thus adds a new perspective 
to the legal assessment of patent settlement cases, whereby the restriction of com-
petition by effect was ultimately considered founded as well. To this end the 
Commission largely relied on its Guidelines on Horizontal Agreements31, as well 
as the relevant CJEU case law, and took into account the actual conditions in 
which each of the patent settlements at issue was concluded. More precisely, the 
restrictive effects were assessed from a counterfactual perspective aimed at estab-
lishing the degree of competition (both actual and potential) that would have oc-
curred in the given market without the settlements. Then, the analysis focused on 
the structure of the market, in particular on Servier’s market power, which al-
                                                        
28 Commission decision of 9 July 2014, Perindopril (Servier), cited above, para. 1179. 
29 Ibid., para. 1137. 
30 Ibid., para. 1213. 
31 Communication from the Commission, Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements, OJ C 11 
of 14 January 2011, pp. 1-72. 
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lowed the originator to maintain its position by means of the devised anticompeti-
tive strategy. 
Concluding the assessment on the restrictive agreements, the exemption pursu-
ant to Art. 101(3) TFEU was also evaluated. According to the Commission, none 
of the parties submitted the evidence required to support their arguments of 
claimed efficiencies that could have met the four cumulative conditions of said 
provision. 
With regard to the alleged anticompetitive conducts under Art. 102 TFEU, it 
appears appropriate to defer the analysis of the Servier case to the following sec-
tion dedicated to abuses of a dominant position. However it is worth mentioning 
here that the Commission regarded this infringement as founded, thus holding the 
involved companies liable under both Art. 101 and Art. 102 TFEU, and fining 
them accordingly. 
On 21 September 2014 Servier filed an appeal with the General Court seeking 
for the annulment of the decision on the basis of seventeen pleas in law. The case 
is still pending32. 
 
Cephalon and Teva case. 
A fourth case of allegedly restrictive agreements in the pharmaceutical sector is 
still in progress. On 19 April 2011 the Commission opened an ex officio antitrust 
investigation against the originator company Cephalon and the generic manufac-
turer Teva with regard to a settlement reached in 2005 in the context of patent liti-
gation in the UK and the US concerning the drug modafinil, used to treat sleep 
disorders and commercialised under the brand name «Provigil»33. More precisely, 
the agreement reportedly refrained Teva from selling its generic version of the 
                                                        
32 Case T-691/14, Servier SAS, Servier Laboratoires Ltd and Les Laboratoires Servier SAS v. 
European Commission, OJ C 462 of 22 December 2014, p. 25. The decision was appealed also by 
Biogaran, which was held jointly liable with Servier with regard to the agreement with 
Niche/Unichem: case T-677/14, Biogaran v. European Commission, OJ C 395 of 10 November 
2014, p. 59 s. 
33 See the press release IP/11/511, available at http://europa.eu/rapid. 
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drug within the EEA markets until October 2012. The EU institution has yet to is-
sue its Statement of Objections. 
These decisions thus attest to a strict approach taken by the European Commis-
sion towards patent settlements between originators and generic manufacturers, as 
demonstrated by the finding, in each of the examined cases, of a restriction of 
competition by object under Art. 101(1) TFEU. The adoption of this legal stand-
ard is of particular importance, as is well known, because of its consequences on 
the burden of proof placed on the enforcement authority, being a prima facie case 
where a demonstration of actual anticompetitive effects is not needed. 
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2.1.2. IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
Actavis case. 
The previous chapter addressed how the specific regime provided by the 
Hatch-Waxman Act does to a certain extent affect the incentives to settle patent 
litigation in the US. This explains why cases of reverse payment patent settle-
ments between originator and generic companies have undergone an intense scru-
tiny by both the Federal Trade Commission (hereinafter also FTC) and the courts 
since the early 1990s34. Therefore, the US approach to these matters actually dates 
back to the past decades and has been developing through a significant case law, 
providing a qualified term of comparison for the more recent EU practice. In par-
ticular, different positions have emerged regarding the antitrust assessment of 
these agreements and the role (if any) played by patent law within such evalua-
tion35. 
On the one hand, the FTC since the start of its enforcement actions in this re-
gard has supported the position of per se illegality insofar as the settlement en-
tailed a significant compensation that was not justified by reasons other than ac-
cepting to postpone the generic drugs’ entry into the market. This reasoning is ul-
timately grounded on the increased costs imposed on consumers as a consequence 
of said settlements. Some commentators, however, have criticised this view for 
being too rigid, not distinguishing between anticompetitive and pro-competitive 
                                                        
34 In this regard, a distinction between «first-wave» and «second-wave» settlements is usually 
adopted. The former refer to agreements dating back between 1993 and 1999, which were rather 
basic and envisaged a «direct monetary payment» against a delayed entry until patent expiration, 
whereas the latter have emerged since 2005 and assumed a «more sophisticated form», e.g. an 
agreed entry prior to the expiration date, or indirect value transfer from the originator: as under-
lined by P.L. PARCU, M.A. ROSSI, Negotiated Foreclosure and IPRs: Recent Developments, in G. 
CAGGIANO, G. MUSCOLO, M. TAVASSI (eds.), Competition Law and Intellectual Property. A Eu-
ropean Perspective, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2012, pp. 155-176, at p. 160. 
35 For an overview of the cases and the related courts’ opinions see S. DE MARGERIE, ‘Pay-for-
Delay’ Settlements: In Search of the Right Standard, in 36 World Competition, 2013, pp. 85-98. 
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settlements36. Nevertheless, it was also maintained by the Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit in 2003, which held that the settlement at stake was a horizontal 
agreement and hence a per se illegal restraint of trade37. Following the same ap-
proach, the Third Circuit in 2012 however adopted a slightly different reasoning 
and ruled in favour of a quick-look rule of reason analysis38. According to this 
court, reverse payment settlements were presumed prima facie to unreasonably 
restrain trade, but the case was rebuttable by demonstrating either a different pur-
pose than delayed entry, or pro-competitive benefits of the payment. 
On the other hand, the opposite position applied the so-called “scope-of-the-
patent test”, according to which a patent settlement shall be considered immune 
from antitrust scrutiny under certain requirements: first, the exclusionary effect 
must fall within the scope and the term of the underlying patent; second, the pa-
tent holder’s infringement claim must not have been objectively baseless; and 
third, the patent must not have been procured by fraud on the US Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO). This second view represented the prevailing opinion 
among US courts, having been upheld by, as well as by the Second Circuit (in 
2002)39, as well as the Eleventh (in 2003)40 and the Federal Circuits (in 2008)41. 
The existing split among the Circuits was ultimately solved by the Supreme 
Court in its decision rendered on 17 June 2013 in the Actavis case42, which consti-
                                                        
36 For example, according to B.M. DICKEY, D. RUBINFELD, Would the per se illegal treatment 
of reverse payment settlements inhibit generic drug investment?, in Journal of Competition Law 
and Economics, 2012, pp. 615-625, at p. 621, the FTC’s approach «appears to be that for every 
“reverse payment” settlement there exists a settlement without a payment and an earlier entry date 
that will increase social welfare. Whether such an outcome is indeed feasible is not at all clear». 
37 In Re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 332 F.3d 896 (6th Circ. 2003). All US decisions cit-
ed in the present work are available at Westlaw database (www.westlaw.com). 
38 In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation, 686 F.3d 197 (3rd Cir. 2012). 
39 In Re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, 466 F.3d 187 (2nd Cir. 2002). 
40 Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003). 
41 In Re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
42 F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). The Court reached a 5-3 decision, which was 
delivered by Justice Breyer. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the dissenting opinion. The judgment 
gave rise to a heated debate in the literature, splitting between those who sustained the Supreme 
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tutes a turning point in the recent developments regarding the extent of the anti-
trust scrutiny into patent law. 
The case was brought before the Supreme Court following the appeal by FTC 
of the FTC v. Watson decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
given in 201243. The factual background refers to a settlement reached between 
the brand company Solvay, which held a patent for the drug AndroGel, and three 
generic manufacturers (Watson Pharmaceuticals, Paddock Laboratories and Par 
Pharmaceuticals) in the context of a patent litigation stemming from two separate 
ANDAs with Paragraph-IV Certifications. Under the terms of the settlement the 
generic drug’s entry into the market was basically delayed until 2015 (that was 
five years after the patent expiry) in exchange for annual cash payments from 
Solvay amounting to millions of dollars. The FTC thus filed a lawsuit against all 
the settling parties claiming an antitrust violation. However, the District Court44 
did not regard it as founded and dismissed the complaint. The decision was ap-
                                                        
Court’s position, and those who deemed it as excessively strict. For the former, see for example A. 
EDLIN, S. HEMPHILL, H. HOVENKAMP, C. SHAPIRO, Activating Actavis, in 28 Antitrust, Fall 2013, 
pp. 16-23; and by the same Authors, Actavis and Error Costs: A Reply to Critics, in The Antitrust 
Source, October 2014, available at www.antitrustsource.com; H. HOVENKAMP, Anticompetitive 
Patent Settlements and the Supreme Court’s Actavis Decision, in 15 Minnesota Journal of Law, 
Science & Technology, 2014, pp. 3-39. For the latter, see for instance R.J.R. PERITZ, The Competi-
tion Question Unasked in Actavis: What is the Scope of the Patent Right to Exclude?, in 28 Anti-
trust, Fall 2013, pp. 45-49; A.P. REEVES, Muddying the Settlement Waters: Open Questions and 
Unintended Consequences Following FTC v. Actavis, in 28 Antitrust, Fall 2013, pp. 9-14; G.S. 
LUNNEY, JR., FTC v. ACTAVIS: The Patent-Antitrust Intersection Revisited, in 93 North Carolina 
Law Review, 2015, pp. 375-458. The decision had resonance also in the European literature: see, 
among others, G. GÜRKANYAK, A. GÜNER, J. FILSON, The Global Reach of FTC v. Actavis – Will 
Europe Differ from the US Approach to Pay-for-Delay Agreements?, in International Review of 
Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 2014, pp. 128-160; F. LA ROCCA, Le problematiche 
dei “reverse payment settlement agreements” rispetto alla normativa antitrust, in Rivista di Dirit-
to Industriale, 2014, II, pp. 199-206. For an interesting perspective on the impact of Actavis even 
beyond pay-for-delay agreements, see A. DEVLIN, Antitrust and Patent Law, Oxford, 2016, pp. 24-
38. 
43 F.T.C. v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012). 
44 In re Androgel Antitrust Litigation (No. II), 678 F.Supp.2d 1371 (N.D. Ga. 2010). 
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pealed before the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which affirmed the 
District Court and resolved the case applying the above-mentioned scope-of-the-
patent test. On the contrary, the Supreme Court ruled in favour of an antitrust-
oriented approach, under which «the opportunity to prove [the] antitrust claim»45 
should be given to the plaintiff in a dispute regarding reverse payment settle-
ments. By rejecting the resort to presumptive rules, it thus held that the appropri-
ate standard is the rule-of-reason doctrine, leaving it to lower courts to further ad-
just this legal assessment to each individual case. It provided five sets of consid-
erations to support this reasoning. 
The first ground regards the potential adverse effects on competition that these 
settlements entail. The agreement at issue actually amounted to a purchase by the 
patentee himself of the exclusive right to sell its brand product that allowed him to 
maintain prices at high level of profit and share them with the competing patent 
challengers. In sum, by agreeing on dividing the patent-related return «the patent-
ee and the challenger gain; the consumer loses»46. This is all the more so where 
the settlement involves, as in the present case, the first Paragraph-IV ANDA filers 
within the regulatory framework of the Hatch-Waxman Act, who represent the 
most advanced competition against the brand company. 
Secondly, the Court admitted a reverse payment may serve different purposes, 
which under given circumstances do not raise antitrust concerns. For example, 
they may roughly amount to the litigation expenses expected from the parties, or 
reflect compensation for other services performed by the generic manufacturer. 
Nevertheless, this possibility should not amount to a presumption of validity, but 
rather both parties are required to prove their respective claims (in particular, the 
defendant needs to show the legitimate justifications underlying the agreement). 
As third reason the decision considered the power of the brand drugmaker to 
charge anticompetitive prices and thus bring anticompetitive harm in practice. 
This position on the market can be inferred by the size of the payment flowing 
                                                        
45 F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., cited above, at 2234. 
46 Ibid., at 2235. 
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from the brand to the generic, which «is itself a strong indicator of [such] pow-
er»47. 
The fourth consideration is probably the most crucial of the whole decision, in 
that it explains the feasibility of the antitrust claim under the rule of reason stand-
ard as opposed to the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion. Indeed, according to the Su-
preme Court, the assessment of the antitrust question can be carried out on the ba-
sis of the size of the payment, without litigating the validity and/or infringement 
of the patent and thus avoiding a complex and cost-consuming proceeding. In the 
Court’s words, «the size of the unexplained reverse payment can provide a work-
able surrogate for a patent’s weakness, all without forcing a court to conduct a de-
tailed exploration of the validity of the patent itself»48. A large payment would 
normally hint at the doubts the patentee has about the strength of its exclusionary 
right’ strength; as the literature has underlined, «the size of the payment may ac-
tually be a more reliable indicator to the extent it reflects the settling parties’ mar-
ket-based judgment about the patent’s probable prospects in a fully litigated in-
fringement suit»49, and further that applying this rationale to large reverse pay-
ments creates «an inference that the settlement is anticompetitive»50. The Court 
therefore supports the view of a general harm to competition arising from this 
kind of settlements. 
Fifthly, the Court stressed that the possibility of facing the antitrust scrutiny 
does not rule out every incentive for the parties to settle their patent disputes, as 
there may be other ways to reach an agreement that do not include a reverse pay-
ment. On the contrary, when the underlying reasons would result in an anticom-
petitive market sharing, the settlement is likely to be found illegal under antitrust 
laws. 
                                                        
47 Ibid., at 2236. 
48 Ibid., at 2236-2237. 
49 H. HOVENKAMP, Anticompetitive Patent Settlements, cited above, p. 21. 
50 A. EDLIN, S. HEMPHILL, H. HOVENKAMP, C. SHAPIRO, Activating Actavis, cited above, at p. 
16, where they refer to this consideration as «the essence of the Court’s opinion». 
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The Supreme Court thus concluded by leaving to the lower courts «the struc-
turing of the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation»51 on the basis of the guid-
ance it provided in its judgment. In this regard it reminded that the courts should 
direct the scrutiny «so as to avoid, on the one hand, the use of antitrust theories 
too abbreviated to permit proper analysis, and, on the other, consideration of eve-
ry possible fact or theory irrespective of the minimal light it may shed on the basic 
question—that of the presence of significant unjustified anticompetitive conse-
quences»52.  
After analysing the arguments of the Court’s decision, it is also worth to briefly 
examining the dissenting opinion in the case at hand. The main criticism to the 
majority regarded the choice of assessing the settlement between the patentee and 
the generic according to antitrust policies, rather than patent law policy, as it 
should be when the case involves a question of validity and/or infringement of a 
patent. Although the dissent admitted that patent agreements may sometimes be 
found unlawful under antitrust laws, it underlined that «those some times»53 have 
already been well established by the Court’s precedents as a matter of scope of the 
patent to be evaluated under patent law. Moreover, the dissenting opinion pointed 
out the mistaken consideration of the majority according to which it would not be 
necessary to litigate the validity of the patent in the context of an antitrust suit. 
This would imply that the defendant (i.e. the patent holder) could not invoke the 
exclusionary rights legitimately granted by its patent as a defence, thus depriving 
patent law of its aim. It ultimately concluded by foreseeing a general discourage-
ment for the generic manufacturers from challenging drug patents as a result of 
the stricter boundaries (i.e. without resorting to payments) for settling such 
claims54. 
                                                        
51 F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., cited above, at 2238. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid., at 2242. 
54 The dissenting opinion has been subjected to much debate in the legal literature as well. In 
particular, among those who supported the majority’s view and affirmed the importance of the an-
titrust scrutiny in assessing reverse payment settlements, see M.A. CARRIER, A Response to Chief 
Justice Roberts: Why Antitrust Must Play a Role in the Analysis of Drug Patent Settlements, in 15 
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Post-Actavis cases. 
Even after Actavis, complex issues related to the antitrust assessment of reverse 
payment patent settlement remain open in the US. Indeed, District Courts that 
have addressed them following the Supreme Court decision have not always ap-
plied its principles in a consistent manner. 
A question immediately perceived as problematic after the Supreme Court 
judgment deals with the determination of a «large and unjustified payment» flow-
ing from the originator to the generic company. In particular, two aspects of this 
notion need to be further assessed by lower courts, namely what constitutes a 
payment under Actavis principles and what makes such a payment large. 
With regard to the concept of payment, the Supreme Court actually analysed a 
case of cash transfer and made reference to this throughout its judgment. This 
provided the ground for two district courts to hold that Actavis only applies to re-
verse payment involving money, so other types of compensation such as a no-AG 
(authorised generic) agreement55 or a co-promotion agreement56, should not un-
dergo antitrust scrutiny. However, the majority of the lower courts that have al-
                                                        
Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology, 2014, pp. 31-40 (his critique was grounded on 
three main aspects: the role of patent law, the role of antitrust policies and the regulatory regime 
provided by the Hatch-Waxman Act). 
55 In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation, 18 F.Supp.3.d 560 (D.N.J. 2014). The 
settlement in this case was said not to trigger antitrust scrutiny «since there was no transfer of 
money» in it. However, the judgment was later vacated and remanded on appeal by direct pur-
chasers: King Drug Company of Florence, Inc. v. Smithkline Beecham Corporation, 791 F.3d 388 
(3rd Cir. 2015). 
56 In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litigation, 45 F.Supp.3d 180 (D.R.I. 2014), in which the set-
tlement involved a no-AG agreement as well. In particular, the Court held that «Actavis requires 
cash consideration to trigger rule of reason scrutiny». This judgment was also subsequently vacat-
ed and remanded by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit on appeal by direct purchasers and 
end payors: In re Loestrin 24 Antitrust Litigation, Case no. 15-1250, 2016 WL 698077, 22 Febru-
ary 2016, where it was established that «non-monetary reverse payments fell under the scope of 
Supreme Court’s 2013 Actavis decision». 
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ready examined the same issue after Actavis did not accept this opinion and found 
that the form of the payment is not a decisive element57.  
There are in fact strong arguments to support the broader reading of the Su-
preme Court judgment, regardless of the payment’s cash or noncash form. The 
most evident of them is the risk of directing the settling parties to other types of 
consideration rather than cash, which would not amount to antitrust violations but 
would give rise to the same, or maybe even more significant, anticompetitive ef-
fects. Moreover, the narrower approach is not substantiated by any economic rea-
son, since some noncash payment could nonetheless produce monetary benefits in 
favour of the generic company. Of course, should the value transfer be in a form 
other than cash, the courts would be required to perform a further level of analy-
sis. In particular, the facts underlying each actual case would need to be addressed 
from the perspective of the originator, in order to establish whether the sacrifice 
undertaken by settling the litigation ultimately resulted in an anticompetitive ad-
vantage58. 
Also related to the concept of payment under Actavis is the specific assessment 
of a no-AG agreement in the context of reverse payment settlements. It is an issue 
at the forefront of the debate given their increasing use and the range of their con-
sequences. An authorised generic is the generic version of a branded drug that is 
authorised by the patent holder itself under its FDA approval. The brand company 
may decide to directly market this version of the product or to reach an agreement 
with a generic manufacturer to this end. Therefore, there could be room for strate-
gies affecting competition within the given market. In this regard a no-AG clause 
                                                        
57  See for example In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litigation, 968 F.Supp.2d 367 
(D.Mass. 2013); In re Lipitor Antitrust Litigation, 46 F.Supp.3d 523 (D.N.J. 2014); In re Effexor 
XR Antitrust Litigation, Civil Action No. 11-5479, 2014 WL 4988410 (D.N.J. 2014). The litera-
ture consistently rejects the narrower opinion as well: among others, J.P. DAVIS, R.J. MCEWAN, 
Deactivating Actavis: The Clash between the Supreme Court and (Some) Lower Courts, in 67 
Rutgers University Law Review, 2015, pp. 557-584, at 567-573; A. EDLIN, S. HEMPHILL, H. 
HOVENKAMP, C. SHAPIRO, The Actavis Inference: Theory and Practice, in 67 Rutgers University 
Law Review, 2015, pp. 585-635, at 592-595. 
58 This point is underlined by A. EDLIN, S. HEMPHILL, H. HOVENKAMP, C. SHAPIRO, The Ac-
tavis Inference, cited above, pp. 593-594. 
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between an originator and a generic producer, whereby the former commits not to 
introduce an authorised generic, could be a valuable element for a prospective set-
tlement, especially with the first ANDA filer during its 180-day market exclusivi-
ty. Such an agreement can in fact provide for a further type of consideration (albe-
it in a noncash form) that the generic could not obtain even by succeeding in the 
patent challenge against the originator, as the latter could still able to launch its 
authorised generic in this case. A no-AG provision, moreover, holds an anticom-
petitive potential far greater than a mere cash payment, in that it confers a consid-
erable bargaining power to the brand company against the generic and it results in 
a form of market division capable of reducing generic competition beyond their 
delayed entry into the market59. All these reasons thus support the broader inter-
pretation of Actavis principles to the extent that they encompass noncash forms of 
payment as well, and in particular no-AG agreements. 
Given the relevance of no-AG agreements, it is worth briefly discussing the 
first challenge brought by the FTC against this kind of practice. In March 2016 
the Commission filed a complaint before the District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania against two settlements between Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. and 
the Japan-based patent holder Teikoku Pharma USA, Inc., on the one hand, and 
the generic manufacturers Watson Laboratories, Inc. (and its owner, Allergan plc) 
and Impax Laboratories, Inc., on the other hand60. The agreements essentially 
aimed at settling the Hatch-Waxman litigation regarding the brand drugs Opana 
ER and Lidoderm, both marketed by Endo, whereby the originator committed not 
to launch its own AGs competing with the generic product of Impax and Watson. 
In its complaint, the FTC carried out an assessment of the unlawfulness of said 
                                                        
59 As to this last ground, in particular, it has been noted that the combination of the generic’s 
commitment to delay its entry and the no-AG agreement ultimately amounts to «an extended peri-
od of brand-only sales, followed by 180 days of sales of the brand and only one generic»: M.A. 
CARRIER, Eight Reasons Why “No-Authorized-Generic” Promises Constitute Payment, in 67 Rut-
gers University Law Review, 2015, pp. 697-720, at p. 719. The Author also provides an extensive 
comment on the other ground mentioned above. 
60 F.T.C. v. Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-01440-PD filed on 30 March 
2016 (E.D. Pa.). 
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no-AG commitments according to the Actavis benchmarks, in that they constitut-
ed large and unjustified payments from the brand firm to the generic manufactur-
ers. Moreover, with specific regard to Opana ER, the FTC also considered that the 
settlement with Impax was part of a broader strategy to facilitate the introduction 
of Endo’s reformulated second-generation product, which ultimately triggered the 
originator’s obligation to provide the generic company with a further large cash 
payment. The District Court, however, did not assess the merits of the case as it 
granted the defendants’ severance motion and the FTC voluntarily dismissed its 
complaint in November 2016. 
Later on, in January 2017, the claims against Endo were settled by means of a 
proposed stipulated order filed before the District Court for the Northern District 
of California61, under whose terms Endo is prevented from entering into patent 
settlement agreements containing reverse payments or no-AG commitments for a 
period of ten years. In addition, the FTC refiled charges against Watson and Al-
lergan for entering into the unlawful Lidoderm agreement with Endo, and also is-
sued an administrative complaint against Impax as to the similar agreement re-
garding Opana ER62. The dispute is therefore still open, and it will be interesting 
to see whether the strict approach adopted by the FTC with regard to no-AG 
agreements is going to be further maintained. 
As to the second aspect of the notion adopted by the Supreme Court, namely 
the requirement for the payment to be large, lower courts have discussed this 
question following the basic guidance provided in Actavis. As already underlined, 
in the judgment a large payment is deemed to work as a surrogate of the patent’s 
weakness. The question thus shifts to the possible justifications of such payment 
that need to be proven by the defendant. The Court made several references to the 
litigation costs avoided by the payer’s (patentee) as a possible ground under this 
aspect: if the settlement covers the expected expenses of the lawsuit and other 
                                                        
61 F.T.C. v. Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. et al., Case No. 3:17-cv-00312-JCS filed on 23 January 
2017 (N.D. Cal.). 
62 On these most recent developments of the dispute, see the FTC press release Endo Pharma-
ceuticals Inc. Agrees to Abandon Anticompetitive Pay-for-Delay Agreements to Settle FTC Charg-
es; FTC Refiles Suits Against Generic Defendants, 23 January 2017, available at www.ftc.gov. 
 67 
costs related thereto, it could prove to be justified and therefore not amount to an 
antitrust violation. Similarly, a payment could refer to services undertaken by the 
generic manufacturer, for example a co-branding deal. Other justifications, on the 
contrary, give rise to concern to the extent that their practical effect amounts to a 
delay of a generic drug’s entry into the market63. Lower courts dealing with re-
verse payment settlements after Actavis have supported this view64, even though 
the analysis of the cases at hand plays a crucial role in this regard and thus there is 
no general consensus yet. 
Another crucial issue regards the actual structuring of the rule-of-reason anti-
trust litigation that was left to the lower courts to establish according to Actavis. 
Preliminarily, it is worth mentioning that said legal standard must not be confused 
with the five sets of considerations provided by the Supreme Court to support its 
position. Rather, the Court’s reasoning implies the application of a streamlined 
rule-of-reason standard under two aspects. First, the large reverse payment (in the 
broader sense) can satisfy the plaintiff’s initial showing of a restraint on trade that 
has anticompetitive effects, and second, the defendant’s burden of proving pro-
competitive effects can be based on a limited set of justifications (namely, avoid-
ed litigation costs or other services performed by the generic). The final showing 
of more pro-competitive means to achieve said effects or that the anticompetitive 
effects outweigh the pro-competitive effects then remain the same and it is again 
up to the plaintiff65. 
                                                        
63 In this regard see H. HOVENKAMP, M.D. JANIS, M.A. LEMLEY, C.R. LESLIE, IP and Antitrust: 
An Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual Property Law, 2nd edition, New York, 
2013 Supplement, § 15.3a1(E) and, extensively, M.A. CARRIER, Payment After Actavis, in 100 
Iowa Law Review, 2014, pp. 7-49, especially at pp. 19-25. 
64 See, among others, In re Lipitor Antitrust Litigation, cited above, at 547; In re Solodyn 
(Minocycline Hydrochloride) Antitrust Litigation, Civil Action No. 14-md-02503-DJC, 2015 WL 
5458570 (D.Mass. 2015), at 7. For a further comment on this issue see also L.J. FALES, P. FEIN-
STEIN, Two Years and Counting Since Actavis: Developments in the Law, in 30 Antitrust, Fall 
2015, pp. 31-36, at pp. 32-33. 
65 For a detailed comment, including practical aspects of the litigation, see L.P. TAAVOLA, 
Jumping into the Actavis Briar Patch – Insight into How Courts May Structure Reverse Payment 
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Courts have nonetheless applied different versions of the described standard, in 
some cases even giving rise to misinterpretation of the Actavis principles66. One 
of the most detailed insights into the structure of the rule-of-reason applied to re-
verse payment settlements has been however provided by the California Supreme 
Court In re Cipro Cases I & II67, which held that Actavis also applied to state anti-
trust law (in particular, the Cartwright Act68, that mirrors the Sherman Antitrust 
Act 69 in many respects). When summarising the structure of the rule of reason, it 
explained that for an agreement to be found prima facie as an unlawful restraint of 
trade, the plaintiff must show both «a limit on the generic’s challenger entry into 
the market and compensation from the patentee to the challenger». Then it is up to 
the defendant to offer «evidence of litigation costs or valuable collateral products 
or services that might explain the compensation». Should the defendant do so, the 
burden shifts again to the plaintiff to demonstrate that «the compensation exceeds 
the reasonable value»70 of said justifications. 
A further question, also related to the analysis of the justifications that could be 
invoked under the rule-of-reason standard, is whether the merits of the settlement, 
                                                        
Antitrust Proceedings and the Questions That Actavis Left Unanswered, in 40 William Mitchell 
Law Review, 2014, pp. 1370-1406, especially at pp. 1395-1405. 
66 See In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation, cited above, at 565-566. To sum up 
in an effective way the District Court’s opinion in the case at hand, see J.P. DAVIS, R.J. MCEWAN, 
Deactivating Actavis, cited above, p. 574: «Lamictal is illustrative because the district court quot-
ed the summary in Actavis of why the Court imposed the rule of reason and treated it as if it ad-
dressed how the legal standard should apply». 
67 In re Cipro Cases I & II, 348 P.3d 845 (Cal. 2015). See extensively J. ELIAS, Putting Cipro 
Meat on Actavis Bones: A Case Study in Filling the Legal Gaps, in 24 Journal of the Antitrust and 
Unfair Competition Section of the State Bar of California, 2015, No. 2, pp. 1-6; C.L. JOHNSON, 
CIPRO’s $400 Million Pay for Delay: How California Law and Courts Can Make a Difference in 
Reverse Payment Challenges, in 67 Rutgers University Law Review, 2015, pp. 721-753. 
68 Stat. 1907, c. 530, p. 986, §§ 1-12. The Act was later incorporated into the California Busi-
ness and Professions Code in 1941 by Stat. 1941, c. 526, § 1. 
69 As it is well known, it is a federal antitrust and antimonopoly statute, which was passed in 
1890 as 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 and amended by the Clayton Act in 1914 (15 U.S.C. § 12-27). The full 
text is available at www.law.cornell.edu/uscode. 
70 In re Cipro Cases I & II, cited above, at 871. 
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and therefore of the patent dispute itself, should be subject to some level of in-
quiry. In this regard, as already mentioned, Actavis held that the size of the unex-
plained reverse payment serves as a workable surrogate for the patent’s weakness. 
Therefore, a full-blown evaluation should not be required when the patentee’s mo-
tive to settle was to obtain an anticompetitive advantage avoiding the uncertainty 
of patent litigation. This guarantee in fact cannot be covered by the legitimate ex-
clusionary effect of its right, since patent protection does not immunise from anti-
trust scrutiny under said circumstances. 
It should then be safe to say that the so-called “Actavis inference” entails a 
complex factual and juridical assessment for both the parties and the court called 
upon to decide. However, a thorough account of the principles of the judgment 
need to be taken, albeit requiring a further and deepened analysis in light of the 
specific background of each individual case. 
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2.1.3. IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
It is now worth considering the practice of Member States as regards the issue 
of anticompetitive agreements in the pharmaceutical sector. In particular, a recent 
decision of the CMA71 dealt with a case of reverse payment settlement agreements 
similar to those investigated by the European Commission. 
The facts of the case concerned the brand anti-depressant drug Seroxat, which 
is based on paroxetine API and was launched by GlaxoSmithKline (hereinafter al-
so GSK) in the UK in 1991, becoming one of the originator’s blockbuster prod-
ucts. The compound patent expired in 1999, while certain process patents re-
mained in force even afterwards. In the late 1990s three generic manufacturers, 
namely IVAX, Generics UK (hereinafter also GUK) and Alpharma, took steps to 
enter into the paroxetine market with their version of the drug. GSK first struck an 
agreement with IVAX, even though no patent litigation had started between them. 
Later, it instigated patent infringement proceedings against GUK and Alpharma, 
both of which were settled by GSK. Under the terms of the latter agreements, sig-
nificant value transfers were made by GSK to the generic companies in return for 
their commitment not to enter the market independently of the originator during 
the time the agreements were in place. After the CMA launched its probe into 
these settlements, it issued the final decision on 12 February 2016, holding GSK 
liable of infringing the Chapter I prohibition of the Competition Act 199872 and/or 
Art. 101 TFEU, as well as the Chapter II prohibition of the same Act73. Moreover, 
it found that both GUK and Alpharma infringed the Chapter I prohibition, while 
the settlement between GSK and IVAX was exempted from said prohibition by 
                                                        
71 UK Competition and Markets Authority, decision of 12 February 2016, Paroxetine – case 
CE/9531-11, available at www.gov.uk/cma-cases. 
72 The Competition Act 1998 (1998 c. 41, available at www.legislation.gov.uk) was enacted 
with the purpose of harmonising the domestic legal system with EU competition law and entered 
into force on 1 March 2002. In particular, the Chapter I Prohibition mirrors the contents of Art. 
101 TFEU and deal with restrictive agreements. 
73 The Chapter II Prohibition of the Competition Act 1998 refers to the abuse, by an undertak-
ing or undertakings, of a dominant position in the UK. 
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virtue of the Vertical Agreement Exclusion Order74. The originator and the gener-
ic companies were consequently fined, with the total amount imposed approxi-
mately £ 50 millions. 
As both these findings were based on a common reasoning, the restrictive 
agreements and the abuse of dominant position will be here assessed together, as 
opposed to the previous EU Servier case. The settlements concluded between 
GSK and GUK and Alpharma, respectively, were deemed to have as their objec-
tive aim a restriction of competition in the UK paroxetine market. Indeed, the 
CMA observed that the value transfers from the originator to the generics75 could 
only be explained on anticompetitive grounds, namely to induce the latter compa-
nies’ «acceptance of entry restrictions and delay [their] potential independent 
market entry»76. More precisely, the payments could neither be explained by the 
avoidance of costs and disruption of litigation, nor by the avoidance of potential 
exposure to damages by GSK under the cross-undertaking77. These arguments 
paralleled the justifications for reverse payments that are held acceptable under 
the US Supreme Court judgment in Actavis, which refer to avoided litigation ex-
penses. 
                                                        
74  The Competition Act 1998 (Land and Vertical Agreements Exclusion) Order 2000 (SI 
2000/310, available at www.legislation.gov.uk). On 1 May 2005 it was repealed by the Competi-
tion Act 1998 (Land Agreements Exclusion and Revocation) Order 2004 (SI 2004/1260, available 
at the same website). Since then, only the EU provisions on vertical restraints are applicable in the 
UK (currently, the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the applica-
tion of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of ver-
tical agreements and concerted practices, OJ L 102 of 23 April 2010, pp. 1-7). The lack of an in-
fringement decision as regards IVAX indeed appears to rely on the fact that in this case the agree-
ment was not intended to settle a patent dispute. 
75 Namely, the value transfers consisted in marketing allowances, the purchase of GUK’s stock 
of paroxetine and profit margins obtained by GUK by supplying a limited volume of GSK’s prod-
uct, amounting to a total of at least £ 21.3 millions over the three-year term of the agreement. 
76 UK Competition and Markets Authority, decision of 12 February 2016, Paroxetine, cited 
above, para. 6.113, as regards GUK. The same finding was held in relation to Alpharma at para. 
6.177 of the decision. 
77 Ibid., paras. 6.115-6.133 and paras. 6.179-6.196. 
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In addition to the finding of a restriction of competition by object, the CMA 
carried out an effects assessment of both agreements. In accordance with the 
Commission’s guidance and well-established EU case law, the effects were evalu-
ated from a counterfactual perspective, i.e. «in comparison to the actual legal and 
economic context in which competition would occur in the absence of the agree-
ment»78. In this regard, the CMA found that if the patent litigation between GSK 
and the generics had continued, the validity of the originator’s patent would have 
been tested, or anyway the subsequent settlement would have reflected the real 
uncertainty as to the strength of the patent claims, without involving transfers of 
value by the incumbent to the challengers. As a result, the likely restrictive effects 
of the settlements with both GUK and Alpharma were established as well. 
As to the abuse of a dominant position by GSK, the CMA considered the 
agreement with IVAX in addition to those already scrutinised under the Chapter I 
prohibition. To this end it held that the value transfers made to the generic manu-
facturers in order to induce them to delay their independent entry into the market 
did not amount to a conduct falling within competition on the merits. Since it had 
the likely effect of restricting competition, and the originator had not demonstrat-
ed the existence of any objective justifications, the UK Authority concluded that 
GSK had infringed the Chapter II prohibition of the Competition Act 199879. 
These findings thus confirm, also at the national level, the narrow approach of 
classifying reverse payment settlements as restrictions of competition by object, 
as the European Commission already held in its decisions, as did the General 
Court in its Lundbeck judgment. In addition, similar to in the Servier case, the 
CMA found that the originator also abused its dominant position in the market, 
focusing its argument on the circumstance that the inducements could not be re-
garded as “normal competition”, i.e. on the merits. 
                                                        
78 Ibid., para. 7.7. 
79 Ibid., paras. 8.1-8.45. 
 73 
The pharmaceutical companies have appealed the CMA decision before the 
Competition Appeal Tribunal and the case is currently pending80. It is interesting 
to note that the Tribunal ordered each appellant to file specific pleadings as re-
gards the relevance (if any) of the General Court’s Lundbeck judgment81, thus 
confirming the close correlation between these reverse payment cases. 
  
                                                        
80 Competition Appeal Tribunal, case No. 1255/1/12/16, registered on 12 April 2016, Merck 
KGaA v. Competition and Markets Authority. The status of the case is available at 
www.catribunal.org.uk. 
81 Competition Appeal Tribunal, case No. 1255/1/12/16, Merck KGaA v. Competition and 
Markets Authority, order of the President (case management directions) of 13 May 2016, available 
at www.catribunal.org.uk. 
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2.1.4. IN ITALY 
 
In this section the focus remains on Member States’ practice, dealing with the 
investigation carried out by the Italian Competition Authority against five brand 
drug manufacturers, namely F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., Genentech Inc., Roche 
S.p.A., Novartis AG and Novartis S.p.A., regarding an allegedly anticompetitive 
agreement related to the sales of the products Avastin and Lucentis in Italy, which 
concluded with a decision issued on 27 February 201482. As opposed to the cases 
examined so far, the perspective thus shifts to competition between originators. 
The factual background of the case had its start in the US and then developed 
in the EU, insofar as is here relevant in Italy. Therefore, it is useful to go over it in 
full. The APIs at issue are bevacizumab and ranibizumab, which the US-based pi-
                                                        
82  Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, proceeding I760, Roche-
Novartis/Farmaci Avastin e Lucentis, decision No. 24823 of 27 February 2014, in Bollettino 
AGCM No. 11 of 17 March 2014, available at www.agcm.it, pp. 78-154. In the literature see L. 
ARNAUDO, The strange case of Dr Lucentis and Mr Avastin: The Italian Competition Authority 
fines Roche and Novartis for collusion, in European Competition Law Review, 2014, pp. 347-351, 
and by the same Author, The Avastin-Lucentis Case: an illicit agreement between Roche and No-
vartis condemned by the Italian Competition Authority, in Italian Antitrust Review, 2014, No. 2, 
pp. 126-129; A. MASTRORILLI, Farmaci di lusso e medicamenti a buon mercato, in Mercato con-
correnza regole, 2014, pp. 489-501; R. PARDOLESI, in Foro italiano, 2014, III, cc. 278-280; J. 
KILLICK, P. BERGHE, Pharmaceutical Sector: Can Non-Authorised Products be Included in the 
Relevant Market for the Assessment of an Alleged Anticompetitive Conduct? A Short Analysis of 
the Recent Italian Avastin-Lucentis Decision, in Journal of European Competition Law & Prac-
tice, 2015, pp. 102-109; A. ROCCHIETTI, I recenti interventi dell’Autorità nel settore farmaceutico, 
in E.A. RAFFAELLI (ed.), Antitrust fra diritto nazionale e diritto dell’Unione europea. XI Con-
vegno, Bruxelles, 2015, pp. 371-387; M. COLANGELO, Il caso Avastin-Lucentis: violazione anti-
trust o regulatory failure?, in Rivista di Diritto Industriale, 2016, II, pp. 218-230. The case also 
had a vast resonance in the public opinion as the media extensively covered the various steps of 
the litigation: see for example the interviews with Mr. F. Massimino (Legal governance and com-
pliance Roche), Sovrapponibile non vuol dire sostituibile, 16 May 2014, available at 
www.lapresse.it; and with Prof. V. Salvatore, Pericoloso orientamento su off label per risparmiare 
sui costi, 6 June 2014, available at www.quotidianosanita.it; the article by Prof. P. Sirena, 
Prescrizione off-label: quali rischi sul vantaggio competitivo, 23 April 2015, available at 
www.sanita24.ilsole24ore.com. 
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oneer Genentech (subsidiary of Roche Group) developed during the 1990s as a 
treatment to neutralise the molecule known as VEGF (Vascular Endothelial 
Growth Factor) that drives the physiological process of angiogenesis. More pre-
cisely, bevacizumab was synthesised first and entered the US market in 2004 un-
der the brand name «Avastin» as a remedy for metastatic tumors. Ranibizumab 
was synthesised as a derivative of bevacizumab, and has been commercialised in 
the US market since 2006 under the brand name «Lucentis» for the treatment of 
the eye disease called wet AMD (Age-related Macular Degeneration). 
Then Genentech continued operating in the US market only and concluded 
separate licensing agreements with the originator companies Roche and Novartis, 
which were awarded worldwide commercial rights on Avastin and Lucentis, re-
spectively. Both drugs were granted MAs by the EMA for the same registered us-
es as in the US: Avastin in 2005 for cancer treatments and Lucentis in 2007 for 
ophthalmic therapies. In-between the respective approvals, an off-label (i.e. un-
registered) use of Avastin (bevacizumab) was developed by ophthalmologists, 
which consisted of treating AMD by an intravitreal injection of a small amount of 
said drug. The equivalence of the two uses – registered and unregistered – was al-
so later supported by independent comparative studies carried out in the US83 and 
the UK84. Moreover, there is a considerable difference when comparing the costs 
of the two eye therapies: in Italy, where the antitrust investigation was carried out, 
Lucentis was launched at a price of approximately 1800 euros per injection (after 
decreased to 900 euros), while Avastin cost around 80 euros per injection. Conse-
quently, during the time Lucentis was not available in Italy (it was commercial-
ised by the end of 2008), the off-label use of Avastin for AMD was acknowledged 
by the Italian Medicines Agency (Agenzia Italiana del Farmaco – AIFA) pursuant 
                                                        
83 The CATT Research Group, Ranibizumab and Bevacizumab for Neovascular Age-Related 
Macular Degeneration, in 364 The New England Journal of Medicine, 2011, pp. 1897-1908. 
84  IVAN Study Investigators, Ranibizumab versus bevacizumab to treat neovascular age-
related macular degeneration: one-year findings from the IVAN randomized trial, in 119 Oph-
talmology, 2012, pp. 1399-1411. 
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to the provisions of Law No. 648/199685, and its costs were covered by the Italian 
National Healthcare System (NHS). More precisely, this legal instrument allows 
the unregistered uses of a drug insofar as there is no equivalent medicine already 
registered for the same treatments, which are listed on the so-called “Lista 648” 
(list 648). After Lucentis’ registration procedures were carried out, the off-label 
uses of Avastin were de-listed accordingly86 and Roche never pursued the formal 
registration of its drug for those purposes. Rather, in June 2011, the Italian branch 
of Roche sought to obtain a modification of the Summary of Product Characteris-
tics (SmPC) of Avastin so as to include a reference to the risks deriving from the 
ophthalmic use of its product, which was granted (with some changes) by the 
EMA. In addition, it requested the Agency to adopt a formal communication to-
wards healthcare professionals (a DHPC) in order to inform them of said modifi-
cation, which was however denied. As a result of this regulatory change, the 
SmPC of Lucentis was also modified by referring to undesirable effects that were 
common to all anti-VEGF medicines. 
In this complex situation the ICA began its antitrust investigation on 6 Febru-
ary 2013 for an alleged infringement of Art. 101 TFEU related to the “Italian 
side” of the Avastin/Lucentis controversy. Assessing the conducts of the Italian 
branches of both Roche and Novartis, it affirmed the existence of a collusive 
agreement aimed at an «artificial product differentiation»87 of the two drugs con-
cerning their ophthalmic uses. With regard to the relevant market, the Authority 
thus considered the medicines used for AMD treatments and other eye-related 
diseases, which comprised both the registered use of Lucentis and the unregistered 
use of Avastin according to a factual interpretation of product substitutability. The 
anticompetitive behaviour consisted in the dissemination of misgiving infor-
                                                        
85 Law of 23 December 1996, No. 648, OJ 300 of 23 December 1996. The overview of the rel-
evant Italian regulatory framework is thoroughly assessed in G.F. FERRARI, F. MASSIMINO, Diritto 
del farmaco. Medicinali, Diritto alla salute, politiche sanitarie, Bari, 2015. 
86 More precisely, on 18 October 2012 Avastin was completely taken out of “Lista 648” by de-
cision of the AIFA. 
87 Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, Roche-Novartis/Farmaci Avastin e Lu-
centis, cited above, para. 189. 
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mation about the safety of Avastin’s off-label uses among the medical communi-
ty, in order to have an impact on doctors’ prescriptions. Moreover, the Authority 
contested a concerted position taken by the originators towards the media, indus-
try stakeholders and policymakers. The pieces of evidence taken into account in-
cluded e-mail exchanges between the management of the two companies and the 
modification of Avastin’s SmPC based on the extra wording that emphasized the 
risks in its ophthalmic use. The ultimate purpose of the devised strategy was to 
boost sales of Lucentis, which both Roche and Novartis benefited from – the for-
mer gaining indirect returns through the royalties paid by Novartis to the licensor 
Genentech, and the latter earning direct profits from its licensed drug. 
The legal consequence deriving from the outlined conducts was a horizontal 
agreement having an anticompetitive object pursuant to Art. 101(1)(c) TFEU 
(market sharing agreement). As the European Commission did in the Servier case, 
the ICA further evaluated its illicit effects, in particular it estimating the larger ex-
penditure incurred by the NHS due to the increased demand of Lucentis as a result 
of the coordination between the two originators88. The Italian branches of Roche 
and Novartis were thus held liable of said infringement and fined accordingly. 
Both the parent companies, Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. and Novartis AG, as well 
as their Italian branches, later appealed the ICA decision before TAR Lazio, the 
administrative Court of First Instance having jurisdiction, which rendered its 
judgment on 2 December 201489. In sum, the originators questioned the Authori-
ty’s evaluation in establishing a situation of competition in the relevant market be-
tween both the Italian companies and the registered and unregistered uses of the 
drugs in question. In their view, the ICA made an error when it did not consider 
the licencing agreements through which the originators were able to enter into the 
market, and moreover it erroneously considered off-label Avastin as a treatment 
                                                        
88 In this regard the Authority estimated increased costs amounting to 54 million euros for 
2012. Should Avastin’s off-label uses have been completely replaced by Lucentis, the estimate 
would raise to 600 million euros in 2013 and 678.6 million euros in 2014. See Autorità Garante 
della Concorrenza e del Mercato, Roche-Novartis/Farmaci Avastin e Lucentis, paras. 228-229. 
89  TAR Lazio, judgment of 2 December 2014, No. 12168, available at www.giustizia-
amministrativa.it. 
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for eye diseases, which they said should not have been included in that category 
given the wrongfulness of such use. Consequently, there were no grounds for 
maintaining the finding of an infringement under Art. 101(1) TFEU. 
The administrative Court upheld the ICA decision and its reasoning. First, it 
confirmed the substitutability between off-label Avastin and Lucentis for oph-
thalmic uses, and therefore the rationality of the market definition adopted by the 
Authority90. In addition, it considered the issues of the licensing agreements and 
the performance of the duties in accordance with the respective pharmacovigi-
lance responsibilities, unrelated to the subject matter of the dispute. Then, re-
examining the evidence at its disposal, particularly the mail and the documents 
exchanged between the Italian companies, the court affirmed the existence of an 
anticompetitive agreement between Roche and Novartis aimed at defining a 
common strategy to restrain the establishment of the off-label uses if Avastin, and 
consequently at expanding Lucentis’ sales to their own benefit91. This justified the 
legal assessment pursuant to Art. 101(1) TFEU and the fines that were conse-
quently imposed. 
This judgment was appealed before Consiglio di Stato, the administrative Su-
preme Court. Again, the parent companies Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. and Novartis 
AG and their Italian branches contested the rationale of the lower court’s assess-
ment and sought to overturn its decision. They also submitted a request for a pre-
liminary ruling to the Court of Justice, which the Supreme Court accepted, albeit 
partially rephrasing the questions92. More precisely, the issues now pending be-
fore the EU court refer to: the possibility to consider the parties of a licensing 
agreement as competitors insofar as the licensee has entered the relevant market 
only by means of that agreement; the relevant market that the ICA defined, re-
gardless of the content of the marketing authorisations granted by the EMA and 
                                                        
90 TAR Lazio, judgment of 2 December 2014, No. 12168, cited above, para. 4. 
91 Ibid., paras. 5-6. 
92  Consiglio di Stato, order of 11 March 2016, No. 966, available at www.giustizia-
amministrativa.it. The preliminary ruling procedure is now pending: see case C-179/16, F. 
Hoffmann-La Roche AG, La Roche SpA, Novartis AG and Novartis Farma SpA v. Autorità 
Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, OJ C 222 of 20 June 2016, p. 4 f. 
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AIFA; the inclusion in the same relevant market of off-label and authorised drugs, 
which were regarded as substitutable; the importance of whether the drugs entered 
into the relevant market in accordance with the pharmaceutical regulatory frame-
work and lastly, whether a conduct aimed at spreading misgiving information 
about the safety and effectiveness of a drug may be held restrictive of competition 
by object where there is an actual uncertainty as to the product’s effects among 
the scientific community. Essentially, it appears that the Supreme Court argues 
about the market definition purported by both the ICA and the first instance court 
as the safety of Avastin’s off-label uses were objectively unclear, and more im-
portantly, had not been formally acknowledged by the competent regulatory au-
thorities. It will thus be interesting to see which guidance the Court of Justice will 
provide in this regard.  
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SECTION TWO  
CASE LAW ON ABUSES OF DOMINANCE 
 
Again taking into account the findings of the 2009 Pharmaceutical Sector In-
quiry, this section will deal with follow-up cases in which pharmaceutical compa-
nies have been questioned for an alleged abuse of their dominant position in the 
relevant market pursuant to Art. 102 TFEU. 
In this regard, the Court of Justice rendered a landmark judgment in 2012 in 
the AstraZeneca case, following the decisions of the Commission and the General 
Court. It provides a comprehensive example of conducts that can be caught under 
the prohibition at issue, namely an abuse of regulatory procedures and a switch 
from the brand drug to its follow-on version to prevent generic entry (so-called 
“product hopping”). Moreover, at the EU level the previously examined Servier 
case will be discussed again insofar as the Commission also found an infringe-
ment of Art. 102 TFEU. 
Moving to the US practice, on the one hand the Buspirone case is examined as 
it concerns an abuse of the regulatory framework provided by the Hatch-Waxman 
Act; on the other hand the TriCor, Nexium and the most recent Namenda cases are 
particularly instructive to analyse product-hopping strategies. 
Finally, Italian case law is again relevant in this context, as the Pfizer case gave 
rise to much debate regarding how to define the notion of abuse compared to the 
exercise of IP laws in the pharmaceutical sector. 
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2.2.1. IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
AstraZeneca case. 
The AstraZeneca dispute is particularly relevant since it is the first fully litigat-
ed case about the patent/antitrust interface in the pharmaceutical industry, and 
therefore provides a reliable indication for future cases as to the EU courts’ ap-
proach to this matter93. 
The underlying facts refer to the brand drug Losec, commercialised by the 
Swedish-based originator company AstraZeneca (hereinafter also AZ) and based 
on the API omeprazole. The medicine obtained patent protection from both the 
EPO and national patent offices that was set to expire during 1999. Its therapeutic 
use is to treat acid-related gastro-intestinal diseases, for which several classes of 
drugs exist. There are, among others, histamine receptor antagonists (so called 
“H2 blockers”) and proton pump inhibitors (so called “PPIs”), whose respective 
action is similar, but while the former act indirectly on the proton pump (an en-
zyme of the stomach), the latter do so directly. The category of PPI, to which 
Losec belongs, thus possesses advanced characteristics and is more effective than 
                                                        
93 The case has been extensively commented upon in the literature. For example see M.P. 
NEGRINOTTI, Abuse of Regulatory Procedures in the Intellectual Property Context: the AstraZene-
ca Case, in European Common Market Law Review, 2008, pp. 446-459; M. MAGGIOLINO, M.L. 
MONTAGNANI, AstraZeneca’s Abuse of IPR-Related Procedures: A Hypothesis of Antitrust Of-
fence, Abuse of Rights and IPR Misuse, in World Competition, 2011, pp. 245-260; I. OTTAVIANO, 
Industrial Property and Abuse of Dominant Position in the Pharmaceutical Market: Some 
Thoughts on the AstraZeneca Judgment of the EU General Court, in G. CAGGIANO, G. MUSCOLO, 
M. TAVASSI (eds.), Competition Law and Intellectual Property, cited above, pp. 191-202; M. 
COLE, Pharmaceutical and competition: first strike to the Commission?, in European Competition 
Law Review, 2013, pp. 227-232; J. DREXL, AstraZeneca and the EU sector inquiry: when do pa-
tent filings violate competition law?, in J. DREXL, N. LEE (eds.), Pharmaceutical Innovation, Com-
petition and Patent Law. A Trilateral Perspective, Cheltenham-Northampton, 2013, pp. 290-322; 
R. PODSZUN, Can competition law repair patent law and administrative procedures? AstraZeneca, 
in Common Market Law Review, 2014, pp. 281-294; A. SPILLMANN, Transparency obligations for 
holders of EU IP assets in the pharmaceutical industry, in Journal of Intellectual Property Law & 
Practice, 2014, pp. 125-132. 
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the others. In fact, sales of PPIs proved to be successful, although they were prici-
er than H2 blockers, and steadily increased at the expense of the latter during the 
1990s. Losec, in particular, became a blockbuster drug that accounted for almost 
40% of AZ’s total sales at the end of that decade. 
Preparing to the approaching patent expiry on omeprazole, AZ filed applica-
tions with national patent offices within the EEA (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, 
the Netherlands, the UK and Norway) in 1993 and 1994 to obtain SPCs pursuant 
to Regulation (EEC) No. 1768/9294 , seeking to extend its exclusionary rights 
(called “SPC strategy”). According to Art. 8(a)(iv) of the mentioned Regulation, 
the applicant for an SPC had to provide the number and date of the first authorisa-
tion to place the product on the market in order to calculate the length of the sup-
plementary protection. Moreover, such a date was relevant to whether the SPC 
could be granted in the first place, given that AZ’s applications were filed during 
a transitional period of implementation of the Regulation. When instructing its pa-
tent agents, the originator company chose a certain view, which was more favour-
able for its applications with regard to the relevant date of the first authorisation95, 
without duly informing the involved patent offices. Subsequently, the strategy 
concerning SPCs had a further development in that AZ’s conduct before the pa-
tent offices resulted in litigation in certain Member States brought by generic 
manufacturers. AZ also filed applications for SPCs in other 3 EEA contracting 
States. 
From the late 1990s, AZ pursued a second scheme to hinder generic entry into 
the omeprazole market (called “post patent strategy”). In Denmark, Sweden and 
Norway it requested the deregistration of the Losec’s capsule formulation com-
bined with its replacement with a newly developed tablet version of the drug, 
Losec MUPS (Multiple Unit Pellet System). This conduct was aimed at prevent-
                                                        
94 For the overall legal framework on SPCs see supra, Chapter one, Section 2.2.1. 
95 Namely, it preferred the effective marketing authorisation date (i.e. the first date of the pub-
lication of the price of the drug, which was on 21 March 1988 in Luxembourg) to the technical 
marketing authorisation date (the earliest was granted on 15 April 1987 in France) in those States 
where the former was able to confer extra months of protection. However, the latter date has been 
conventionally referred to as the relevant one in this context. 
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ing generic companies from resorting to the simplified procedure for market au-
thorisation under Art. 4, para. 3, point 8(a)(iii) of Directive 65/65/EEC96, which 
required an established use of the brand product. Moreover, it affected parallel 
imports of Losec capsules as a result of the import licences being revoked. 
In 2003 the European Commission initiated its antitrust proceedings under Art. 
82 TEC (now Art. 102 TFEU) and Art. 54 of the EEA Agreement (both having 
the same scope of application) concerning the facts at issue, and rendered its deci-
sion on 15 June 200597. It held AZ liable of infringing the mentioned provisions 
and therefore fined the company 60 million euros for misusing the patent system 
and marketing procedures to prevent generic entry to its blockbuster drug Losec. 
The EU enforcer’s assessment will be discussed here, starting from its evalua-
tion of the relevant market98. In this regard, it took a rather factual and detailed 
approach considering the above-mentioned categories of H2 blockers and PPIs 
during the time of the alleged abuse, which spanned from 1993 until 2000. In-
deed, it built its analysis according to ATC levels – as is convention in the phar-
maceutical sector – but referring to a narrower level than the one generally used in 
competition cases, namely the fourth level based on chemical subgroups instead 
of the third level based on therapeutic indications. The Commission stressed the 
revolutionary and innovative character of PPIs, and therefore their therapeutic su-
periority when compared to H2 blockers, maintaining that the two categories 
«have a mode of action which is fundamentally distinct»99 from one another. This 
led the EU authority to support the view of the relevant product market compris-
ing only PPIs. Furthermore it considered the aspect of substitutability between H2 
                                                        
96 Council Directive 65/65/EEC of 26 January 1965 on the approximation of provisions laid 
down by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action relating to proprietary medicinal products, OJ 
22 of 9 February 1965, pp. 369-373, repealed by already mentioned Directive 2001/83/EC (for an 
overview of the relevant EU legislation see supra, Chapter one, Section 2.2.1). 
97 Commission decision of 15 June 2005, case COMP/A.37.507/F3, AstraZeneca, published on 
19 July 2006, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition; see also the press release IP/05/737, 
available at http://europa.eu/rapid. 
98 Commission decision of 15 June 2005, AstraZeneca, cited above, paras. 329-504. 
99 Ibid., para. 376. 
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blockers and PPIs in terms of prescriptions and demand trends: it observed that 
the decreasing demand of the former and the increasing demand of the latter dur-
ing the given period were not inconsistent with the narrower view of the relevant 
market, but rather reflected the situation of gradual establishment of PPIs over H2 
blockers due to other factors such as a lack of information in doctors’ practice. 
Then the Commission established AZ’s dominance during the time of the al-
leged abuse both in the product market as above defined and in the national mar-
kets involved, considering in particular its market shares, its IPRs and other regu-
latory rights deriving from pharmaceutical law, and its ability to maintain higher 
prices100. 
In light of this preliminary evaluation, the EU institution assessed the two al-
leged abuses separately. It is worth underlining that the actual anticompetitive ef-
fects of both conducts were examined, even if such evidence is not strictly re-
quired to ground an infringement of Art. 102 TFEU101. First, it addressed the mis-
leading representations made by AZ in order to obtain an extended patent protec-
tion through SPCs. To this end it identified two stages of the abusive conduct: 
firstly, AZ gave instructions to its patent agents when filing applications for SPCs 
in several EEA contracting States; and secondly, AZ supplied misleading infor-
mation before other national patent offices and national courts during judicial pro-
ceedings. Nonetheless, it described the abuse as «of a single and continuous na-
ture», showing AZ had «a high degree of centralisation and coordination»102. On 
this basis it concluded that the company has abused its dominant position under 
                                                        
100 Ibid., paras. 505-601. 
101 This principle has been consistently affirmed by the Court of First Instance/General Court 
(among others, see judgment of 30 September 2003, case T-203/01, Manufacture française des 
pneumatiques Michelin v. Commission of the European Communities, EU:T:2003:250, paras. 239 
and 241; judgment of 30 January 2007, case T-340/03, France Télécom SA v. Commission of the 
European Communities, EU:T:2007:22, para. 195), although the Court of Justice has in some in-
stances stressed the relevance of such finding (see for example judgment of 14 October 2010, case 
C-280/08 P, Deutsche Telekom AG v. European Commission, EU:C:2010:603, paras. 250-261). 
102 Ibid., paras. 774-775. 
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the meaning of Art. 82 TEC (now Art. 102 TFEU) and Art. 54 of the EEA 
Agreement. 
Secondly, the EU institution analysed AZ’s practice of selective deregistration 
of Losec capsules combined with the switch to the new formulation of the prod-
uct, Losec MUPS. This second abuse directly tackled the extent of the antitrust in-
terference into the exercise of patent rights. In fact, even though such conduct was 
not in itself abusive under the relevant legislative framework, it nonetheless con-
stituted a violation of Art. 102 TFEU given the absence of any objective justifica-
tions and its departure from the standard competitive behaviour to protect legiti-
mate commercial interests. Moreover, it successfully prevented parallel imports of 
Losec capsules because the related licenses were revoked. 
AZ lodged an appeal with the EU General Court against the Commission’s de-
cision. The Court of first instance, however, substantially upheld the EU competi-
tion authority, holding that both the above-mentioned abuses committed by AZ 
amounted to an infringement of Art. 82 TEC (now Art. 102 TFEU)103. The deci-
sion was reversed only in relation to the claimed restriction of parallel imports, 
which in the General Court’s view had not been sufficiently supported by evi-
dence. Without repeating the already examined Commission’s reasoning, it is use-
ful to focus specifically on the key arguments in law that the Court supported in 
its judgment. 
With regard to the first abuse concerning the misleading representations pro-
vided to the authorities, the General Court resorted to a parameter often referred 
to, but of rather vague meaning, which is the notion of «competition on the mer-
its»104. By falling outside the scope of such a concept, the practice of leading in 
                                                        
103 General Court, judgment of 1 July 2010, case T-321/05, AstraZeneca AB, AstraZeneca plc 
v. European Commission, EU:T:2010:266. During the proceedings the European Federation of 
Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) served as intervener and supported AZ’s ap-
peal. 
104 Ibid., para. 355. Among the CJEU precedents, see Court of Justice, judgment of 9 Novem-
ber 1983, case 322/81, NV Nederlandsche Banden Industrie Michelin v. Commission of the 
European Communities, EU:C:1983:313; General Court, judgment of 30 September 2003, Michel-
in, cited above. 
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error the national patent offices and the courts was indeed inconsistent with the 
special responsibility imposed on the undertaking in a dominant position, thus re-
sulting in a restriction of competition. Furthermore, in order to establish the mis-
leading nature of AZ’s representations, the Commission correctly carried out a 
factual assessment on the basis of objective factors, being the proof of the inten-
tion relevant to the limited extent of supporting such findings. To this end, the 
Court also confirmed the Commission’s ground that the conduct at stake must not 
bear direct effects on competition in order to amount to an abuse of a dominant 
position. Rather, from the considerations on competition of the merits it followed 
that it was sufficient to establish the capability of AZ’s behaviour to restrict com-
petition in light of the regulatory context in which it took place105. 
As to the second abuse, the General Court maintained the Commission’s legal 
assessment that «the illegality of abusive conduct under Article 82 EC [now Art. 
102 TFEU] is unrelated to its compliance or non-compliance with other legal 
rules»106, and, indeed, that abuses of dominance are often lawful practices under 
branches of law other than competition law. This consideration outweighed the 
fact that AZ was entitled to request the deregistration of Losec capsules marketing 
authorisation under the mentioned Directive 65/65/EEC. Moreover, such conduct 
could not be consistent with the standard of competition on the merits, since it did 
not pursue the legitimate protection of an investment. 
Both reasons given by the General Court therefore rely heavily on the notion of 
competition on the merits, and they both show a renewed intensity of the antitrust 
scrutiny into the realms of patent law. 
AZ took the case further to the Court of Justice, seeking an annulment of the 
General Court’s decision. The final judgment, delivered on 6 December 2012107 
did not uphold any of the grounds of appeal raised by AZ, thus confirming the 
reasoning of the lower court in its entirety. Again, it is worth focusing in particu-
                                                        
105 General Court, judgment of 1 July 2010, AstraZeneca, cited above, paras. 376-377. 
106 Ibid., para. 677. 
107 Court of Justice, judgment of 6 December 2012, case C-457/10 P, AstraZeneca AB, Astra-
Zeneca plc v. European Commission, EU:C:2012:770. 
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lar on the main arguments in law, as they are the most relevant feature of the deci-
sion. 
In its assessment of the first abuse, the Court of Justice stressed that an under-
taking in a dominant position cannot resort to any possible means to lay claim on 
a right, including deliberate recourse to highly misleading representations in order 
to lead the authorities into an error. Indeed, by adopting the same parameter the 
General Court referred to, it confirmed that this conduct «would be manifestly not 
consistent with competition on the merits»108. In this regard the Court of Justice 
also specified how each case must be proved in concreto according to the factual 
circumstances, without inferring from the above-mentioned argument that even an 
unintentional and immediately rectified misrepresentation made to a public au-
thority would constitute an abuse under Art. 102 TFEU. When considering the ef-
fects of AZ’s abusive behaviour, the Court also upheld the General Court, and 
maintained it was sufficient to demonstrate a potential anticompetitive effect. In 
fact it was established that AZ’s misleading representations «were very likely to 
result in the issue of unlawful SPCs»109. 
In addition, when evaluating the grounds of appeal regarding the second abuse, 
the Court of Justice supported the line of reasoning of the lower instance. In par-
ticular, in two significant paragraphs of its decision it confirmed a rather strict ap-
proach regarding the extent of competition law enforcement. Both arguments fol-
lowed from the broad notion of competition on the merits: on the one hand, the 
Court reasserted the autonomy of a finding of illegality under Art. 102 TFEU 
from the compliance or non-compliance with other legal rules (in the case at issue, 
the Directive 65/65/EEC)110; and, on the other hand, it held that an undertaking in 
a dominant position, given its special responsibility, has to submit to «a straight-
forward restriction of the options available under European Union law»111 (in the 
case at issue, the deregistration of the market authorisation for Losec capsules 
                                                        
108 Ibid., para. 98. 
109 Ibid., para. 111. 
110 Ibid., para. 132. 
111 Ibid., para. 149. 
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provided for in Directive 65/65/EEC), unless it demonstrates the existence of le-
gitimate interests or objective justifications for its conduct. 
This ruling of the Court of Justice thus represents a turning point in the EU 
case law, and consequently for the Member States. As will be discussed in the fol-
lowing chapter, its implications seem particularly far-reaching and entail a re-
newed balance in the interplay between competition policy and patent law. 
 
Servier case. 
Keeping in mind these considerations, it is now worth focusing on the most re-
cent case law concerning Art. 102 TFEU in a context of pharmaceutical patent lit-
igation, namely the Commission decision in the Servier case, which has already 
examined here, in the section on restrictive agreements112. As will be recalled, in 
this case the EU antitrust authority has assessed the application of the provision at 
issue for the first time with regard to a proper patent settlement agreement. To this 
end it took into account Servier’s conducts as an acquirer of API technology to 
produce perindopril, and as a party of the agreements concluded with competing 
generic manufacturers. 
Regarding the technology acquisition, the Commission carried out its assess-
ment in light of the relevant legal framework on technology transfers, as well as 
CJEU case law on acquisitions of IP rights that constitute an abuse of dominant 
position under Art. 102 TFEU (in particular, the Tetra Pak I and AstraZeneca 
judgments113). Also in this decision the concept of competition on the merits rep-
resented the legal standard under which the Commission evaluated the circum-
stances of the case. Three elements were especially highlighted in this context, 
namely the competitive threat posed by the acquired technology to Servier’s exist-
ing patents, the removal of a potentially enabling source of competition through 
the technology acquisition and the capability to restrict competition by rendering 
                                                        
112 Commission decision of 9 July 2014, Perindopril (Servier), cited above. 
113 Court of First Instance, judgment of 6 October 1994, case T-83/91, Tetra Pak International 
SA v. Commission of the European Communities, EU:T:1994:246; General Court, judgment of 1 
July 2010, AstraZeneca, cited above; Court of Justice, judgment of 6 December 2012, AstraZene-
ca, cited above. 
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it more difficult for generic suppliers to enter the market. Consequently, the EU 
institution held that Servier deviated from competition on the merits, as its con-
duct was able to produce foreclosure effects on the given market. 
Regarding the patent settlements concluded with the five generic manufactur-
ers, the Commission stressed the difference in its assessment under Art. 101 and 
Art. 102 TFEU. In the latter perspective the crucial issue became the «distinct uni-
lateral aspect»114 possessed by said agreements, which was based on Servier using 
its market power to induce the most advanced generic competitors to refrain from 
entering the market. In particular, such an additional element was inferred from 
the central role held by the originator in all settlements and the cumulative self-
reinforcing effect of the pattern of agreements. 
The two conducts were thus respectively held as abusive within the meaning of 
Art. 102 TFEU. Furthermore, according to the Commission, said behaviours con-
stituted «a single and continuous exclusionary strategy infringing Article 102»115, 
on the basis of their complementarity, as well as their combined effects and over-
lapping timeline. Together they consistently pursued the common goal of delaying 
or blocking generic entry into the perindopril market, thus deviating from Servi-
er’s special responsibility as the dominant company, and implementing measures 
that do not qualify as competition on the merits. 
This second case is thus significant in that it builds upon the main reasoning of 
the CJEU judgments in AstraZeneca, and also shifts the perspective to a different 
factual background, which is a patent settlement case. A more critical assessment 
of its impact on future cases will be carried out in the next chapter. 
  
                                                        
114 Commission decision of 9 July 2014, Perindopril (Servier), cited above, para. 2931. 
115 Ibid., para. 2961. 
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2.2.2. IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
The case law analysis regarding the US takes into account two different types 
of conduct that can be caught under the provision of Section 2 of the Sherman Act 
and examined together with the abuses of dominance established by the CJEU in 
the AstraZeneca case. However, the legislative divergence existing between the 
EU and the US legal systems in this regard must be borne in mind. Art. 102 TFEU 
and Section 2 of the Sherman Act, in general terms, are not perfectly comparable, 
in that the latter actually prevents monopolization or attempted monopolization, 
which requires at least a larger market share and is broadly described in the men-
tioned provision, without references to any specific conduct116. Still, the compari-
son allows drawing further considerations on EU case law that has recently devel-
oped. 
 
Buspirone case. 
The first case that provides a useful term of reference to this end is the Buspi-
rone antitrust dispute dating back to 2002117. The facts of the case concern a mul-
tidistrict litigation that involved the drug buspirone, used to treat anxiety and sold 
by Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS) under the brand name «BuSpar». The antitrust 
dispute was brought before the Southern District of New York by generic manu-
facturers who sought to enter the buspirone market, as well as direct purchasers of 
the drug, end payers and consumer organisations, collectively claiming that BMS 
had violated, insofar as is here relevant, Section 2 of the Sherman Act having ex-
tended an unlawful monopoly over the drug market by abusing certain provision 
of the Hatch-Waxman Act. More precisely, BMS obtained the original patent 
covering buspirone in 1980 and had been selling the drug since 1986. The patent 
                                                        
116 Extensively E.M. FOX, Monopolization and Dominance in the United States and the Euro-
pean Community: Efficiency, Opportunity and Fairness, in 61 Notre Dame Law Review, 1986, pp. 
981-1020, and by the same Author, Monopolization and abuse of dominance: Why Europe is dif-
ferent, in 59 The Antitrust Bulletin, 2014, No. 1, pp. 129-152. 
117 In re Buspirone patent litigation/In re Buspirone antitrust litigation, 185 F.Supp.2d 363 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 91 
was set to expire on 21 November 2002, and only 12 hours before the expiry 
BMS was granted a new patent on the drug, which was immediately submitted to 
the FDA for listing in the Orange Book (the publication for Approved Drug Prod-
ucts with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations)118. This move actually prevented 
the FDA from approving any pending ANDAs regarding generic buspirone prod-
ucts that competitor manufacturers had submitted when the original patent expiry 
was approaching. The antitrust plaintiffs argued the new patent did not claim the 
use of buspirone and thus BMS had fraudulently represented to the FDA that the 
new patent covered approved uses of the drug. Moreover, they claimed BMS took 
further advantage from the false statements to the FDA by pursuing patent in-
fringement suits against generic suppliers of the drug and therefore obtaining the 
automatic 30-month stay of the approval applications. 
The reasoning adopted by the District Court is particularly interesting in that it 
examined the application of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine119, as claimed by the 
defendant BMS, in the context of Orange Book listings and then of the exception 
to this immunity set forth in the Walker Process case120. Noerr-Pennington in fact 
provides immunity from federal antitrust liability insofar as a concerted effort of 
two or more individuals is directed to petition the government, with this conduct 
                                                        
118 For a broader framework of the US regulatory system with regard to the approval of generic 
drugs see supra, Chapter one, Section 2.2.2. 
119 The US Supreme Court first articulated this doctrine as an interpretation of the Sherman Act 
in Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961) and 
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 281 U.S. 657 (1965). As an in-depth discussion of the doc-
trine cannot be carried out in this limited context, for a comprehensive framework and the applica-
tion in the pharmaceutical sector see, inter alia, E.H. STEINHAUER, Is Noerr-Pennington Immunity 
Still a Viable Defense Against Antitrust Claims Arising form Hatch-Waxman Litigation?, in 61 
Food and Drug Law Journal, 2006, pp. 680-700; M. AVERY, M. NEWSOM, B. HAHN, The antitrust 
implications of filing “sham” citizen petitions with the FDA, in 65 Hastings Law Journal, 2013, 
pp. 113-152. 
120 The US Supreme Court established this ground of exception in Walker Process Equipment, 
Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965). As will be explained, Walker 
Process is intended to overcome Noerr-Pennington immunity beyond the mere sham-litigation 
standard. 
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falling within the scope of the fundamental right to communicate with govern-
ment entities granted by the First Amendment to the US Constitution. In this re-
gard, the Court held that BMS’ conduct of requesting the FDA to list its new pa-
tent in the Orange Book did not qualify as petitioning activity for Noerr-
Pennington purposes, since in this case the public authority’s actions «were non-
discretionary and [did] not reflect any decision as to the validity of the representa-
tions [made by BMS] in an Orange Book listing»121. Nonetheless, the Court also 
went on to consider whether the exception provided under Walker Process if the 
Noerr doctrine were to apply to BMS’ conduct. According to this exception, a pa-
tent holder may be subject to antitrust liability when it attempts to maintain its 
monopoly over a product by bringing patent infringement suits against competi-
tors based on a patent procured through fraudulent representations to the PTO. Af-
ter establishing a similarity between the submissions made to the PTO when ap-
plying for a patent and those made to the FDA in an Orange Book listing applica-
tion, the District Court considered that BMS had knowingly made false statements 
about the scope of its new patent to the FDA, and held as founded the plantiff’s 
allegations that no reasonable patent infringement claim could have been asserted 
against generic competitors on the basis of said patent. Therefore, it concluded 
that Walker Process could be applied in the case at hand122. 
The Buspirone litigation thus confirms that misleading (or rather, false) state-
ments to public authorities in the context of Orange Book filings can be caught 
under the prohibition of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, similar to AstraZeneca’s 
first abuse concerning the misleading representations submitted to national patent 
offices in order to obtain the SPCs. 
 
Two other cases can offer a comparison with EU case law with regard to the 
different conduct known as “product hopping”, which consists of making use of 
the regulatory framework by switching between different formulations of a drug 
in order to prevent competition from generic manufacturers. The analysis focuses 
                                                        
121 In re Buspirone patent litigation/In re Buspirone antitrust litigation, cited above, at 371. 
122 Ibid., at 373-375. 
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on three cases, TriCor, Nexium, and Namenda, which are worth examining to-
gether as the courts have moved towards a narrower approach to these matters. 
 
TriCor case. 
The factual background of TriCor refers to fenofibrate API, which is used to 
treat high levels of triglycerides, as well as high cholesterol, and is marketed by 
the brand company Abbott on the basis of a licensing agreement from another 
manufacturer, Fournier. The first NDA for TriCor was approved by the FDA in 
1998 for its capsule formulation and then listed in the Orange Book with the un-
derlying patent. Two generic producers (Novopharm – later acquired by Teva – 
and Impax) filed ANDAs with Paragraph-IV Certifications between 1999 and 
2000 for this fenofibrate formulation, to which Abbott and Fournier responded by 
suing them for patent infringement, thus triggering the thirty-month stay of the 
approval of generic products provided by the Hatch-Waxman Act. Pending this 
dispute, Abbott submitted another NDA, this time for a tablet formulation of the 
drug, which was approved in 2001. Subsequently, the company engaged in a con-
duct known as “market cannibalization”, which consisted of stopping the sale of 
the prior capsule formulation and buying back the existing supplies of the cap-
sules from pharmacies, so that generic substitution would no longer be possible. 
Moreover, it changed the capsule formulation’s code in the National Drug Data 
File to «obsolete» in order to prevent pharmacies from filling TriCor prescriptions 
with the generic substitute123. The generics then developed equivalent versions of 
the new tablet formulation, filing their respective ANDAs with Paragraph-IV Cer-
tifications, and again between 2002 and 2003 Abbott and Fournier filed patent in-
fringement lawsuits against them, triggering another regulatory thirty-month stay. 
In addition, as they did before, the originators submitted a NDA for a new tablet 
formulation based on a different dosage and a label change (the “no food effect 
                                                        
123 The National Drug Data File (NDDF) is a private database that provides information about 
FDA-approved drugs. The change of code pursued by Abbott eliminated the reference to the brand 
drug that pharmacies would have needed to effectively substitute it with its generic equivalent. 
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label”), paired up with a cannibalization strategy to block generic competition on 
the previous tablet formulation. 
Teva and Impax, together with direct and indirect purchasers, brought the re-
sulting antitrust litigation against Abbott and Fournier before Delaware District 
Court124, claiming that the defendants had engaged in a conspiracy that amounted 
both to a restraint of trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and a mo-
nopolization of the fenofibrate market in violation of Section 2 of the same Act. 
The originator companies, on their part, moved to dismiss the case, maintaining 
that each new formulation they introduced reflected improvements over the prior 
ones, and therefore must be deemed lawful under antitrust rules, and that they had 
no obligation to help their competitors by allowing them to free-ride on the brand 
product. 
The Court eventually ruled in favour of the plaintiffs, explaining that the ap-
propriate standard to assess such claims had to be the rule of reason approach giv-
en the peculiarities of the pharmaceutical drug market. Hence, in such a product-
hopping case, the plaintiff was initially required to «show anticompetitive harm 
from the formulation changes, [and] that harm [was going to] be weighed against 
any benefits presented by the [d]efendant»125. In this regard it found that Abbott 
and Fournier’s conducts actually prevented an unfettered consumer choice be-
tween brand and generic versions of the drug, thus resulting in potentially anti-
competitive «consumer coercion»126. This assessment did not have to establish to-
                                                        
124 In re TriCor Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation, 432 F.Supp.2d 408 (D. Del. 2006). For a 
comprehensive comment see S.D. SHADOWEN, K.B. LEFFLER, J.T. LUKENS, Anticompetitive prod-
uct changes in the pharmaceutical industry, in 41 Rutgers Law Journal, 2009, pp. 1-81; for a 
comparative perspective with the EU system, see J. WESTIN, Product switching in the pharmaceu-
tical sector – an abuse or legitimate commercial consideration?, in European Competition Law 
Review, 2011, pp. 595-601. 
125 In re TriCor Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation, cited above, at 422. 
126 Ibid., at 424. This consideration allowed the Court to distinguish this case from the Second 
Circuit’s precedent in Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2nd Cir. 1979), in 
which the introduction of new products on the market (namely, a Kodak camera and related film 
cartridges) was not accompanied by the withdrawal of any prior versions, and their acceptance on 
the market was based purely on consumer free choice. 
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tal foreclosure effects, but rather that generics were «barred from the cost-efficient 
means of competing»127 in the given market. 
It is also worth mentioning what the Court ruled regarding to the defendants’ 
argument that they were not required to aid their competitors. Indeed, they had no 
duty to do so, but nonetheless it acknowledged the particular situation existing in 
a monopoly, where a monopolist is not free to adopt certain conducts that a com-
pany in a competitive market may pursue because of the lack of market con-
straints. This consideration mirrors in many respects the concept of special re-
sponsibility applied by the CJEU to dominant companies, thus confirming a 
common background for comparing the respective case law. 
 
Nexium case. 
Two years after TriCor, another court was called upon to rule on a product 
hopping case, namely in the already mentioned Walgreen Co. v. AstraZeneca 
Pharmaceutical case (also known as Nexium) 128. 
The facts at issue concern Nexium, a prescription drug for heartburn treatments 
containing the API esomeprazole whose patent is held by the brand company 
AstraZeneca. Nexium was actually a follow-on product for Prilosec, a blockbuster 
prescription drug that the originator started marketing in 1989 and whose patent 
expired in October 2001. AstraZeneca obtained FDA approval for Nexium in Feb-
ruary 2001, and also for a new over-the-counter formulation of Prilosec capsules 
in June 2003. Upon the introduction of Nexium on the market, the originator en-
gaged in an aggressive activity of promoting and detailing the second-generation 
product to doctors, while it ceased its marketing efforts for Prilosec. However, no 
withdrawal of the latter drug from the market ever took place, and it remained 
available in both prescription and over-the-counter formulations. 
                                                        
127 In re TriCor Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation, cited above, at 423. 
128 Walgreen Co. v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals L.P., 534 F.Supp.2d 146 (D.D.C. 2008). Al-
so in this regard see, for example, S.D. SHADOWEN, K.B. LEFFLER, J.T. LUKENS, Anticompetitive 
product changes, cited above, and J. WESTIN, Product switching in the pharmaceutical sector, cit-
ed above. 
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Generic competitors for Prilosec therefore filed an antitrust suit against Astra-
Zeneca before the District Court for the District of Columbia. They claimed the 
originator pursued an exclusionary strategy in violation of Section 2 of the Sher-
man Act by switching the market from Prilosec, which faced generic competition, 
to Nexium, which did not, and, in addition, had no therapeutic superiority over its 
predecessor. The District Court, however, granted the defendants’ motion to dis-
miss and distinguished this case from TriCor, again on the basis of consumer 
choice. Here it found that «there [was] no allegation that AstraZeneca eliminated 
any consumer choices[, r]ather [it] added choices»129 by introducing its follow-on 
drug. Moreover, with regard to the claim of Nexium’s lack of superiority, the 
Court held that the determination of which product among several is superior 
should be «left to the marketplace», not to judiciary bodies. 
The combined analysis of these two cases is particularly instructive in that they 
also highlight another critical aspect of the pharmaceutical market. Indeed, while 
the court in the Nexium case appears to have reasonably relied on the absence of 
any gaming of the regulatory system by AstraZeneca (as opposed to Abbott and 
Fournier in TriCor), it did not duly consider the price disconnect that results be-
cause doctors who prescribe the drug do not pay for it, and patients (or insurers) 
who pay do not choose the drug. The trade-off between prices and quality is not 
up to the final consumer, as it is in most markets, and therefore the argument re-
garding the main role of the marketplace in determining the therapeutic superiori-
ty of a product seems to be inconsistent with the actual conditions of the market in 
question. 
 
Namenda case. 
Among the most recent cases on product reformulations, Namenda occupies a 
central role in that it is the first and only appellate decision to date. 
The factual background refers to a memantine-based drug designed to treat 
Alzheimer’s disease, which has been marketed since 2004 by Forest Laboratories 
(a wholly-owned subsidiary of Actavis) in a twice-daily formulation under the 
                                                        
129 Walgreen Co. v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals L.P., cited above, at 151. 
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brand name «Namenda IR». The drug soon became one of the originator’s best 
selling products and Forest began developing a once-daily extended-release for-
mulation, «Namenda XR», in order to align its production with all other dementia 
treatments that are administered once a day. This follow-on drug was approved by 
the FDA in June 2010 and entered into the market in June 2013, approximately 
two years ahead of IR’s patent expiry date. Initially, Forest adopted a “soft-
switch” strategy to transition patients from IR to XR, which envisaged a heavy 
promotion of the latter formulation, as well as its sale at a discounted rate. As the 
patent cliff was quickly approaching, however, the originator employed a more 
direct approach trying to set up a “hard switch”. More precisely, it publicly an-
nounced it would soon discontinue Namenda IR and notified the FDA of its in-
tent, but due to an interruption in XR production, it was forced to sell the first-
generation product until the autumn of 2014. 
Before IR withdrawal could ultimately take place, New York State filed a 
complaint in the District Court for the Southern District of New York against For-
est and Actavis, claiming that the planned hard switch violated Sections 1130 and 2 
of the Sherman Act. Indeed, the plaintiff alleged that the originators’ plan was ac-
tually to impair generic entry into the memantine market by means of the launch 
of Namenda XR, forcing patients to switch to the reformulated drug and prevent-
ing substitution with generic IR as provided by most states’ laws. The District 
Court granted the plaintiff’s request for preliminary injunction and ordered Forest 
and Actavis to continue production of Namenda IR and to inform the medical 
community of its continued availability until thirty days after the date when ge-
neric memantine would first have been available (i.e. after 11 July 2015)131. 
Forest and Actavis appealed the grant of the preliminary injunction before the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which rendered its judgment on 22 May 
                                                        
130 The claim based on Section 1 of the Sherman Act referred to an agreement that Forest and 
Actavis entered into with Foundation Care, a mail-order-only pharmacy, in order to limit access to 
Namenda IR. However, for the purposes of this analysis it will not be touched upon, as the Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit ultimately did not address this claim. 
131 The People of the State of New York v. Actavis, PLC, et al., Civ. No. 14-7473 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014). 
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2015 upholding the lower court’s injunction132. When stating its antitrust reason-
ing, the appellate court considered the two benchmarks of consumer coercion and 
anticompetitive exclusionary effects, as the Delaware District Court already did in 
TriCor. As to the former, the anticompetitive threshold of the originators’ “hard 
switch” was found on the removal of Namenda IR from the market prior to gener-
ic entry, which deprived consumers of the choice as to «whether the benefits of 
switching to once-daily Namenda XR would outweigh the benefits of adhering to 
twice-daily therapy using less expensive generic IR»133. As regards the anticom-
petitive effects of said conduct, it relied on the «dangerous probability» that the 
originator companies would maintain their monopoly power in the relevant mar-
ket after generic entry. Indeed, even though patients in theory would not be pre-
vented from switching back to IR generic treatment, «in practice, such a reverse 
commute would be a highly unlikely occurrence»134 due to the successful “hard 
switch”. 
Then, the Second Circuit assessed the defendants’ argument that their patent 
rights on the two formulations of the drug would shield them from antitrust liabil-
ity. To this end, it recalled the landmark finding in Actavis under which patent and 
antitrust policies are both relevant to determine the scope of a patent and conclud-
ed that in the case at issue the attempted use of patent rights to extend the exclu-
sivity period on the relevant market (namely, the «combination of (…) withdrawal 
of IR and introduction of XR»135) pushed the conduct beyond the scope of those 
rights, and thus subject to antitrust liability. 
The significant reach of this judgment thus resides not only in the fact that it 
confirmed the special attention paid by US courts to the unique phenomenon of 
product hopping, but also in that it is the only case where the court handed down a 
                                                        
132 New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638 (2nd Cir. 2015). For a com-
ment see, among others, E. LACY, “Hard Switch” a Violation of the Sherman Act in “Product 
Hopping” Case - New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638 (2d Cir. 2015), in 
12 Journal of Health and Biomedical Law, 2016, pp. 91-109. 
133 Ibid., at 655. 
134 Ibid., at 656. 
135 Ibid., at 660. 
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remedy, namely a preliminary injunction. The Second Circuit, moreover, properly 
stressed the anticompetitive effects deriving from the combination of product 
withdrawal with other conducts in order to ground its finding. Nonetheless, it ap-
pears to have relied too heavily on the distinction between “soft” and “hard 
switch” that does not ultimately constitute the deciding element on which the anti-
trust scrutiny should focus136, as will be argued in more detail in the following 
chapter137. 
  
                                                        
136 Taking this view, M.A. CARRIER, S.D. SHADOWEN, Product Hopping: A New Framework, 
in 92 Notre Dame Law Review, 2016, pp. 167-230. Among those who strongly criticised the 
judgment, see J. SHEPERD, Deterring Innovation: New York v. Actavis and the Duty to Subsidize 
Competitors’ Market Entry, in 17 Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology, 2016, pp. 
663-707, stressing in particular the reduced incentives for innovation arising out from the duty to 
continue marketing superseded drugs as a consequence of the Second Circuit’s findings. 
137 Infra, Chapter three, Section 3.2. 
 100 
2.2.3. IN ITALY 
 
Pfizer case. 
Concerning the present topic of abuses of dominance, Italian practice provides 
a fully litigated case that is particularly relevant when compared with the CJEU 
landmark judgment in AstraZeneca. Indeed, the Pfizer case builds up on the EU 
precedent and seems to push the antitrust scrutiny over the exercise of IPRs even 
further, as will be described below. 
The facts underlying the case refer to the European patent held by the Swedish-
based company Pharmacia covering the API latanoprost, which is used to treat 
glaucoma and other eye-related diseases and commercialised under the brand 
name «Xalatan». The patent protection was due to expire in September 2009, but 
was later extended until July 2011 thanks to the grant of SPCs in those Member 
States where it had been validated, except in Italy and Spain. After being acquired 
by Pfizer in 2003, the originator devised a strategy to align the patent protection 
throughout all European countries, namely by filing an application for a divisional 
patent also claiming the compound latanoprost138, which was indeed granted in 
2009, and for the SPC related thereto. The protection was thus matched until July 
2011. Moreover, Pfizer applied for a paediatric extension of the SPC, as allowed 
by the regulatory system139, which granted an additional six-month protection un-
til January 2012. In Italy, meanwhile, generic manufacturers (including Rati-
opharm) relied upon the expiry date of the “parent” patent, i.e. September 2009, 
and planned their entry into the latanoprost market accordingly. Pfizer, however, 
engaged in various conducts (even in litigation) aimed at warning potential com-
petitors of its extended exclusionary rights, ultimately causing generic suppliers to 
                                                        
138 More precisely, it was filed as a divisional application of a further divisional patent (see 
EPO Technical Board of Appeal, decision of 10 May 2012, case T-2402/10, available at 
www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals). 
139 The relevant provisions are set forth in Regulation (EC) No. 1901/2006 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on medicinal products for paediatric use and 
amending Regulation (EEC) No. 1768/92, Directive 2001/20/EC, Directive 2001/83/EC and Regu-
lation (EC) No. 726/2004, OJ L 378 of 27 December 2006, pp. 1-19. 
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delay production of competing drugs. On this basis, Ratiopharm filed a complaint 
with the ICA, which started its investigation against Pfizer in October 2010 for an 
alleged violation of Art. 102 TFEU. 
The ICA issued its decision on 11 January 2012 and affirmed the existence of 
an abuse of dominant position within the meaning of Art. 102 TFEU140, thus im-
posing fines on Pfizer. The infringement was pursued through a complex exclu-
sionary strategy comprising the artificial extension of Xalatan’s patent protection 
in Italy beyond the expiry of the parent patent in September 2009, the judicial liti-
gation brought against generic competitors, and the paediatric extension of the 
compound patent obtained until January 2012. As to the first conduct concerning 
the divisional patent and the SPC, the Authority listed the following grounds on 
which its decision relied: the timing of the application for such patent, which was 
much more delayed than the one on the original compound and yet concurrent 
with generic entry into the given market; the validation of the divisional patent 
only in Italy, where the expiry of the parent patent was due earlier than in other 
Member States, and the following application for the SPC in the same country; 
and the lack of the launch of any new product on the market, contrary to what 
would have been expected after the grant of a divisional patent141. With regard to 
                                                        
140 Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, proceeding A431, Ratiopharm/Pfizer, 
decision No. 23194 of 11 January 2012, in Bollettino AGCM No. 2 of 30 January 2012, available 
at www.agcm.it, pp. 5-56. The whole Pfizer case was extensively commented upon in the litera-
ture: see, inter alia, M. COLANGELO, Dominanza e regulatory gaming: il caso Pfizer, in Mercato 
concorrenza regole, 2012, pp. 325-336; E. AREZZO, Strategic patenting e diritto della concorren-
za: riflessioni a margine della vicenda Ratiopharm - Pfizer, in Giurisprudenza commerciale, 2014, 
I, pp. 404-426; D. GERADIN, The Uncertainties Created by Relying on the Vague ‘Competition on 
the Merits’ Standard in the Pharmaceutical Sector: The Italian Pfizer/Pharmacia Case, in Journal 
of Competition Law & Practice, 2014, pp. 344-352; C. STOTHERS, M. VAN KERCKHOVE, Is winter 
coming? The competition chill continues in Italian Antitrust Authority v Pfizer (Xalatan), in Euro-
pean Intellectual Property Review, 2014, pp. 729-732; G. GHIDINI, G. CAVANI, P. PISERÀ, Il caso 
Pfizer, in Rivista di diritto civile, 2015, pp. 1565-1594; A. ROCCHIETTI, I recenti interventi 
dell’Autorità nel settore farmaceutico, in E.A. RAFFAELLI (ed.), Antitrust fra diritto nazionale e 
diritto dell’Unione europea. XI Convegno, cited above. 
141 Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, Ratiopharm/Pfizer, cited above, paras. 
182-203. 
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the legal proceedings initiated by Pfizer, the ICA highlighted the situation of un-
certainty resulting from those actions that effectively contributed to postpone the 
entry of bioequivalents of latanoprost142. The litigation, in fact, appeared merely 
vexatious and did not lay claim to Pfizer’s rights. Finally, when examining the 
paediatric extension of the patent, the Authority concluded that on the basis of the 
drug’s characteristics, this application was purely instrumental and did not appear 
to pursue any actual interests. 
The legal assessment also referred to the role of intent in abuse of dominance 
cases, confirming the CJEU approach that said evaluation is not required in this 
context, but may nevertheless constitute the connecting element of the whole anti-
competitive strategy. In the case at issue, the collected evidence supported the 
finding of such an exclusionary intent. 
Pfizer brought an appeal before the administrative court of first instance (TAR 
Lazio), which delivered its judgment on 3 September 2012143, overturning the Au-
thority’s decision. Assuming that Pfizer did nothing more than exercising its 
rights before patent offices and courts, the court’s reasoning established whether 
the conducts in question had been characterised for a clear exclusionary intent 
given by something more (quid pluris) than the mere combination of lawful be-
haviours. To this end, it held that the main argument on which the ICA relied was 
actually the EPO annulment of the divisional patent144. This circumstance, how-
ever, fell short insofar as the EPO Board of Appeal ultimately ruled on the validi-
ty of said patent and the decision was thus vitiated under this aspect. Indeed, the 
administrative court also maintained that the Authority should have considered 
                                                        
142 Ibid., paras. 182-203. 
143  TAR Lazio, judgment of 3 September 2012, No. 7467, available at www.giustizia-
amministrativa.it. In the literature see G. SENA, Esclusiva brevettuale e strategia escludente, in 
Rivista di Diritto Industriale, 2012, II, pp. 626-630; E. AREZZO, Strategic patenting, cited above. 
144 More precisely, the administrative court drew this conclusion notwithstanding the contrary 
statements made by the ICA in its decision (see Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, 
Ratiopharm/Pfizer, cited above, para. 185). This further element thus confirmed the inconsistency 
of the position taken by the Authority with regard to the annulment of the divisional patent (TAR 
Lazio, judgment of 3 September 2012, No. 7467, cited above, para. 4.1). 
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staying the proceedings until the Board of Appeal had rendered the final decision 
on the annulment. Since it did not, its decision was rather based on provisional de-
terminations and was found to be lacking the evidence and reasoning necessary to 
conclude that there was an abuse of dominant position. 
The ICA, for its part, appealed the first instance judgment before the adminis-
trative supreme court (Consiglio di Stato). The final decision on the case was thus 
issued on 12 February 2014145. It found the lower court’s arguments unpersuasive 
in that they evaluated Pfizer’s behaviours against the background of patent law (in 
particular, the EPO annulment of the divisional patent). This aspect was, however, 
irrelevant to the main issue of establishing the anticompetitive nature of a number 
of conducts that were per se lawful under patent law. Indeed, the supreme court in 
this regard offered a particular qualification of the abuse of dominance as a «spec-
ification of the broader category of abuse of rights»146, since Pfizer’s instrumental 
exercise of rights granted by the legal system resulted in the exclusion of competi-
tors from the latanoprost market. Therefore, according to the supreme court, the 
ICA correctly argued that the originator pursued a different and further aim than 
mere patent protection, and that its conducts were distinguished by a clear exclu-
sionary intent in order to hinder the entry of generic drugs. One of the decisive 
factors in this reasoning was that Pfizer did not market a new drug after having 
obtained the divisional patent. In light of the above, the administrative supreme 
court reversed the lower court’s judgment and confirmed the findings of the Au-
thority. 
                                                        
145 Consiglio di Stato, judgment of 12 February 2014, No. 693, available at www.giustizia-
amministrativa.it. For further comments see C. D’AMORE, The Administrative Supreme Court con-
firms the ICA’s decision to condemn Pfizer for abuse of dominant position aimed at delaying the 
market entry of generic pharmaceutical companies, in Italian Antitrust Review, 2014, No. 1, pp. 
77-81, and by the same Author, Il caso Ratiopharm/Pfizer e l’abuso del diritto, available at 
www.competition-law.eu; G. GHIDINI, G. CAVANI, P. PISERÀ, Il caso Pfizer, cited above. Among 
those who expressed criticism towards the supreme court’s approach, see C. OSTI, The Italian way 
to antitrust judicial review: a few oddities of the Pfizer case, in Italian Antitrust Review, 2014, No. 
3, pp. 115-132. 
146 Consiglio di Stato, judgment of 12 February 2014, No. 693, para. V), C). 
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The Italian Pfizer case followed the approach of the CJEU in AstraZeneca, but 
also took the antitrust scrutiny over the exercise of IPRs to an extreme intensity in 
the sense that here the originator’s conducts were lawful according to the patent 
law framework, as opposed to the misleading position taken by AstraZeneca to-
wards patent offices and courts. This explains their qualification in terms of abuse 
of rights, as claimed by the court, which requires the existence of a right and its 
exercise in a way that is not consistent with the aim provided by the relevant legal 
system. As will be further discussed in the next chapter, the need to establish a 
quid pluris that shows the objectively anticompetitive nature of otherwise lawful 
conducts appears a reasonable application of both AstraZeneca and Pfizer prece-
dents. In particular, for industries that rely heavily on R&D such as pharmaceuti-
cal companies, a reasonable distinction between legitimate protection of IPRs and 
anticompetitive strategies could be again based on innovation, i.e. on the launch 
of new products on the given market. In this regard, the conclusion of the admin-
istrative supreme court in Pfizer seems to have been correctly drawn. 
 
Aspen case. 
This recent case investigated by the ICA has concluded with the decision to 
impose a fine of over 5 million euros on Aspen Pharma for having infringed Art. 
102 TFEU, by increasing prices of its life-saving anti-cancer medicines by up to 
1500%147. The case does not actually involve patent law issues, but rather a strat-
egy of aggressive price negotiation undertaken by the dominant company towards 
the competent regulatory body, i.e. AIFA. For this reason, an in-depth analysis of 
the decision will not be carried out in the context of this thesis. Nonetheless, it is 
worth mentioning, as the ICA continues to pay particular attention to various is-
sues pertaining to the regulatory framework in the pharmaceutical sector – in this 
instance, pricing procedures – that may amount to anticompetitive conducts. 
                                                        
147 Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, proceeding A480, Incremento prezzi 
farmaci Aspen, decision No. 26185 of 29 September 2016, in Bollettino AGCM No. 36 of 17 Oc-
tober 2016, pp. 5-99, available at www.agcm.it. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 
 
This third chapter aims at providing a more critical insight into some of the un-
resolved issues within the debated interplay between antitrust and patent law in 
the pharmaceutical industry. Indeed, as can be inferred from the analysed case 
law, under many respects the complex accommodation of the two bodies of law 
seems far from settled. 
Firstly, the main questions concerning the practice of restrictive agreements 
will be addressed. In this regard, the competition law standard to ground a finding 
of infringement under Art. 101 TFEU, i.e. a restriction by object or by effect, con-
stitutes one of the key aspects of the discourse and will be thoroughly examined 
against the background of the relevant CJEU case law, as well as the landmark US 
Actavis case. Then, further remarks concerning the particular nature of co-
promotion and co-marketing agreements will be proposed. Lastly, this section will 
discuss the reach of the recent request for preliminary ruling submitted in the con-
text of the Italian Roche-Novartis case. 
The second section will deal with the most significant developments of case 
law on abuses of dominance/monopolisation. Here the perspective shifts to the ra-
ther elusive standard of competition on the merits as applied to conducts that are 
on the one hand exclusionary practices, and on the other may be found lawful un-
der other branches of law. By recalling the relevant case law, it will be argued that 
the application of more sector-specific benchmarks appears more appropriate to 
ground a finding of abuse under Art. 102 TFEU in a highly regulated context such 
as the pharmaceutical industry. Furthermore, some considerations will be also put 
forth as to a relatively unexplored question, namely the concept of competition in 
innovation between originator companies in non-existing markets, where a proper 
dominant position has not yet emerged. Finally, the separate aspect of vexatious 
litigation as an anticompetitive practice within the meaning of Art. 102 TFEU will 
be touched upon. 
The last section of the chapter will discuss an issue that has not yet found a 
proper assessment in EU and US case law, which is the combined anticompetitive 
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effect of a reverse payment settlement agreement and a switch from the first- to 
second-generation brand drug. Indeed, these conducts taken together may cause 
the most serious harm to final consumers (i.e. patients), and seem to warrant fur-
ther specific scrutiny by enforcement authorities and courts. 
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3.1. THE INTERFACE BETWEEN COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW 
AS APPLIED TO RESTRICTIVE AGREEMENTS: 
PROBLEMATIC ISSUES 
 
After having analysed the most relevant EU case law regarding cases of restric-
tive agreements, an issue that appears to merit further discussion is of course the 
application of the strictest legal standard of restriction of competition by object 
pursuant to Art. 101(1) TFEU, which has been not only a common assessment in 
all the above-mentioned Commission decisions (Lundbeck, J&J and Novartis, 
Servier), and is the ground of the complaint in the on-going Cephalon and Teva 
case, but has also been confirmed at the national level in the UK Paroxetine case. 
In particular, this aspect needs to be examined within the broader framework of 
the two notions of restrictions encompassed by the said provision, namely «by ob-
ject» and «by effect»1. The topic is one of the most typical in EU competition law, 
in that it constitutes one of the legal bases for its enforcement, yet it has been of-
ten discussed, even in recent times, both in CJEU case law and the literature. 
In this regard, a turning point can be found in the Commission’s initiative of 
modernisation of competition law that was gradually introduced from the early 
2000s and involved a process of reform on many levels 2 . It was essentially 
grounded on a shift from a form-based to an effects-based approach in the en-
forcement in this field and required, among other aspects, a clearer distinction be-
tween the two types of restriction in Art. 101 TFEU in order to convey legal cer-
tainty. The practical consequence is of great importance for the purposes of estab-
lishing an infringement, given that a restriction by object amounts to a presump-
                                                        
1 For an overview of the two notions see, for example, A. JONES, B. SUFRIN, EU Competition 
Law, 5th ed., Oxford, 2014, pp. 203-249; H. SCHRÖTER, T. JAKOB, R. KLOTZ, W. MEDERER 
(Hrgs.), Europäisches Wettbewerb, 2. Auflage, Baden-Baden, 2014, Rn. 120-127; L. VOGEL, Eu-
ropean Competition Law, Paris, 2015, pp. 84-89. 
2 Among the extensive literature, see, for example, D. SCHMIDTCHEN, M. ALBERT, S. VOIGT 
(eds.), The More Economic Approach to European Competition Law, Tübingen, 2006; J. DREXL, 
W. KERBER, R. PODSZUN (eds.), Competition Policy and the Economic Approach. Foundations 
and Limitations, Cheltenham-Northampton, 2011. 
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tion of illegality of the agreement, which can be rebutted by the other party by 
demonstrating pro-competitive effects pursuant to Art. 101(3)3. By contrast, in the 
assessment of a restriction by effect the enforcement authority bears the burden of 
proof of showing the actual impact on competition of the alleged anticompetitive 
conduct. However, as the literature has stressed, the modernised approach has ac-
tually had a limited impact on the interpretation and application of the two catego-
ries4. On the one hand, the identification of by object restrictions is broadly drawn 
and, on the other, a common understanding in determining the existence of by ef-
fect restrictions is still lacking. At times, the positions emerging from the Com-
mission’s practice and the CJEU case law have not been sufficiently consistent 
with the objectives of the reform towards an effective enforcement. 
More specifically, the notion of a by object restriction has been assessed many 
times by the CJEU since its very early judgments. The essential feature of said in-
fringement lies in its own restrictive nature, to be inferred from the purpose of the 
agreement itself, which must reveal a «sufficiently deleterious»5 effect on compe-
tition. Along the same path, other formulations of the by object substantive stand-
ard refer to conducts that are «by their very nature injurious»6 to the proper func-
                                                        
3 In practice, however, this kind of «severe restrictions of competition are unlikely to fulfil the 
conditions of [Art. 101(3)]», as they are usually “black-listed” in block exemptions regulations or 
regarded as hard-core restrictions according to the Commission’s guidance: see Communication 
from the Commission, Guidance on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, OJ C 101 of 27 
April 2004, pp. 97-118, para. 46. 
4 See the opinions expressed by A. JONES, Left Behind by Modernisation? Restrictions by Ob-
ject Under Article 101(1), in European Competition Journal, 2010, pp. 649-676, at pp. 650-565; 
C. LEMAIRE, Object vs. Effect After the Modernisation of EU Law: What Has (or Should Have) 
Changed?, in New Frontiers of Antitrust 2012, Brussels, 2013, pp. 163-182; D. WAELBROECK, D. 
SLATER, The Scope of Object vs Effect Under Article 101 TFEU, in J. BOURGEOIS, D. 
WAELBROECK (eds.), Ten years of effects-based approach in EU competition law. State of play 
and perspectives, Brussels, 2013, pp. 131-157. 
5 The reference is taken from the well-known judgment of the Court of Justice of 30 June 1966, 
case 56/65, Société Technique Minière v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH, EU:C:1966:38, p. 249.  
6 See, among others, Court of Justice, judgment of 20 November 2008, case C-209/07, Compe-
tition Authority v. Beef Industry Development Society Ltd and Barry Brothers (Carrigmore) Meats 
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tioning of free and undistorted competition, or that reveal «a sufficient degree of 
harm to competition»7, or further that are «obvious restrictions of competition»8. 
Should this not be the case, the «consequences of the agreement» would then be 
taken into account and, for a restriction by effect to be found, the court would 
have to establish that «competition has in fact been prevented or restricted or dis-
torted to an appreciable extent»9. 
The distinction, however, has been blurred by more recent case law that culmi-
nated in the Allianz Hungária judgment of 201310. The Court of Justice here held 
that in carrying out the evaluation of an agreement allegedly restricting competi-
tion by object, «regard must be had to the content of its provisions, its objectives 
and the economic and legal context of which it forms a part (...). When determin-
ing that context, it is also appropriate to take into consideration the nature of the 
goods or services affected, as well as the real conditions of the functioning and 
structure of the market or markets in question»11. Moreover, in order to affirm the 
existence of said restriction, it specified that «it is sufficient that it has the poten-
tial to have a negative impact on competition, that is to say, that it be capable in 
                                                        
Ltd., EU:C:2008:643, para. 17; judgment of 13 December 2012, case C-226/11, Expedia Inc. v. 
Autorité de la concurrence and others, EU:C:2012:795, para. 36. 
7 See, for example, Court of Justice, judgment of 6 October 2009, joined cases C-501 P, C-513 
P, C-515 P and C-519/06 P, GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited and others v. Commission of the 
European Communities, EU:C:2009:610, para. 55. 
8 This standard has been more rarely recalled: see Court of First Instance, judgment of 15 Sep-
tember 1998, joined cases T-374, T-375, T-384 and T-388/94, European Night Services Ltd (ENS) 
and others v Commission of the European Communities, EU:T:1998:198, para. 136. 
9 Court of Justice, judgment of 30 June 1966, Société Technique Minière, cited above, p. 249. 
10 Court of Justice, judgment of 13 March 2013, case C-32/11, Allianz Hungária Biztositó Zrt 
and others v. Gazdasági Versenyhivatal, EU:C:2013:160. Previous cases that similarly contributed 
to a wider interpretation of the notion of restriction by object are: judgment of 4 June 2009, case 
C-8/08, T-Mobile and others v. Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit, 
EU:C:2009:343, regarding information exchange; judgment of 13 October 2011, case C-439/09, 
Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique SAS v. Président de l’Autorité de la concurrence, Ministre de 
l’Économie, de l’Industrie et de l’Emploi, EU:C:2011:649, dealing with a selective distribution 
agreement. 
11 Judgment of 13 March 2013, case C-32/11, Allianz Hungária, cited above, para. 36. 
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an individual case of resulting in the prevention, restriction or distortion of com-
petition within the internal market»12. The consequences of such an extensive ap-
proach are rather problematic: not only would the assessment of a restriction by 
object become too general, even encompassing conducts that do not meet the 
«sufficiently deleterious» requirement mentioned above, but it would also entail 
the risk of overlapping the analysis of the object and the effects of the agreement, 
resulting in a finding of an infringement on both levels. 
In a subsequent ruling – Groupement des cartes bancaires of 2014 13 – the 
Court of Justice nonetheless appears to retract from this precedent and to endorse 
a narrower interpretation of the concept of restriction by object. It reaffirmed, in 
fact, that «the essential legal criterion for ascertaining whether coordination be-
tween undertakings involves such a restriction of competition ‘by object’ is the 
finding that such coordination reveals in itself a sufficient degree of harm to com-
petition»14. 
As to the actual distinction between by object and by effects restrictions, the 
Court recalled the substantive standard already explored in its case law prior to 
Allianz Hungária, but it also added a further qualification that appears to be rele-
                                                        
12 Ibid., para. 38. 
13 Court of Justice, judgment of 11 September 2014, case C-67/13 P, Groupement des cartes 
bancaires (CB) v. European Commission, EU:C:2014:2204. For further comments, taking into ac-
count also the precedent of Allianz Hungária, see J. KILLICK, J. JOURDAN, Cartes Bancaires: A 
Revolution or a Remainder of Old Principles We Should Never Have Forgotten?, 2014, available 
at www.competitionpolicyinternational.com; G. BRUZZONE, S. CAPOZZI, Restrictions by Object in 
the Case Law of the Court of Justice: in search of a Systematic Approach, in G.A. BENACCHIO, M. 
CARPAGNANO (a cura di), L’applicazione delle regole di concorrenza in Italia e nell’Unione eu-
ropea. Atti del V Convegno biennale Antitrust, Trento, 16-18 aprile 2015, Napoli, 2015, pp. 217-
236; P. FATTORI, The Impact of Groupement des Cartes Bancaires on Competition Law Enforce-
ment, in Italian Antitrust Review, 2015, No. 2, pp. 22-28; J.R. RUIZ CALZADO, A. SCORDAMAG-
LIA-TOUSIS, Groupement des Cartes Bancaires v Commission: Shedding Light on What is not a 
‘by object’ Restriction of Competition, in Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2015, 
pp. 495-498; S.-P. BRANKIN, The substantive standard behind the object-effect distinction post-
Cartes Bancaires, in European Competition Law Review, 2016, pp. 376-383. 
14 Court of Justice, judgment of 11 September 2014, Groupement des cartes bancaires (CB), 
cited above, para. 57. 
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vant in this context. Indeed, it held that the by object category «can be applied on-
ly to certain types of coordination between undertakings which reveal a sufficient 
degree of harm to competition that it may be found that there is no need to exam-
ine their effects, otherwise the Commission would be exempted from the obliga-
tion to prove the actual effects on the market of agreements which are in no way 
established to be, by their very nature, harmful to the proper functioning of nor-
mal competition»15. Moreover, the Court acknowledged that its settled case law 
leads to consider certain collusive behaviours between undertakings «so likely to 
have negative effects, in particular on the price, quantity or quality of the goods 
and services, that it may be considered redundant, for the purposes of applying 
[Art. 101(1) TFEU], to prove that they have actual effects on the market»16. In 
this regard, the judgment also confirms the relevance of the experience as an ele-
ment that must be accorded full consideration when assessing an alleged re-
striction by object. It follows that an anticompetitive conduct possessing distinc-
tive characteristics would hardly fall within the scope of said notion: in such a 
case it would be advisable to carry out a full-blown evaluation of its restrictive ef-
fects in order to support a finding of infringement under Art. 101(1) TFEU. 
Cartes Bancaires thus seems to provide additional guidance in order to proper-
ly establish a by object restriction, to the extent that the level of harm to competi-
tion revealed by the investigated conduct «must justify the avoidance of a full ef-
fects analysis»17. The unresolved question regards, however, the circumstances in 
which such avoidance becomes justified. To this end, the opinion given by Advo-
cate General Wahl in the case at issue could prove helpful, by explaining that a by 
object classification should be limited to cases of «(i) conduct[s] entailing an in-
herent risk of a particularly serious harmful effect or (ii) conduct[s] in respect of 
which it can be concluded that the unfavourable effects on competition outweigh 
the pro-competitive effects»18. The latter instance, in particular, could represent an 
                                                        
15 Ibid., para. 58 (emphasis added). 
16 Ibid., para. 51 (emphasis added). 
17 As underlined by S.-P. BRANKIN, The substantive standard, cited above, p. 380. 
18 Opinion of Advocate General Wahl delivered on 27 March 2014, case C-67/13 P, Groupe-
ment des cartes bancaires (CB) v. European Commission, EU:C:2014:1958, para. 55. 
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objective benchmark to ground the distinction between by object and by effect re-
strictions. Indeed, whenever it is clear that the «net effects»19 of the individual re-
striction in the context the overall agreement will be negative, a by object qualifi-
cation would appear justified. 
More recently, the Toshiba case20  has followed the mentioned guidance of 
Cartes Bancaires, while also suggesting a further level of assessment of by object 
restrictions. As the case concerned a market-sharing agreement between undertak-
ings possessing an «object restrictive of competition» and «fall[ing] within a cate-
gory of agreements expressly prohibited»21 by Art. 101(1) TFEU, the Court of 
Justice held that the analysis of the economic and legal context of which such 
practice forms part may be «limited to what it is strictly necessary»22 in order to 
establish a restriction by object. Within the by object category itself, the Court 
thus seems to point to a further distinction between hard-core restraints (such as 
market-sharing agreements, as well as the other conducts listed in Art. 101(1) 
TFEU) and the other infringements. The former would in fact allow a truncated 
evaluation to be carried out, while the latter would require a «more thorough»23 
analysis of the economic and legal context, which remains, beside the contents 
and the object of the agreement, one of the elements to be taken into account 
when assessing the degree of harm produced by an alleged restrictive conduct24. 
Even though the wording is different, this distinction could actually come close to 
the two instances mentioned by Advocate General Wahl in Cartes Bancaires 
when establishing the narrow boundaries of by object restrictions. 
                                                        
19 The evocative terms are by S.-P. BRANKIN, The substantive standard, cited above, p. 381 f. 
20 Court of Justice, judgment of 20 January 2016, case C-373/14 P, Toshiba Corporation v. Eu-
ropean Commission, EU:C:2016:26. 
21 Ibid., para. 28. 
22 Ibid., para. 29. 
23 Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet delivered on 25 June 2015, case C-373/14 P, Toshiba 
Corporation v. European Commission, EU:C:2015:427, para. 90, which was upheld by the subse-
quent judgment of the Court of Justice. 
24 For an extensive comment on restrictions by object in light of the mentioned CJEU judg-
ments see G.L. ZAMPA, A. DI GIÒ, The Conundrum of Restrictions “by Object”: Rationale, Scope, 
Impact and a Proposal, in Italian Antitrust Review, 2015, No. 3, pp. 13-44. 
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Moving to the application of these principles to the specific case of reverse 
payment settlement agreements, the crucial issue then becomes whether they pro-
duce the particularly serious degree of anticompetitive harm to be regarded as 
hard-core restrictions, therefore requiring a limited analysis of their contents, ob-
ject and legal and economic context to ground a by object qualification. However, 
in light of the narrower approach supported by the recent CJEU case law, one 
could also argue that, given the said agreements atypical and complex features, it 
would be rather necessary to carry out a more thorough evaluation of their nega-
tive net effects in order to establish a by object infringement, or even to perform a 
full effects analysis showing that competition has in fact been prevented, restrict-
ed or distorted to an appreciable extent. As will be recalled about the three Com-
mission decisions analysed in the previous chapter, only Servier added the further 
evaluation of the likely restrictive effects on competition produced by the patent 
settlements at issue. 
The General Court in Lundbeck – the first and so far only judgment on reverse 
payment cases25 – has resolved this ambiguity, at least for the time being, by tak-
ing the view that the Commission had properly applied the above-mentioned 
CJEU case law when holding that the agreements in question «had as their object 
the restriction of competition, within the meaning of [Art.] 101(1) TFEU»26. Sev-
eral grounds were recalled to uphold the Commission reasoning. Essentially, the 
General Court confirmed that the reverse payments from Lundbeck to the five ge-
                                                        
25 As already done in the previous chapter, also for the purposes of the critical assessment only 
the Lundbeck judgment will be specifically referred to, but the considerations here proposed also 
extend to the decisions rendered by the General Court on appeal by the other generic undertakings 
involved in the reverse payment agreements (case T-460/13, Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd, 
formerly Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd and Ranbaxy (UK) Ltd v. European Commission, 
EU:T:2016:453; case T-467/13, Arrow Group ApS and Arrow Generics Ltd v. European Commis-
sion, EU:T:2016:450; case T-469/13, Generics (UK) Ltd v. European Commission, 
EU:T:2016:454; case T-470/13, Merck KGaA v. European Commission, EU:T:2016:452; case T-
471/13, Xellia Pharmaceuticals ApS and Alpharma, LLC, formerly Zoetis Products LLC v. Euro-
pean Commission, EU:T:2016:460). 
26  General Court, judgment of 8 September 2016, case T-472/13, H. Lundbeck A/S and 
Lundbeck Ltd v. European Commission, EU:T:2016:449, para. 354. 
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nerics entailed a limitation of the incentives to seek market entry, with the conse-
quence that the overall agreements did not reflect the parties’ perception of the 
strength or weakness of the patent, nor were they aimed at finding a compromise 
solution to the patent disputes, but they basically «replaced the uncertainty as to 
the possibility of generic entry without being subject to injunctions or infringe-
ment actions, or of successfully challenging the validity of the applicants’ patents, 
with the certainty that the generic undertakings would not enter the market during 
the term of the agreements»27. Indeed, as the US Supreme Court had already held 
in Actavis, it was precisely the disproportionate size of the reverse payments, in 
addition to other significant factors28, that justified the application of the strictest 
legal standard29. 
As regard the classification of the agreements at issue within the notion of re-
striction of competition by object, the General Court further specified that they 
were comparable to «market exclusion agreements», resulting in the «exclusion of 
competitors from the market [as] an extreme form of market sharing and of limita-
tion of production»30 . Accordingly, the Commission had correctly considered 
them as producing the sufficiently serious degree of harm to competition required 
to ground such a finding, without having to carry out a full effects analysis (and 
                                                        
27 Ibid., para. 369. 
28 In this regard, the General Court stressed that, according to the agreement provisions, the 
amount of the payments corresponded to the approximate profits of the generic undertakings if 
they had entered the market with their versions of the citalopram drug, the generics were not al-
lowed to launch their products upon the expiry of the agreements without having to fear infringe-
ment actions by Lundbeck, and the restrictions thereby imposed fell beyond the scope of the origi-
nator’s patents. 
29 Particularly instructive to this end is also a passage from the Commission decision in Servi-
er: «even if the limitations in the agreement on the generic undertaking's commercial autonomy do 
not go beyond the material scope of the patent, they constitute a breach of Article 101 of the Trea-
ty when those limitations cannot be justified and do not result from the parties' assessment of the 
merits of the exclusive right itself but in particular from a transfer of value overshadowing this as-
sessment and inducing the generic undertaking not to pursue its independent efforts to enter the 
market» (Commission decision of 9 July 2014, case AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), para. 1137). 
30 General Court, judgment of 8 September 2016, Lundbeck, cited above, para. 453. 
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the related counterfactual evaluation). Furthermore, this finding was justified even 
though the Commission had not ruled in the past on whether this type of agree-
ment constitutes a restriction by object. In relation to the above-mentioned role of 
experience as referred to in Cartes bancaires31, the General Court in fact clarified 
that this argument «does not concern the specific category of an agreement in a 
particular sector, but rather refers to the fact that it is established that certain 
forms of collusion are, in general and in view of the experience gained, so likely 
to have negative effects on competition that it is not necessary to demonstrate that 
they had such effects in the particular case at hand»32. It thus appears justified to 
classify reverse payment settlements under the by object category, provided that 
«an individual and detailed examination having regard to their content, purpose 
and context»33 had been performed, in accordance with Cartes Bancaires and 
Toshiba precedents. 
The finding of a restriction by object, as argued by the Commission and then 
specified by the General Court, seems to depart from the rule-of-reason standard 
chosen by the US Supreme Court in Actavis, under which both parties need to 
bear their respective burden of proof. This approach, theoretically, would be more 
consistent with a full effects analysis pursuant to Art. 101(1) TFEU34, as opposed 
to a per se illegality standard. Upon closer examination, a convergent trend be-
tween the two viewpoints may however result35. As underlined in the second 
chapter36, the Supreme Court’s reasoning actually implies the application of a 
                                                        
31 Court of Justice, judgment of 11 September 2014, Groupement des cartes bancaires (CB), 
cited above, para. 51. 
32 General Court, judgment of 8 September 2016, Lundbeck, cited above, para. 438 (emphasis 
added). 
33 Ibid. 
34 For a comprehensive insight on this perspective see M.-A. VOLKS, The Applicability of a 
US-Type Rule of Reason under Article 101(1) TFEU. A Comparison of EU with US Law, Ham-
burg, 2015. 
35 Also taking this view, with regard to the Servier case, is C. DESOGUS, Manovre di avvicina-
mento tra l’Europa e gli Stati Uniti: il caso Servier sui patent settlements, in Mercato concorrenza 
regole, 2016, pp. 249-278, especially at pp. 272-275. 
36 See supra, Chapter two, Section 2.1.2. 
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streamlined rule-of-reason standard. On the one hand, the large size of the pay-
ment serves as a proxy to show the anticompetitive effects of the settlement, and, 
on the other hand, the originator may have recourse to a limited set of justifica-
tions to support its defence and prove the outweighing pro-competitive effects. 
Especially the first aspect amounts to a (rebuttable) presumption37, which finds a 
very similar wording in the General Court’s Lundbeck judgment when it stated: 
«[t]he size of a reverse payment may constitute an indicator of the strength or 
weakness of a patent, as perceived by the parties to the agreements at the time 
they were concluded, and of the fact that [the] originator undertaking was not ini-
tially convinced of its chances of succeeding in the event of litigation»38. 
As a result, the critical reading of the EU approach, as proposed by some 
commentators39, does not seem entirely convincing. It is true that the regulatory 
framework in the EU and the US does affect the level of competition between 
originators and generic to a different extent40. In the latter legal system, an effec-
tive market foreclosure can be produced by a single settlement reached by an orig-
inator company and the first generic entrant that filed an ANDA with a Paragraph-
IV Certification, by means of the 180-day exclusivity period and the potential 30-
month stay in case of patent litigation. Conversely, in the EU context, in which 
the MA procedures are based only on quality, safety and efficacy concerns (absent 
a patent linkage rule), there is no such limit as to MA applications for generic 
drugs in relation to the same reference product prior to patent expiry, with the 
                                                        
37  As mentioned, it is the so-called «Actavis inference»: see extensively A. EDLIN, S. 
HEMPHILL, H. HOVENKAMP, C. SHAPIRO, The Actavis Inference, cited above. 
38 General Court, judgment of 8 September 2016, Lundbeck, cited above, para. 353. 
39 Among others, S. GALLASCH, Activating Actavis in Europe – the Proposal of a “Structured 
Effects Based” Analysis for Pay for Delay Settlements, in CCP Working Papers, 2015, No. 3, 
available at http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk; G. BRUZZONE, S. CAPOZZI, The Procompetitive and 
Anticompetitive Impact of Patent Settlements, in G. PITRUZZELLA, G. MUSCOLO (eds.), Competi-
tion and Patent Law in the Pharmaceutical Sector: An International Perspective, Alphen aan den 
Rijn, 2016, pp. 15-30, especially at pp. 27-29; I.S. FORRESTER, The Dangers of Settling Patent Lit-
igation, ibid., pp. 67-76. 
40 See supra, Chapter one, Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2. 
 117 
consequence that an originator would have to pay off all generic competition to 
ensure the same level of market foreclosure as in the US system. 
Nevertheless, should an agreement be concluded between an originator and 
that generic company (or companies) that has been developing its own product, or 
has even applied for a MA, thus resulting in an advanced potential competitor, the 
negative impact on competition in the given market would be substantially com-
parable to that occurring in case of a settlement between originator and first AN-
DA filer within the Hatch-Waxman regulatory framework. Consequently, in these 
instances the finding of a restriction by object would appear justified, since the 
level of market foreclosure is considerably serious41. These particular circum-
stances have indeed occurred in the above-mentioned Lundbeck and Servier cases, 
where the reverse payment agreements involved the brand companies and those 
advanced generic competitors that had been preparing to launch their product into 
the market42. The anticompetitive harm resulting from their delayed entry was 
thus significant, as the agreements basically eliminated the competitive pressure 
brought by the generic manufactures. 
Conversely, a full-scale effects analysis would seem more proper whenever a 
certain degree of competition between originators and generics still exists even af-
ter a reverse payment agreement was concluded. In this case a finding of in-
fringement of Art. 101(1) TFEU would in fact require the establishment of actual 
anticompetitive effects by carrying out a counterfactual analysis. As the General 
Court and the Commission have stated, and as also confirmed by the recent trends 
resulting from the annual monitoring activity, the sole existence of a reverse pay-
ment in the context of a patent settlement is not always problematic from an anti-
trust perspective, but it does raise concerns when it is intended to delay generic 
market entry. 
                                                        
41 As confirmed by other commentators, for example C. DESOGUS, Manovre di avvicinamento 
tra l’Europa e gli Stati Uniti, cited above, pp. 262-268. 
42 More precisely, the agreements between Lundbeck and the five most advanced competitors 
were concluded around the same time, while in Servier the elimination of competition developed 
progressively, as the originator entered into settlements with those generic companies that each 
time appeared to exert the most effective competitive pressure. 
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In this regard, a partially different set of considerations is appropriate in rela-
tion to the J&J and Novartis case. As will be recalled, the agreement at issue was 
not a patent settlement, but rather a co-promotion agreement by means of which 
the subsidiary of the most advanced competitor committed to perform a number 
of promotion services in exchange for monthly payments granted by the origina-
tor’s subsidiary. The anticompetitive feature of such an agreement, on which the 
Commission focused its scrutiny, was however the termination clause actually 
amounting to a non-entry mechanism for the generic undertaking. This was pre-
cisely the element that led the EU enforcer to conclude with a finding of a re-
striction by object within the meaning of Art. 101(1) TFEU. However, one should 
not jump to conclusions regarding the strictest legal standard adopted in this case 
in relation to co-promotion (or co-marketing) agreements in general. Indeed, as 
previous Commission decisions have already pointed out43, in many cases this 
kind of agreement between companies participating in the same market may actu-
ally produce efficiency gains44 to be passed on to consumers that can be deemed 
as worthy of an individual exception under Art. 101(3) TFEU45. Again, it was be-
cause of the specific circumstances in J&J and Novartis, namely the inhibition of 
generic market entry and the lack of evidence of actual promotion activities, that 
the Commission did not exempt the agreement at issue under the mentioned pro-
vision. 
                                                        
43 See Commission decision 94/770/EC of 6 October 1994 relating to a proceeding pursuant to 
Article 85 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (IV/34.776 - Pasteur Mérieux-
Merck), OJ L 309 of 2 December 1994, pp. 1-23; case COMP/36.932/EISAI/Pfizer, 10 February 
1999, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition. 
44 For example, by means of these agreements the originator can rely on other companies that 
possess the know-how and the network required to implement a successful promotion or market-
ing strategy, without incurring in significant investments to carry out such activities on its own and 
thus being able to focus on its core business. 
45  On this issue see further J. WESTIN, M. HEALY, B. BATCHELOR, Pharmaceutical co-
promotion, co-marketing and antitrust, in European Competition Law Review, 2014, pp. 402-412; 
E.A. RAFFAELLI, E. TETI, Co-marketing and Co-promotion Agreements, in G. PITRUZZELLA, G. 
MUSCOLO (eds.), Competition and Patent Law in the Pharmaceutical Sector, cited above, pp. 147-
160. 
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Lastly, a separate comment seems appropriate about the only case analysed 
concerning competition between originators, namely the Italian Roche-Novartis 
case. The most debatable aspect here regards not so much the legal standard 
adopted by the ICA and confirmed by the administrative Court of First Instance, 
i.e. a restriction by object pursuant to Art. 101(1)(c) TFEU, but rather the prelimi-
nary assessment of the relevant market in which the originators operated. As is 
well known, its definition constitutes an essential element for the enforcement of 
competition rules, in that it specifies their scope of application on a case-by-case 
basis. 
Just to briefly recall the general framework, at the EU level the Commission 
has provided guidance on how to determine the concept of relevant market46 by 
combining two distinct dimensions, namely the product market and the geograph-
ical market. The former «comprises all those products and/or services which are 
regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer by reason of the 
products’ characteristics, their prices and their intended use»47, while the latter 
takes into account «the area in which the firms concerned are involved in the sup-
ply of products or services and in which the conditions of competition are suffi-
ciently homogeneous»48. Then, after these two aspects have been defined, the en-
forcement authority is asked to carry out a further analysis on the basis of the con-
cept of substitutability. In this regard, both the demand-side and the supply-side 
substitution are addressed in order to specify the relevant market with a greater 
degree of certainty49. 
In the case of pharmaceutical products, however, the concept of substitutability 
is peculiar to the extent that certain drugs may possess the same formulation but 
different therapeutic indications, or conversely may be therapeutically equivalent 
                                                        
46 Commission notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community 
competition law, OJ C 372 of 9 December 1997, pp. 5-13. 
47 Ibid., para. 7. 
48 Ibid., para. 8. 
49 For an overview and further references on the notion of relevant market see, for example, V. 
ROSE, D. BAILEY, Market Definition. Introduction and Overview, in V. ROSE, D. BAILEY (eds.), 
Bellamy and Child: European Union Law of Competition, 7th ed., Oxford, 2013, pp. 320-358. 
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while having different formulations. Indeed, at both EU and national level the rel-
evant market in this sector is commonly defined by referring to therapeutic classes 
according to the internationally accepted Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical 
(ATC) classification system50. The product market is usually established on the 
basis of the third ATC level, i.e. the pharmacological subgroup51. This allows a 
comparison of medicinal products that have similar pharmacological properties, 
and thus can be prescribed for the same disease. Nonetheless, at times the compar-
ison requires grouping of various therapeutic classes together, or further consider-
ing the fourth ATC level based on the active ingredient. 
In view of these general principles, it is apparent that the ICA decision in 
Roche-Novartis has added a further aspect in the definition of relevant market, 
namely by considering an off-label use (Avastin) and an authorised drug (Lucen-
tis) as substitutable treatments for AMD and other eye-related diseases. The off-
label use of a certain medicine is a rather sensitive issue not only for the physician 
who opts for this therapeutic choice52, but also from a regulatory perspective. As 
far as Italy is concerned, this practice has been subject to subsequent legislative 
                                                        
50 The ATC system provides for a classification of active substances «according to the organ or 
system on which they act and according to their chemical, pharmacological and therapeutic prop-
erties» (World Health Organization, Introduction to Drug Utilisation Research, 2003, pp. 33-37, at 
p. 33-34, available at http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs). The ATC index is periodically updated 
and is available at www.whocc.no/atc_ddd_index. 
51 In this regard see the Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry of the ICA, which clarifies the definition 
of relevant market for the purposes of competition law probes (Autorità Garante della Concorrenza 
e del Mercato, Indagine conoscitiva nel settore farmaceutico, 1997, pp. 9-11, available at 
www.agcm.it). 
52 The consequences in terms of civil and criminal liability of the physician fall beyond the 
scope of this more limited inquiry. For a comprehensive illustration in the Italian legal system see, 
among others, F. MASSIMINO, La prescrizione dei farmaci «off label»: adempimenti, obblighi e 
responsabilità del medico, in Danno e responsabilità, 2003, pp. 925-937; G. IADECOLA, Pre-
scrizione di farmaci off label e responsabilità penale del medico, in Diritto penale e processo, 
2006, pp. 1135-1140; A. QUERCI, Farmaci off label e nuove frontiere della responsabilità civile, 
in Rassegna di diritto farmaceutico, 2009, pp. 1-18; F. MASSIMINO, Recenti interventi normative e 
giurisprudenziali in materia di prescrizione dei farmaci off label, in Danno e responsabilità, 2010, 
pp. 1104-1118. 
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reforms, also at the regional level. In particular, the last amendment has actually 
been introduced in light of the Roche-Novartis case, and establishes that an off-
label use can be included in the so-called “Lista 648” (allowing its related expens-
es to be reimbursed by the NHS) even if another therapeutic alternative exists 
among the authorised medicines, upon condition that such unregistered use is 
well-known and consistent with scientific studies carried out the by the national 
and international medical communities, and also according to criteria of economic 
efficiency and pertinence53. This last reference, in particular, raises more than one 
doubt as to the ultimate aim of this legislative change, which could be intended to 
become a tool for overcoming the choice freely made by an undertaking to not ask 
for a MA for certain uses of a drug, provided that a public interest for allowing 
those uses exists54. 
For the purposes of the antitrust assessment, the inclusion of both off- and on-
label uses of different drugs to define the relevant market appears to warrant fur-
ther scrutiny. It is true that account should be taken of factual circumstances, but 
the choice of relying exclusively on the demand side, namely on consumers and 
prescribing doctors, does not seem entirely convincing in order to ground the 
evaluation of substitutability. Beside the demand, it is indeed the regulatory agen-
cy (in Italy, AIFA) authorising the placing on the market on grounds of drug safe-
ty and efficacy that ultimately determines the definition of relevant market. Only 
this benchmark ensures that the concept of substitutability is established accord-
ing to objective criteria, and thus, that the considered drugs are actual “competi-
tors” for the treatment of certain diseases, which consequently can be included in 
                                                        
53 See Art. 3 of the Decree-Law of No. 36 of 20 March 2014, converted into Law No. 79 of 16 
May 2014, Italian OJ No. 115 of 20 May 2014. For a comment, see G. COMANDÈ, L. NOCCO, 
«Hard cases make bad law». O No? L’Antitrust, il caso Avastin-Lucentis ed i farmaci off-label, in 
Rivista Italiana di Medicina Legale, 2014, pp. 779-791. 
54 Ibid., p. 789, where the procedure is defined as an instrument of commercial control («da 
strumento di controllo scientifico dell’appropriatezza clinica [a] (anche forse in maniera prepon-
derante) strumento di controllo commerciale»). 
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the same relevant market55. For these reasons, the request for preliminary ruling 
submitted to the Court of Justice by the Italian administrative Supreme Court ap-
pears a safe move in order to shed light not only on the merits of the case at issue, 
but more generally to provide guidance for future antitrust cases in the pharma-
ceutical sector. 
Moreover, the ICA Roche-Novartis decision offers a further interesting ground 
to take into account for future cases on restrictive agreements in the pharmaceuti-
cal sector. Even though the Authority structured its reasoning on a by object 
benchmark, it nonetheless performed the evaluation of the actual effects of the 
agreement as an element to be employed for setting appropriate fines. As some 
commentators have pointed out, this may also ensure effectiveness for the subse-
quent judicial review of the merits of the case, to the extent that it does not need to 
«focus on the details of the economic quantification of the effects of the conduct, 
which might be subject to a significant degree of dispute but ultimately are not a 
constituent element of the finding of the abuse»56. 
  
                                                        
55 This aspect is particularly stressed by G. GUERRA, La commercializzazione dei farmaci a 
confronto con gli usi off-label: il difficile bilanciamento tra tutela della salute e concorrenza, in 
Politiche sanitarie, 2014, pp. 99-108; J. KILLICK, P. BERGHE, Pharmaceutical Sector: Can Non-
Authorised Products be Included in the Relevant Market for the Assessment of an Alleged Anti-
competitive Conduct? A Short Analysis of the Recent Italian Avastin-Lucentis Decision, in Journal 
of European Competition Law & Practice, 2015, pp. 102-109; M. COLANGELO, Il caso Avastin-
Lucentis: violazione antitrust o regulatory failure?, in Rivista di Diritto Industriale, 2016, II, pp. 
227-230. On the definition of relevant market in the pharmaceutical sector see, more in general, 
M. GRANIERI, Alcune considerazioni su inibitoria cautelare, danno e mercato rilevante 
nell’antitrust farmaceutico, in Danno e responsabilità, 2007, pp. 858-865, especially at pp. 862-
865; among US commentators, G. FARAH, L. ALEXANDER, Prominent market definition issues in 
pharmaceutical antitrust cases, in 30 Antitrust, Fall 2015, pp. 46-49. 
56 As underlined by F. ARENA, R. CHIEPPA, Italy – The Intersection between Competition Law 
and Intellectual Property Law: The Public Enforcement Approach Followed by the ICA, in G. 
PITRUZZELLA, G. MUSCOLO (eds.), Competition and Patent Law in the Pharmaceutical Sector, cit-
ed above, pp. 239-252, at p. 251. 
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3.2. THE INTERFACE BETWEEN COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW 
AS APPLIED TO ABUSE OF DOMINANCE CASES:  
PROBLEMATIC ISSUES 
 
The case law examined in the second chapter raises several questions with re-
gard to abusive conducts falling within the meaning of Art. 102 TFEU and Sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act. Here an attempt will be made to evaluate these from a 
more critical perspective. 
Preliminarily, it is worth underlining that the anticompetitive conducts previ-
ously analysed in this regard seem to share atypical and sector-specific features as 
opposed to other practices that have traditionally been deemed to constitute abus-
es of dominance (just to name a few: excessive or unfair prices, predation, margin 
squeeze, tying, etc.). Indeed, in some cases they are exclusionary practices that 
may be found lawful under other branches of law – especially, insofar as is here 
relevant, IP laws57 – and such circumstance adds a further level of complexity 
(and also uncertainty) to the antitrust scrutiny. The question, which in the early 
debates on the problematic intersection between IP and antitrust did not even ap-
pear conceivable, thus becomes to establish to what extent competition law en-
forcement applies in order to counter potential failures or shortcomings of the pa-
tent systems and to pursue the fundamental goals of maintaining a competitive 
market and ensuring consumer welfare. 
In such a context, the traditional distinction between existence and exercise of 
patent rights58 no longer seems relevant, in that the unilateral conducts in question 
directly involve the right to patent protection, especially as concerns the so-called 
follow-on or second-generation drugs. This is a crucial issue within the broader 
framework of the pharmaceutical industry, which lies at the very centre of the pa-
tent/antitrust interface. The competitive dynamics between blockbuster drugs and 
                                                        
57 For an overview, see M. DE LA MANO, R. NAZZINI, H. ZENGER, Specific abusive practices in 
Relation to IP Rights, in J. FAULL, A. NIKPAY (eds.), Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition, 
cited above, pp. 490-512. 
58 See supra, Chapter one, Section 1.2. 
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their generic competitors following the patent cliff, whereby the former experi-
ence a considerable price drop59, make it all the more evident that the develop-
ment of said follow-on products becomes a key factor in the strategies of “ever-
greening” pharmaceutical patents. Although the activity of patent filing for such 
products may well be encompassed within the statutory scope of the protection 
conferred by IP laws, the above-mentioned AstraZeneca, Servier, TriCor, 
Namenda and Pfizer cases have blazed a trail in subjecting this conduct to scruti-
ny under the competition law standard of abuse of dominance/monopolisation60. 
Just to briefly recall the respective factual backgrounds, in the first European 
case the anticompetitive practice consisted in the selective deregistration of the 
first-generation product61 combined with the switch to a new drug formulation, 
while in the second one the relevant conduct was the IPRs’ acquisition from an-
other API producer that removed a potentially enabling source of competition; the 
                                                        
59 According to the Commission’s Inquiry, in case of generic entry an average price drop of 
20% is observed after the first year following loss of exclusivity of the brand product, and about 
25% after two years: see Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Final Report, 8 July 2009, para. 212, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition. 
60 Essentially, as the Court of Justice effectively expressed in AstraZeneca: «the illegality of 
abusive conduct under Article 82 EC is unrelated to its compliance or non-compliance with other 
legal rules and, in the majority of cases, abuses of dominant positions consist of behaviour which 
is otherwise lawful under branches of law other than competition law» (Court of Justice, judgment 
of 6 December 2012, case C-457/10 P, AstraZeneca AB, AstraZeneca plc v. European Commis-
sion, EU:C:2012:770, para. 132). 
61 It is however to be considered that the factual circumstances of the AstraZeneca case will not 
likely occur again in practice, as the Directive 65/65/EEC has been repealed by the Directive 
2001/83/EC and, even before the legislative amendment, the CJEU in 2003 held that it was not re-
quired, for generic undertakings to obtain MA by means of the abridged procedure, that the refer-
ence medicinal product still be sold on the market (Court of Justice, judgment of 16 October 2003, 
case C-223/01, AstraZeneca A/S v Lægemiddelstyrelsen, EU:C:2003:546, especially para. 27). 
Consequently, a strategy of deregistration as implemented by AstraZeneca would not have imped-
ed an abridged application for MA. See further J. DREXL, AstraZeneca and the EU sector inquiry: 
when do patent filings violate competition law?, in J. DREXL, N. LEE (eds.), Pharmaceutical Inno-
vation, Competition and Patent Law. A Trilateral Perspective, Cheltenham-Northampton, 2013, 
pp. 290-322, at p. 291 f. 
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two US cases dealt with practices falling under the meaning of product hopping; 
and the Italian case addressed the filing of a divisional patent and the related SPCs 
that served to align patent protection throughout European countries, as well as 
the application for a paediatric extension that granted an additional period of ex-
clusivity. 
The common line of reasoning in these decisions has led to ascertaining a quid 
pluris that serves as a distinguishing factor between a lawful entitlement to a pa-
tent right and its abuse: in sum, it was the finding that the above-mentioned con-
ducts were not pursuing a legitimate aim of protecting an investment, i.e. they 
could not be regarded as «competition on the merits»62. Or even, as the Italian 
administrative supreme court stated in Pfizer, these conducts fell within the mean-
ing of the general notion of «abuse of rights», of which the abuse of dominant po-
sition constitutes a specification63. Some further points are however to be noted 
with regard to EU and US case law. 
AstraZeneca and Pfizer shared an approach that ultimately brought enforce-
ment authorities and courts to establish a “deviation” from the exercise of rights 
granted by the respective regulatory frameworks, which could not be explained 
                                                        
62 The literature has indeed extensively commented on the significant reach of this body of case 
law: among others, see M. SIRAGUSA, The EU Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry. New Forms of 
Abuse and Article 102 TFEU, in G. CAGGIANO, G. MUSCOLO, M. TAVASSI (eds.), Competition 
Law and Intellectual Property. The European Perspective, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2012, pp. 177-
190; A. MUSELLI, La difficile riconciliazione del diritto della proprietà intellettuale e del diritto 
della concorrenza: note a margine dei casi AstraZeneca e Pfizer, in Concorrenza e mercato, 2013, 
pp. 759-778; J. DREXL, AstraZeneca and the EU sector inquiry, cited above; H. ULLRICH, Strate-
gic patenting by the pharmaceutical industry: towards a concept of abusive practices of protec-
tion, in J. DREXL, N. LEE (eds.), Pharmaceutical Innovation, Competition and Patent Law, cited 
above, pp. 241-272; M. COLANGELO, Concorrenza sui meriti, regolazione di settore e condotte 
abusive nel mercato farmaceutico, in Foro italiano, 2014, III, cc. 514-518; G. PITRUZZELLA, Life-
Cycle Management Strategies in the Pharmaceutical Patent Sector, in G. PITRUZZELLA, G. MUS-
COLO (eds.), Competition and Patent Law in the Pharmaceutical Sector, cited above, pp. 74-84. 
63 Consiglio di Stato, judgment of 12 February 2014, No. 693, para. V), C). Due to the limited 
purposes of this inquiry, for a thorough assessment of the concept of abuse of rights in its various 
application see, in the Italian literature, G. VISINTINI (ed.), L’abuso del diritto, Napoli, 2016; F. 
PIRAINO, Il divieto di abuso del diritto, in Europa e diritto privato, 2013, pp. 75-173. 
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but for the purpose of extending the exclusionary rights to the detriment of gener-
ic competitors. More precisely, in the European case, the deregistration of the 
first-generation drug (the originator’s second abuse) neither sufficiently referred 
to the grounds of pharmacovigilance64, nor was justified by other valid economic 
reasons. In the Italian case, the element that appeared most at odds with the usual 
trends of patent filings in the pharmaceutical sector was the timing of the request 
of the divisional patent, which was actually filed at a much later stage in relation 
to the R&D activity65 carried out on the dosage of the API claimed in such an ap-
plication. Indeed, this invention had been marketed in the form of Pfizer’s brand 
drug Xalatan since long before the divisional patent was even granted, with the 
consequence that the request for the divisional patent could only be explained as a 
means to obtain additional SPC protection to which it would not otherwise be en-
titled66. 
Servier instead dealt with a different conduct, i.e. the acquisition of patents and 
patent applications from a competitor that had been pursuing the activity of in-
venting around the originator’s patent and appeared to have developed a non-
infringing API. The anticompetitive character of such technology acquisition was 
found in the absence of any further development of those IPRs by the originator, 
thus resulting in a mere defensive mechanism rather than an improvement of its 
production processes. 
On the other hand, the US courts in TriCor and Namenda concluded that, in the 
context of product reformulations, neither product withdrawal nor product im-
                                                        
64 As to the suspension or revocation of MA, the Directive 65/65/EEC explicitly referred to 
cases «where that product proves to be harmful in the normal conditions of use, or where its thera-
peutic efficacy is lacking, or where its qualitative and quantitative composition is not as declared» 
(Art. 11). 
65 This is in fact the relevant benchmark to assess the lawfulness of the conduct under Art. 102 
TFEU: cp. H. ULLRICH, Strategic patenting by the pharmaceutical industry, cited above, p. 265. 
66 In this regard the literature criticising the finding of abuse pursuant to Art. 102 TFEU has ar-
gued that even if the originator had applied for the SPC in Italy at the same time than in the other 
Member States, the exclusionary effect towards generic competitors would have been the same (C. 
OSTI, The Italian way to antitrust judicial review: a few oddities of the Pfizer case, in Italian Anti-
trust Review, 2014, No. 3, pp. 129-130). 
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provement were alone capable of raising competition law concerns, but it was the 
combination – undertaken by monopolist firms – of introducing a follow-on drug 
and withdrawing the first-generation drug from the market (a so-called “hard 
switch”) that produced the overall effect of consumer coercion and market fore-
closure. 
These elements, which share the common background of a departure from the 
standard of competition on the merits, do not seem however to constitute solid ar-
guments to maintain a finding of abuse with a sufficient degree of certainty. As 
has been pointed out, the conducts at issue also depend, at least in part, upon the 
intention of the dominant originators to exclude their competitors from the mar-
ket67. This subjective element appears too unpredictable, and may also require an 
excessive burden of proof that could in some cases prove difficult to bear for en-
forcement authorities and courts68. Similarly, the evidence required to establish 
that a certain patent strategy pursued by an undertaking did not make actual eco-
nomic sense but for its capability to impair competition would entail a complex 
assessment in practice, and in some instances could also run the risk of under-
deterrence69. In other words, even though the standard adopted in these cases led 
to reasonably affirm the antitrust liability of the dominant originators, they never-
theless seem to possess a certain “artificial” character that does not ensure their 
relevance also under different factual circumstances. 
By contrast, the application of standards that, although related to the broad 
concept of competition on the merits, also possess an additional sector-specific 
character, seems better attuned to support the antitrust scrutiny in relation to prac-
                                                        
67 See M. SIRAGUSA, The EU Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry. New Forms of Abuse, cited 
above, p. 185. 
68 On this aspect see C. OSTI, What Is in a Name: The Concept of Abuse in Sui Generis Abuse, 
in G. PITRUZZELLA, G. MUSCOLO (eds.), Competition and Patent Law in the Pharmaceutical Sec-
tor, cited above, pp. 93-106, at pp. 100-101. 
69 More generally, on the difficulties to structure the assessment under Art. 102 TFEU see for 
example R. O’DONOGHUE, Verbalising a General Test for Exclusionary Conduct under Article 82 
EC, paper delivered at the 12th Annual Competition Law and Policy Workshop, 8-9 June 2007, 
EUI, Florence, available at www.eui.eu. 
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tices that may be found lawful under other branches of law. These benchmarks 
would properly consider the conditions of a regulated market that is not fully 
competitive, as is the case with the pharmaceutical industry. For example, by tak-
ing into account whether a certain strategic patenting pursued the aim of channel-
ling the capability to innovate solely towards the dominant undertaking to the det-
riment of competition by substitution, a more intense antitrust inquiry into the 
field of patent law would appear justified to ensure market conditions that are suf-
ficiently open to new sources of competition70. As has been underlined, it is the 
«regulatory interoperability»71 created by the originator that has undermined the 
possibility for generic manufacturers of market entry, thus precluding patients 
from benefitting from a competing drug. 
By the same token, in a product hopping case the substantial anticompetitive 
nature of such conduct would not depend on whether the originator performed a 
“soft” or a “hard switch” between first- and second-generation drugs (i.e. with or 
without the withdrawal of the first product from the market), but rather on wheth-
er the move of the prescription base from one drug to the other is successful be-
fore the generic entry into the market. This is in fact the clinching factor that 
properly considers the regulatory framework of the pharmaceutical market, where 
there is a disconnection between the choice, the payment and the intake of a given 
prescription drug72. When such an effect is achieved, the product hop has ulti-
mately impaired competition by substitution, in that the absence of prescriptions 
for which the generic can automatically be substituted deprives consumers of the 
possibility to make the relevant choice. 
                                                        
70 Among those who support this view, see C. DESOGUS, Nuove frontiere tra regolazione, pro-
prietà intellettuale e tutela della concorrenza nel settore farmaceutico: le pratiche di brevetta-
zione strategica, in Rivista della Regolazione dei mercati, 2015, No. 1, pp. 59-96. 
71 The effective wording is by C. DESOGUS, Nuove frontiere tra regolazione, proprietà intel-
lettuale e tutela della concorrenza nel settore farmaceutico, cited above, p. 93. 
72 In this regard see M.A. CARRIER, S.D. SHADOWEN, Product Hopping: A New Framework, 
cited above. For a European perspective also B. DOMEIJ, Anticompetitive marketing in the context 
of pharmaceutical switching in Europe, in J. DREXL, N. LEE (eds.), Pharmaceutical Innovation, 
Competition and Patent Law, cited above, pp. 273-289. 
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Moreover, these sector-specific standards would explain why the counterargu-
ment that the technological progress on the relevant market could in any case be 
ensured by the originator company does not appear convincing. Indeed, it is pre-
cisely the plurality of sources of innovation coming from the coexistence of both 
originators and generics competing on the market that is able to overcome the 
“market failures” characterising the pharmaceutical industry73, where the competi-
tion in innovation (i.e. by investing in R&D) does not develop at the same rate 
and capacity as other non-regulated sectors. Consequently, when the right to pa-
tent protection itself, as well as its exercise, are used as a means to hold up (or to 
remove) potential sources of innovation, so as to restrict dynamic competition, a 
heightened antitrust scrutiny not only becomes justified, but necessary to compen-
sate for the patent systems’ own shortcomings. 
These considerations may furthermore provide a valuable background against 
which to assess a different, and still relatively unexplored, aspect of defensive pa-
tent strategies, namely that involving competition in innovation between origina-
tor companies. The Commission’s Sector Inquiry has only touched upon the is-
sue74, so how competition law may face a restrictive conduct that aims at exclud-
ing potential entrants into a non-existing market, that occurs «when the relevant 
technology or product markets are still to emerge», remains relatively unex-
                                                        
73 More precisely, MA and drug pricing procedures that affect the rate of entry of new products 
into the market, high costs for pharmaceutical R&D, inelasticity of the demand due to the price 
disconnect (see supra, Chapter one, Sections 2.1 and 2.2). 
74 Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Final Report, cited above, paras. 1090-1144. The main find-
ings are summarised in the Executive summary of the Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Report, 
COM(2009) 351 final of 8 July 2009, para. 4.1, p. 19, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition, 
where the Commission adopts a general commitment for future investigations: «[w]ith regard to 
competition between originator companies in particular, defensive patenting strategies that mainly 
focus on excluding competitors without pursuing innovative efforts and/or the refusal to grant a 
license on unused patents will remain under scrutiny in particular in situations where innovation 
was effectively blocked». 
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plored75. In such an instance, it becomes clear that the usual toolbox of competi-
tion law enforcement may fall short, especially as regards Art. 102 TFEU in that it 
requires, in principle, an undertaking with a market-dominant position. Although 
any guidance from case law and practice is still lacking76, the issue is actually not 
merely theoretical given the significant downtrend in the entry of innovative drugs 
as opposed to a steady increase in R&D and patenting activities. 
By taking into account the above-mentioned standard of dynamic competition, 
it is indeed possible to argue that even a patent-related unilateral conduct occur-
ring outside the market, which is able to reduce other originators’ incentive for in-
novation, amounts to a position of economic strength that falls within the meaning 
of the well-known CJEU definition of dominant position as «the power to behave 
to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, its customers and ulti-
mately of the consumers»77. Again, it is the harm brought to other sources of in-
novation, even where a defined relevant market has not yet emerged, that leads to 
the conclusion of an anticompetitive infringement in terms of abuse of a (sui gen-
eris) dominant position78, with the result that not every R&D-based rivalry be-
                                                        
75 J. DREXL, Anticompetitive stumbling stones on the way to a cleaner world: protecting com-
petition in innovation without a market, in Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 2012, pp. 
507-543, at p. 529. 
76 To date, the only EU investigation on alleged anticompetitive conducts between originators 
has been the Boehringer Ingelheim case (case COMP/39246 – Boehringer, initiated by the Com-
mission decision of 22 February 2007), in which said pharmaceutical company was deemed to 
have filed for unmeritous patents regarding lung cancer drugs that would have potentially blocked 
the market entry of Almirall’s competing brand product. The parties later concluded a settlement 
agreement that addressed the antitrust concerns and the Commission closed the case in 2011 (see 
press release IP/11/842, available at http://europa.eu/rapid. The facts, however, referred in any 
case to a situation where the originators were competing in an already existing market, namely that 
of treatments of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD). 
77 Court of Justice, judgment of 13 February 1979, case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG 
v. Commission of the European Communities, EU:C:1979:36, para. 38. 
78 In this regard, see the insightful comments by A. PEZZOLI, Originators versus Originators: 
Competition before the Market and Market Power beyond Dominance, in G. PITRUZZELLA, G. 
MUSCOLO (eds.), Competition and Patent Law in the Pharmaceutical Sector, cited above, pp. 31-
42, especially at pp. 36-38. 
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tween originators would raise competition law concerns, but only insofar as the 
patent strategy is pursued without any innovative efforts. 
A different set of considerations are here proposed with regard to the other 
abusive practices that have been analysed in the previous chapter, namely the mis-
leading (or even false) representations made by originator companies in the con-
text of administrative patent-filing procedures before the competent authorities. In 
this regard, as will be recalled, the first abuse in AstraZeneca and the US Buspi-
rone case are particularly instructive79. 
This issue touches upon the broader framework of vexatious litigation, and its 
US equivalent of sham litigation80. These two doctrines share the common back-
ground of condemning abusive litigation before administrative or judicial authori-
ties that has no reasonable grounds of success, but it is pursued as an anticompeti-
tive practice. As opposed to the above-mentioned atypical conducts falling within 
the meaning of Art. 102 TFEU (and Section 2 of the Sherman Act), it is a conduct 
that finds its basis on an abuse of procedure and, from a general viewpoint, it has 
been rarely referred to and applied in the context of antitrust litigation. Indeed, as 
far as EU case law is concerned, this kind of abuse has occurred only in one case, 
ITT Promedia81. Here the Court of First Instance adopted a particularly narrow 
approach in order to establish a finding of abuse under Art. 102 TFEU, by holding 
that «only wholly exceptional circumstances»82 are required thereto. More pre-
                                                        
79 Also in the Italian Pfizer case, one of the alleged anticompetitive conducts concerned a num-
ber of baseless disputes brought by the originator against the generic competitors. However, inso-
far as such aspect did not play an essential role in the finding of the infringement under Art. 102 
TFEU, the case will not be referred to in this further context. 
80 For a comprehensive overview of the issue see V. GUIMARÃES DE LIMA E SILVA, Sham Liti-
gation in the Pharmaceutical Sector, in European Competition Journal, 2011, pp. 455-503; S. 
VEZZOSO, Towards an EU Doctrine of Anticompetitive IP-Related Litigation, in Journal of Euro-
pean Competition Law & Practice, 2012, pp. 521-535; G. MUSCOLO, Abuse of Litigation, Abuse of 
Patent and Abuse of Dominance: Where Do We Stand?, in G. PITRUZZELLA, G. MUSCOLO (eds.), 
Competition and Patent Law in the Pharmaceutical Sector, cited above, pp. 107-124. 
81 Court of First Instance, judgment of 17 July 1998, case T-111/96, ITT Promedia NV v Com-
mission of the European Communities, EU:T:1998:183. 
82 Ibid., para. 60. 
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cisely, it upheld the Commission decision and ruled that an abuse may only be 
found «where an undertaking in a dominant position brings an action (i) which 
cannot reasonably be considered as an attempt to establish its rights and can there-
fore only serve to harass the opposite party, and (ii) which is conceived in the 
framework of a plan whose goal is to eliminate competition’»83. 
The narrow view taken by the EU court parallels the ground of antitrust im-
munity laid down in the US Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which covers the right to 
petition the government granted by the First Amendment of the US Constitution84. 
However, there is also an essential difference between the two legal systems, in 
that in the EU the fundamental right to access to court does not amount to grant-
ing competition law immunity. Rather, the abusive resort to litigation is directly 
subject to antitrust scrutiny under Art. 102 TFEU, without the need to previously 
overcome any ground of immunity. 
Both doctrines are furthermore characterised by a determining role of intent, 
namely the aim to impair competition, which ultimately does not fit properly into 
competition law standards. As explained above with regard to other kinds of abu-
sive conducts, it appears in fact more appropriate to refer to objective criteria, and 
even more to sector-specific benchmarks, in order to ground a finding of abuse of 
dominant position. This has indeed been the solution preferred by the General 
Court in AstraZeneca when assessing the first abuse. Indeed, following the rea-
soning of the Commission in its decision, it distinguished the conduct at issue 
from a case of vexatious litigation, confirming not only the narrow interpretation 
already established in ITT Promedia, but also focusing on the objective nature of 
the concept of abuse of dominant position85.  
                                                        
83 Ibid., para. 30. 
84 For further references on Noerr-Pennington, as well the related Walker-Process exception, 
see supra, Chapter two, Section 2.2.2. For a comprehensive comparison between the EU and the 
US approaches see S. GALLASCH, AstraZeneca v the Walker Process—A real EU-US divergence 
or just an attempt to compare apples to oranges?, in European Competition Journal, 2011, pp. 
505-526. 
85 General Court, judgment of 1 July 2010, case T-321/05, AstraZeneca AB, AstraZeneca plc v. 
European Commission, EU:T:2010:266, paras. 356-363. 
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3.3. THE COMBINED IMPACT OF PATENT SETTLEMENTS 
AND PRODUCT REFORMULATIONS: 
A NEW ENFORCEMENT PERSPECTIVE 
 
This section of the critical assessment tries to shed light on a new dimension of 
antitrust scrutiny into the pharmaceutical industry, which, as far as EU case law is 
concerned, has been evaluated (albeit partially) only in the context of the Servier 
case. Namely, it is the use of reverse payment settlements as a means of pursuing 
an anticompetitive switch to a follow-on brand drug, with the result that the com-
bined conduct in question infringes both Art. 101 and Art. 102 TFEU. Even 
though the mentioned case is still ongoing, as the Commission decision is under 
appeal before the EU General Court, it is still possible to set out some considera-
tions also taking into account the points already made in the previous sections. 
For the sake of clarity, a brief review of the relevant facts in Servier seems ap-
propriate86. The originator had set up a broad defensive strategy of its patented 
API, perindopril, that encompassed several conducts: filing a patent cluster, rais-
ing technical entry barriers, acquiring alternative, non-infringing technologies and 
accompanying IPRs, settling patent disputes with the most advanced generic 
competitors and selectively switching to its patented second-generation product. 
For the purposes of the present inquiry, the most relevant of them are the technol-
ogy acquisition and the patent settlement agreements, in that they block the two 
viable options to launch a generic product into market when the brand drug is still 
patent-protected. Their anticompetitive character lay in the fact that, on the one 
hand, Servier never made use of the acquired technology in its R&D activities, 
and, on the other hand, it concluded the agreements to settle patent disputes with 
each of the most advanced competitors who posed an actual threat to its market 
power. Indeed, as will be recalled, these two conducts, taken together, constituted 
                                                        
86 For more details see supra, Chapter two, Section 2.2.1. 
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«a single and continuous exclusionary strategy»87 infringing Art. 102 TFEU in 
addition to the separate liability under Art. 101 and Art. 102. 
The aspect that the Commission decision nevertheless appears to have failed to 
appreciate88 is the further complementarity between the mentioned conducts and 
the ultimate goal of the exclusionary strategy, which is the development of the 
brand follow-on drug towards which the product demand was channelled in order 
to impair generic substitution. In this regard, the patent settlement agreements in 
fact have the potential to play a key role for the reasons proposed below89. 
As already explained, the launch of a second-generation product by an origina-
tor company does not amount to an abuse itself, as long as it does not prevent oth-
er sources of innovation from entering and competing in the relevant market. In 
such an instance, where the follow-on drug coexists with generic entry into the 
market, the consumer (even taking into account the sector-specific price discon-
nect) may still make its own choice on the basis of the innovative features of the 
product and its price. Consequently, even the switch of the prescription base is not 
likely to be substantially successful as it would be in the absence of generic com-
petition. 
In this context, however, should the originator enter into a reverse payment set-
tlement with the most advanced sources of competition in order to plan the switch 
of the prescription base to its second-generation product while resting assured that 
generic undertakings would not pose any competitive threat, it is all the more evi-
dent that this conduct may raise the most serious antitrust concerns. Indeed, by 
means of the agreement the brand company is able to perform a switch from its 
                                                        
87 Commission decision of 9 July 2014, case AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), paras. 2961-
2998. 
88 As the literature has indeed pointed out: see C. DESOGUS, Manovre di avvicinamento tra 
l’Europa e gli Stati Uniti, cited above, pp. 277-278. 
89 The issue has been relatively addressed by commentators so far: see M.A. CARRIER, A Real-
World Analysis of Pharmaceutical Settlements: The Missing Dimension of Product Hopping, in 62 
Florida Law Review, 2010, pp. 1009-1036; S. GALLASCH, Adding a New Dimension to EU Phar-
maceutical Antitrust – Pay for Delay Settlement as Part of a Unilateral Strategy such as Product 
Hopping, in CCP Working Papers, 2015, No. 2, available at http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk. 
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original drug to its follow-on that has a near-certain probability of success and 
furthermore that takes place «at a later stage than under the normal competitive 
process, even after the expiry of the marketing exclusivity period»90. Even in case 
of generic entry after the agreement has expired, the product demand would be ul-
timately directed towards the brand follow-on drug and the generic product would 
not exert any effective competitive pressure on the first-generation product 
(should it still be marketed). 
One could object that such an agreement may well amount to a legitimate legal 
tool to protect IPRs and R&D investments from generic competition prior to pa-
tent expiry91. Nevertheless, as already mentioned with regard to the separate as-
sessment of patent settlement, it is the substantial transfer of value flowing from 
the brand company to the generic manufacturer that distinguishes the agreement 
and triggers the “inference” of its anticompetitive nature. 
In sum, the framework resulting from a combination of reverse payment set-
tlement and product hopping would be as follows: the originator would benefit 
from the commitment of the generic manufacturer not to challenge its patent for a 
certain period of time, and additionally, even after generic entry, the originator 
would benefit from a lack of any viable competition given the successful switch 
of the prescription base to its brand follow-on drug. Moreover, the combined as-
sessment allows the antitrust scrutiny to also be directed towards conducts that 
would otherwise be exempted. Even settlements that provide for the possibility 
for generics to enter into the market before patent expiry, which are usually not 
subjected to inquiry, would not produce any actual pro-competitive effect if the 
brand firm has previously performed a successful product hop92. By this time, the 
                                                        
90 Ibid., p. 18. 
91 In a similar fashion, also the deregistration of MA for the reference product in AstraZeneca 
had amounted to a lawful practice under the relevant regulatory framework, but was nevertheless 
found to be anticompetitive to the extent that it fell outside the scope of competition on the merits 
insofar as it allowed the subsequent switch to the brand follow-on product. On this aspect see S. 
GALLASCH, Adding a New Dimension to EU Pharmaceutical Antitrust, cited above, p. 19. 
92 This point is particularly stressed by M.A. CARRIER, A Real-World Analysis of Pharmaceuti-
cal Settlements, cited above, p. 1036. 
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entry of generic versions of the brand-generation product would not offer an ef-
fective competition and would not take advantage of substitution laws, thus result-
ing in a relevant harm to consumers. 
Therefore, this appears an issue worth of further attention by enforcement au-
thorities and courts when called upon to rule on cases involving both reverse 
payment settlements and practices of switching from a brand’s first- to second-
generation products. The capability of producing foreclosure effects on the rele-
vant market is indeed particularly intense and it seems that only by taking into ac-
count the combined perspective of the two conducts would the antitrust scrutiny 
be able to evaluate the resulting anticompetitive harm to an effective extent. By 
contrast, in Servier the Commission did not seem to properly consider this causal 
link between the technology acquisition and the patent settlements, on the one 
hand, and the switch to the brand follow-on drug, on the other hand. 
Moving to US case law, where in any case the phenomenon of product hopping 
has been tackled in several antitrust probes, the analysed decisions have not yet 
assessed the actual cumulative effects of pay-for-delay agreements and drug 
switching, which remains a key defensive strategy for brand companies. Actually, 
the issue appears to have been touched upon only briefly in the FTC complaint 
filed against Endo and other pharmaceutical companies in the Opana ER-
Lidoderm case93. As will be recalled, the action specifically tackled no-AG com-
mitments undertaken by the originator in the context of patent settlements in ex-
change for the delay of generic entry into the market. With specific regard to the 
agreement between Endo and Impax concerning Opana ER, the originator’s strat-
egy was furthermore aimed at introducing a reformulated brand drug that would 
not have been subject to automatic substitution from generic versions of the first-
generation product. Indeed, FTC argued that Endo already knew that «it would be 
unable to obtain FDA approval for its Reformulated Opana ER and convert the 
market before Impax could enter with its generic version of Original Opana ER», 
                                                        
93 F.T.C. v. Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-01440-PD filed on 30 March 
2016 (E.D. Pa.). 
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and thus it was its precise purpose to «purchase the time it needed»94 by entering 
into the reverse payment agreement and paying off the generic competitor to stay 
out of the market. When assessing the harm to consumers caused by the settle-
ment at issue, the FTC moreover stated that such agreement facilitated Endo’s 
strategy to transition from its first- to second-generation drug to the extent that the 
prescription base was successfully switched before Impax could enter into the 
market in 2013. As a result, its generic product did not fall within the scope of ap-
plication of state substitution laws and was able to capture only a residual share of 
the relevant market95. 
As already mentioned, the charges brought against Endo were recently settled, 
with the originator committing to refrain from concluding similar reverse payment 
agreements for ten years. Thus no court specifically addressed the claim regarding 
the link between the Opana ER settlement and the product hop. This case nonethe-
less shows a continuous effort by the US enforcement agency towards an effective 
antitrust scrutiny into anticompetitive patent strategies. 
                                                        
94 Ibid, at 59 (emphasis added). 
95 Ibid., at 163-164. 
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FINAL REMARKS 
THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY BETWEEN 
COMPETITION, PATENT LAW AND REGULATION 
 
After having assessed the state of play and the current developments in the case 
law regarding the interface between competition and patent law in the pharmaceu-
tical sector, here an attempt will be made to propose some broader considerations 
regarding the overall balancing of interests underlying the industry in question. 
As mentioned above, the pharmaceutical market belongs to those industrial 
sectors where regulation plays an essential role in defining their features. In this 
regard, patent law constitutes an integral part of its regulatory framework, aiming 
at driving innovation and competitiveness through granting exclusionary rights to 
compensate the high investments in R&D incurred by pharmaceutical companies. 
Beside regulation, however, the interference of competition law as a further 
“presence” within the said industry has progressively amplified, reaching signifi-
cant lengths in recent times. As both EU and US case law have shown, the tradi-
tional opinion supporting a reciprocal autonomy between competition and patent 
law has ultimately been superseded by a growing complementarity of the two sets 
of law. Indeed, it can be argued that antitrust now defines, together with patent 
law, the boundaries of the scope of a patent by preventing the exclusionary rights 
granted by the latter to be procured and exercised in a way that leads to foreclo-
sure effects on the relevant market. In this regard, AstraZeneca1 and Actavis2 well 
                                                        
1 As will be recalled, especially relevant is the already mentioned passage of the decision: « the 
fact that, in the light of its special responsibility, an undertaking in a dominant position cannot 
make use of [the] possibility [of deregistering a MA] in such a way as to prevent or render more 
difficult the entry of competitors on the market, unless it can, as an undertaking engaged in compe-
tition on the merits, rely on grounds relating to the defence of its legitimate interests or on objec-
tive justifications, does not constitute either an ‘effective expropriation’ of such a right or an obli-
gation to grant a licence, but a straightforward restriction of the options available under European 
Union law» (Court of Justice, judgment of 6 December 2012, case C-457/10 P, AstraZeneca AB, 
AstraZeneca plc v. European Commission, EU:C:2012:770, para. 149). 
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summarise the current stance of competition law towards the pharmaceutical pa-
tent system: a not-so-veiled preference towards the enhancement of antitrust scru-
tiny into the realms of patent law as a means to counterbalance the failure of the 
latter to pursue its pro-competitive purposes. Some further thoughts on the possi-
ble grounds of this change of mind-set therefore seem appropriate. 
It has been argued that the strengthened role of competition may find its back-
ground in the developing trend considering the promotion of consumer welfare as 
the primary goal of this field of law3. In particular, such an aspect would be able 
to overcome the other objective of protecting the process (or structure) of compe-
tition itself by employing an approach that is more outcome/effect-oriented 4 , 
namely that is based on the actual economic effects of the considered practices, 
rather than their form. The European Commission’s modernisation initiative has 
                                                        
2 In this regard, see the following passage of the Supreme Court judgment: «patent and anti-
trust policies are both relevant in determining the “scope of the patent monopoly”—and conse-
quently antitrust law immunity—that is conferred by a patent» (F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 
2223 (2013), at 2231). 
3 In this regard R. CAFARI PANICO, Concorrenza, benessere del consumatore e programmi di 
compliance. Nuove tendenze, in AA.VV., Scritti in onore di Giuseppe Tesauro, vol. II, Napoli, 
2014, pp. 1473-1503. More generally, among others, also K.J. CSERES, The Controversies of the 
Consumer Welfare Standard, in The Competition Law Review, 2007, No. 2, pp. 121-173; G. AMA-
TO, F. DENOZZA, H. SCHWEITZER, A. NICITA, D. STALLIBRAS, Tutela della concorrenza e tutela dei 
consumatori. Due fini confliggenti?, in Mercato concorrenza regole, 2009, pp. 381-400; V. 
DASKALOVA, Consumer Welfare in EU Competition Law: What Is It (Not) About?, in The Compe-
tition Law Review, 2015, No. 1, pp. 131-160. 
4 The debate regarding the different objectives of competition law has indeed been a traditional 
topic among scholars, and cannot be here reviewed in its complexity. In a nutshell, two economic 
theories have been proposed, originally in the US, but soon followed also in the EU: the Harvard 
School (e.g. D.F. Turner, P. Areeda), which presumed the illegality of any conduct aimed at ob-
taining, enhancing or exercising market power, and the Chicago School (e.g. R. Bork, R. Posner), 
which instead required an extensive factual inquiry into the effects of a given conduct on consum-
ers to ground a finding of illegality. For further comments see H. HOVENKAMP, The Harvard and 
Chicago Schools and the Dominant Firm, in University of Iowa Legal Studies Research Papers, 
2010, No. 19, available at http://papers.ssrn.com; with regard to the EU legal order, P. MANZINI, 
The Goals of EU Competition Law, in B. CORTESE (ed.), EU Competition Law. Between Public 
and Private Enforcement, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2014, pp. 21-33. 
 140 
indeed supported said view, by increasingly introducing the reference to consumer 
welfare in its guidance papers and notices5, but over time it has also preferred to 
formulate such a concept in the broader terms of positive effects as regards price, 
quality and choice6. EU case law has followed a similar path, albeit generally ex-
pressing in more cautious terms. The Post Danmark I judgment offers a relevant 
example, as the Court of Justice, with regard to Art. 102 TFEU, held that it «ap-
plies, in particular, to the conduct of a dominant undertaking that, through re-
course to methods different from those governing normal competition on the basis 
of the performance of commercial operators, has the effect, to the detriment of 
consumers, of hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition existing in 
the market or the growth of that competition»7. Moving to a case pertaining spe-
cifically to the pharmaceutical industry, the ICA’s decision in Roche-Novartis 
best illustrates such an approach. The Authority evaluated the strategy undertaken 
by the two originator companies in relation to the higher costs incurred by the 
                                                        
5 See Communication from the Commission, Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of 
the Treaty, OJ C 101 of 27 April 2004, pp. 97-118, para. 13, where the objective of (now) Article 
101 TFEU is presented as the protection of competition «as a means of enhancing consumer wel-
fare and ensuring an efficient allocation of the resources»; similarly, Communication from the 
Commission, Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the 
EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ C 45 of 24 February 
2009, pp. 7-20, para. 19. 
6 Particularly instructive is the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1217/2010 of 14 December 
2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
to certain categories of research and development agreements, OJ L 335 of 18 December 2010, pp. 
36-42, para. 10, where is it stated that the benefits towards consumers result in «the introduction of 
new or improved products or services, a quicker launch of those products or services, or the reduc-
tion of prices brought about by new or improved technologies or processes». 
7 Court of Justice, judgment of 27 March 2012, case C-209/10, Post Danmark A/S v. Konkur-
rencerådet, EU:C:2012:172, para. 24 (emphasis added). For an in-depth analysis of the decision, 
see for example S. BARAZZA, Post Danmark; The CJEU Calls for an Effect-Based Assessment of 
Pricing Policies, in Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2013, pp. 466-468; F. 
BIEN, M. KRAH, The Ruling of the CJEU in Post Danmark: Putting an End to Selective Price Cuts 
as an Abuse Under TFEU Article 102 and Turning Towards a More Economic Approach, in Eu-
ropean Competition Law Review, 2012, pp. 482-487. 
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Italian NHS (and, consequently, by the patients as final users) as a result of the al-
leged product differentiation carried out between the registered use of the higher-
priced drug (Lucentis) and the off-label use of the lower-priced drug (Avastin)8. 
A specific inquiry into the reasons underlying this change of policy perspective 
would fall outside the more limited scope of these concluding remarks. Nonethe-
less, insofar as here relevant, it seems that setting the focus on the anticompetitive 
effects from the viewpoint of consumer welfare may be capable of drawing com-
petition law closer to regulation, to the extent that the former pursues the further 
regulatory purpose of defining economic policy objectives in light of what is most 
beneficial to consumers9. As a result, the well-known distinction between regula-
tion, considered as the ex ante activity laying down the rules governing the mar-
kets, and competition, understood as the ex post enforcement of those rules, may 
progressively lose its meaning10. 
The question thus becomes whether antitrust enforcers are indeed properly 
equipped to carry out such tasks, especially in regulated sectors – such as the 
pharmaceutical industry – where governments have established public agencies 
with the precise aim of providing an autonomous control of the market. Again, the 
ICA’s Roche-Novartis decision may serve as a good example to this end. In that 
case, as has been stressed by some commentators11, the antitrust authority ap-
                                                        
8 See supra, Chapter two, Section 2.1.3. 
9 R. CAFARI PANICO, Concorrenza, benessere del consumatore e programmi di compliance, 
cited above, p. 1477-1478. 
10 The literature has extensively commented upon this relationship. Among recent works, see 
J.C. LAGUNA DE PAZ, Regulation and competition law, in European Competition Law Review, 
2012, pp. 77-83; R. PARDOLESI, A. PALMIERI, Sull’interfaccia (problematica) fra regolazione 
economica e disciplina della concorrenza, in Foro italiano, 2012, III, pp. 493-496; N. DUNNE, Be-
tween competition law and regulation: hybridized approaches to market control, in Journal of An-
titrust Enforcement, 2014, pp. 225-269; G. PITRUZZELLA, Concorrenza e regolazione, in federal-
ismi.it, 2014, No. 22, available at www.federalismi.it; J. DREXL, F. DI PORTO (eds.), Competition 
Law as Regulation, Cheltenham-Northampton, 2015. 
11 See S. SILEONI, Caso Avastin/Lucentis. La regolazione del commercio dei farmaci, tra tutela 
della salute e vincoli di spesa pubblica, in IBL Briefing Papers, 2014, No. 141, pp. 9-15, available 
at www.brunoleonimedia.it; J. KILLICK, P. BERGHE, Pharmaceutical Sector: Can Non-Authorised 
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peared to have overcome its statutory limits by reviewing the choices of the regu-
latory agencies (namely, EMA and AIFA) as regards the therapeutic safety of the 
unregistered use of Avastin. The substitutability between registered Lucentis and 
off-label Avastin, which the competent authorities had not endorsed, was in fact 
the ground on which the ICA built its notion of relevant market, and consequently 
its finding of restriction of competition pursuant to Art. 101 TFEU. 
Moreover, this overlap between competition law and regulation calls into ques-
tion whether the former should be more broadly underpinned by socioeconomic 
aims such as ensuring general accessibility to certain goods and services, among 
which pharmaceutical products may well stand in the forefront. 
Such a trend, however, may also be read from another perspective. Indeed, one 
could consider that strong active ingredient patents are gradually losing im-
portance among the key drivers of the pharmaceutical market12. The widespread 
practice of ancillary patents (also known as “weak” patents) granted for chemical 
variants, alternative formulations, and different dosages, which make up a web of 
overlapping claims around the compound patents, is thus leading to frequent chal-
lenges and infringement disputes between brand firms and generic manufacturers 
and, in the long term, to a steady slowdown of innovation and technological pro-
gress. This slowdown also results from the difficulties encountered by patent of-
fices, as they are required to evaluate hundreds of thousands of applications per 
year in a resource-constrained situation13. A similar scenario would thus call for a 
more intense activity by antitrust enforcement authorities, in a sort of inversely 
                                                        
Products be Included in the Relevant Market for the Assessment of an Alleged Anticompetitive 
Conduct? A Short Analysis of the Recent Italian Avastin-Lucentis Decision, in Journal of Europe-
an Competition Law & Practice, 2015, pp. 102-109, at pp. 106-108. 
12 For a more general inquiry see N. TUOMINEN, An IP perspective on defensive patent strate-
gies of the EU pharmaceutical industry, in European Intellectual Property Review, 2012, pp. 541-
551; as regards the US system see A.F. ABBOTT, The evolving IP-antitrust interface in the USA—
the recent gradual weakening of patent rights, in Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, 2014, pp. 363-
388, who particularly criticises the effects of an enhanced antitrust scrutiny. 
13 See C.S. HEMPHILL, B.N. SAMPAT, Weak Patents are a Weak Deterrent: Patent Portfolios, 
Orange Book Listing Standard, and Generic Entry in Pharmaceutical, 2011, p. 22, available at 
www.nber.org. 
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proportional ratio between the two bodies of law. This heightened scrutiny, in par-
ticular, would be directed at assessing the right of patent holders to exercise the 
market power deriving from such weak patents, thus attempting to provide a 
counterbalance to the patent systems’ own deficiencies. Hence, competition law 
would be able to prevent unlawfully obtained exclusionary rights being used to 
the detriment of other competitors, and ultimately of consumers. 
Both these hypotheticals – the growing importance of consumer welfare among 
competition law goals and the shortcomings of the patent systems – should fur-
thermore be viewed in the broader context underlying the pharmaceutical indus-
try, namely referring to human rights considerations such as the access to afforda-
ble treatments and to safe and effective medicines14. As already mentioned, the 
sector in question has a unique nature in the sense that it touches upon further sen-
sitive interests pertaining to all individuals, which requires enforcement authori-
ties and courts, when called upon to strike a proper balance between competition 
and patent laws, to take these considerations into account. 
Irrespective of which of the proposed grounds may be found more convincing, 
legitimate doubts arises as to whether this “interventionist” approach endorsed by 
competition law enforcers could be more effectively undertaken by EU and na-
tional legislators, in particular through specific acts regulating the competitive 
process of bringing generic drugs onto the market while preserving the incentives 
for originator companies to continue innovating. In this regard, the US system 
may provide for a qualified guidance with the already analysed Hatch-Waxman 
Act, which was enacted with the very purpose of favouring generic entry to the 
advantage of patients and insurers. At the same time, however, case law has 
shown the potential anticompetitive abuse of such regulatory framework arising 
especially (but not only) in relation to restrictive agreements concluded between 
originators and generic manufacturers15. 
                                                        
14 See supra, Chapter one, Section 1.3. 
15  In the literature see, among others, K.E. BEHRENDT, The Hatch-Waxman Act: Balancing 
Competing Interests or Survival of the Fittest?, in 57 Food & Drug Law Journal, 2002, pp.247-
271; J. ROSENTHAL, Hatch-Waxman Use or Abuse – Collusive Settlements between Brand-Name 
and Generic Drug Manufacturers, in 17 Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 2002, pp. 317-335; 
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It is indeed a hard task to balance the conflicting interests at stake in an objec-
tive piece of legislation, and whether the legislator will actually embark on such 
an ambitious project of accommodating competition into patent laws remains to 
be seen. In addition, the mentioned difficulties would be even more evident in a 
supranational context such as the EU, where the institutions should attempt to lay 
down regulatory procedures that apply to 28 (or, following Brexit, 27) Member 
States. 
In light of the foregoing, it could be therefore concluded that the more intense 
antitrust scrutiny exercised with regard to pharmaceutical patent strategies appears 
to some extent justified, at least for the time being, on the grounds of maintaining 
a competitive market structure in a sector characterised by a relatively low level 
of competition in innovation (or by substitution). 
By the same token, a more active approach of antitrust law towards pharma-
ceutical patents would serve the further purpose of contributing to patients’ wel-
fare by allowing for a timely entry of generic products, thus triggering substitution 
laws and the related lower costs for NHSs. This consideration, nonetheless, 
should not be taken to extreme consequences illustrated in the ICA’s Roche-
Novartis decision by drifting towards a form of “regulation in disguise”, which 
does not pertain to the ex post enforcement of rules defined by the legislator on 
economic policy grounds. 
                                                        
L.P. NUSSBAUM, J.D. RADICE, Where Do We Go Now? The Hatch-Waxman Act Twenty-Five Years 
Later: Successes, Failures, and Prescriptions for the Future, in 41 Rutgers Law Journal, 2009, pp. 
229-253. 
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